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BORDEN PARKER BOWNE

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Orthodoxy of Bowne

The Washington Conference

Some Leaders of Thought

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(FULL CONTENTS INSIDE)

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
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METHODIST REVIEW

MAY, 1922

BORDEN PARKER BOWNE

FRANCIS J. McCONNELL

Pittsburgh, Pa.

THE best way I can treat the theme assigned me is to set down a series of reminiscences rather than to attempt any formal study of the Bowne philosophy or of the Bowne influence on the Methodist Church. I know that this article will seem to introduce myself with a frequency beyond the limits of modesty, but I am willing in this and some other respects to transgress a few of the dictates of propriety if by doing so I can make real in any degree the character of the great teacher, or give a whiff of the air out of which some present-day Methodist liberties came.

In July, 1894, I was standing in the doorway of the Methodist Book Store in Boston when my old college president and teacher, Dr. James W. Bashford, came in with a man whom I had never seen. Dr. Bashford called to me and said that he wanted to introduce me to Dr. Bowne. Dr. Bowne had been pictured to me as a terror to callow youths, as a sarcastic critic of everybody below the range of positive genius, and I expected to be dismissed with a curt and crisp syllable or two. To my surprise Dr. Bowne asked me kindly of my plans for study, and concluded with the remark, "Before you get through I hope you will come over and set up at least one tabernacle with me." A few months later I joined Dr. Bowne's classes and a little later still found myself well along in a personal acquaintance and friendship with him that deepened till his death. As I look back now I feel that I accepted invitations to walk, and to visit at Longwood, and to see him in his office, that I ought to have declined—for, at least

at the beginning of our acquaintance, I could do nothing but listen. Still, I did listen; and possibly the knowledge that I was an absorbed and appreciative listener may have prompted Dr. Bowne to a lavish generosity of his time with me.

In the fifteen years in which I knew Dr. Bowne I heard him talk his way through from objective idealism to personalism. It will be remembered that when Bowne first published his *Metaphysics* he was an idealist of the type of his old friend and teacher, Hermann Lotze. The idealism was from the first of the objective type rather than of the subjective, or Berkeleyan type, though Bowne of course had unmitigated contempt for crass criticism of Berkeley—like that of Dr. Johnson—which would prove the existence of an external world by kicking stones or pounding on the ground with sticks. Bowne's idealism was directed at an explanation of the reality of the external world—not a denial of that reality—an idealism which maintained that only the active could be real, and that only a spiritual agent could be active. There could be no lump stuff existing in itself and by its own right. The only reals are selves.

From that idealism Bowne advanced more and more to emphasis on the supremacy of the self, or of selves—finite selves and God. Not only did he seek to free the self from bondage to any inert stuff. He also sought to free it from anything impersonal—like categories, or natures, or laws. That is to say, he sought to make a spiritual agent, or rather, The Spiritual Agent, the fundamental reality back of categories and laws. This view Bowne called transcendental empiricism, the empiricism which seeks for truth in the movement of a spiritual agent working through categories, rather than the lower empiricism which too often gets things reversed and misses the self in the study of assumedly self-existent laws. He talked the whole problem out to me as he found his way along, and one day in the summer of 1905, I think it was, he told me that he was going to change the name of his system from objective idealism to personalism. I remarked that I feared that would minimize the idealistic feature, and asked why he did not call it personal idealism. He replied that he wanted the emphasis kept unmistakably on the personal element.

Two other features are characteristic of the Bowne philosophy—the emphasis on the volitional element in theistic belief and the suggested reconciliation of the intuitive and utilitarian positions in ethics. As to the first, be it remembered that long before James and Dewey, Bowne taught pragmatism, but the pragmatism took into account the demands of the whole nature of man. We postulate—not prove—God as the demand of our whole nature, and then note the results in life, as we work on the basis of the postulate. If I may venture such a judgment, the finest passage in Bowne's philosophical writing is the introduction to his *Theism*, in which this substantially pragmatic position is set forth. I think the further, more detailed elaboration of his theistic exposition may have to be recast to clear it of the absolutism of which William James used to complain to him. The other distinctive Bowne contribution is the scheme for the union of the intuitive and utilitarian positions in his *Ethics*, an important factor in ethical progress being also the constantly expanding human ideal which is exalted and enforced by Christianity. I think it was about 1905 that Dr. Bowne began to say that he thought he had sufficiently established his essential philosophic conceptions and that his interests were definitely turning in other directions.

For some years before this, in fact, he had been giving a large share of his attention to matters outside the academic. In the opening stages of his career he had fought valiantly against the materialistic school of evolution. "Evolution," he used to say, "as a theory of origins, is harmless, but as a theory of causes is useless." To hold fast to the good in evolution and to fight off the useless took a large part of his effort during all the earlier years of his professional life. By 1890 that battle had been fought through. For ten years, from about 1895 to 1905, he turned his strength to the defense of the newer methods of biblical study in our theological schools—and this battle was on when he made the remark to me about the more practical questions in which he was interested. The biblical question became acute for Methodism in the case of Prof. H. G. Mitchell of Boston University. The Board of Bishops had in those days the power to confirm theological professors. After a prolonged scuffle between the contending

parties the bishops confirmed Mitchell in 1900, but declined or failed to do so in 1905. Two attempts were made after 1905 to bring Mitchell to trial in his own Conference. I was his counsel during both attempts at trial, and saw things from the inside. What changes may have taken place in Dr. Mitchell's mind after he was dismissed from Boston University I do not know, but during the time he was under fire it was absurd to call him a heretic. He had not much interest in abstract theology, but was pre-eminently a scientific searcher for facts—thoroughly devoted to his church—one of the two or three men I have known whom I think of as saints. The views that he held at the time of the attacks on him would now be called conservative. Bowne saw clearly their essentially conservative character and from the first entered the lists in Mitchell's defense. The final result of the conflict was to leave Bowne with an undying contempt for ecclesiastical officialism. Mitchell's fault was the fundamental fault of the prophet—telling the truth as he saw it. Moreover, he assumed that his scholars would examine his statements on their own account and would come to conclusions of their own. He did not know how to make a diplomatic statement. For this downright openness and honesty Bowne had unqualified admiration. I do not suppose that Dr. Bowne was particularly concerned about the details of biblical scientific study. He himself was one of the most conservative scholars I have ever known as to the divinity of Christ, for example, believing that Christ came into this world after actual preexistence as the Son of God. In technical terms he held to a stiff kenotic Christology. In the details of criticism he was not concerned, insisting, however, upon two things—the right of the scholar to speak, and the duty of biblical students to be hospitable toward, at least provisionally, whatever the scientific processes might seem to have established as fact.

To return to the contempt for officialism. Poor Rabbi Mitchell was the target of the denunciatory eloquence of board secretaries, official editors and bishops, many of whom had never read a line of what he had written. After Bowne had gone to a missionary convention and had heard a missionary leader talk fifty-eight minutes on Mitchell and two on missions; after he had

heard a home board secretary publicly call Mitchell a traitor to the Church; after he had heard the most unbridled invective from bishops, he felt called on to take a hand to save Methodist scholarship from officialism. Of course his mistake was that all officials came to look pretty much alike to him; but the Mitchell crisis did not make for closeness of discrimination. Moreover, the officials who sympathized with Mitchell were keeping so quiet that there was no way, except private conversation, of distinguishing them from the heresy hunters. Many were of the "I'm-with-you-but-don't-use-my-name" brand. So Bowne went after officials as a class. After he had passed judgment on the utterances of some of them, their efficiency as public prosecutors was thenceforward considerably damaged. A General Conference officer, leading the anti-Mitchell group, once told a preachers' meeting that the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch had been settled for him by a trip through the Red Sea; as he had looked off toward the purple mountain peaks to the east, the conviction had been born in his soul that Moses had written the books that bear his name. This was going quite far even for the Mitchell opponents, and when they began to say that their leader would better use another argument he denied that he had ever said anything about the effect of the Red Sea trip on his biblical convictions. But he said just what I have reported. I was there and heard it, although I believe the brother was entirely sincere in his denial. He was an enthusiastic orator, in the ecstasy of one of those emotional climaxes in which the speech organs function automatically. Bowne remarked: "He should have been forthwith arrested for intellectual indecent exposure." It is only fair to say that this particular official was magnanimous enough to say some years after, when Bowne was making one of his splendid stands on behalf of the divinity of Christ, that he had lived long enough to thank God for Borden P. Bowne.

I don't believe that anything in Swift's *Tale of a Tub*—a favorite classic of Bowne's, by the way—is more caustic than some of the things Bowne said about the Board of Bishops after the dismissal of Mitchell. If Bishop Edward G. Andrews could say to me—as he did—that the bishops had not met the Mitchell

issue "with manliness" I would better leave to the reader's imagination what Bowne said. Bowne must not be misunderstood in all this. He was no disgruntled place-seeker, venting spite in disappointment. He was not a cynic uttering bitterness for the sheer mordant pleasure of it. He was a believer in his church and jealous for her welfare. The Mitchell issue was confused as it reached the Board of Bishops; some of the bishops friendly to Mitchell—the Board stood nearly half and half in the ballot—were convinced that technically the law compelled them to an adverse vote; and the Board was acting under a wretched unit rule which was repealed by a change in the Discipline in 1908. So that some qualifying considerations are to be kept in mind as we think of the Bowne excoriations. With the most charitable construction possible of the bishops' handling of the Mitchell case, however, let us not forget that Bowne was right on the dangers of officialism to religious liberty. We do not need to accept Bowne's definition of ecclesiastical officialism as "imbecility spiced with knavery," to recognize the peril against which he fought. I believe in an episcopacy with strict limitations, but I am as sure as I can be of anything that Bowne was right in his contention that a Board of Bishops is a poor instrument for the determination of doctrinal questions. An official group is likely to ask, not "What is the truth?" but "How does this meet the official standards?" Bowne recovered a measure of friendliness toward the Board after the General Conference of 1908 had taken doctrinal matters like the Mitchell case out of the Board's control. I do not wish to leave the impression that bishops were the only objects of Bowne's attentions. Bishops, secretaries, presiding elders, ecclesiastical editors—all were to him "unprofitable works of darkness." He once asked me if I could cite an instance of an official ecclesiastical editor's being bold, except when he was safe. I think Dr. Bowne was a little severe in this. I have always felt that I might find such an instance—if I had time.

Another sphere in which Bowne wrought as a liberating influence was that of the clarification of thought about personal religious experience. With the facts of religious experience Bowne of course had no quarrel. He was convinced, however,

after thirty years of dealing with young people in college, that much Methodist exposition of religious experience was misleading to the point of harmfulness. The danger is always that uninstructed minds will try to experience, not religion, but a figure of speech, or a theological doctrine. To use his own illustration, a brother rises in a prayer meeting and says, "The devil told me not to come to the meeting this evening." Are we to infer, asked Bowne, that the brother has had an infernal interview? Not at all. The fact is simply that the brother felt disinclined to come. Take the same principle and apply it to higher phases of religious experience. Even in dealing with the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit, we find that believers mix the experience of assurance, or of faith, or of determination to live righteously, with doctrine. The psychological fact is what it is. The doctrine as a doctrine has to be judged by quite other than psychological tests. In that classic experience which has meant so much for Methodism, John Wesley's heart was "strangely warmed." What a mass of doctrine has been jammed into that experience! One interpreter insists that then John Wesley was converted, leaving us to infer that through those earlier years when Wesley wrought in all good conscience for his Lord he was not converted. Another interpreter tells us that the Wesley experience was the witness to entire sanctification. If it was, it failed to witness to Wesley himself, for there is no record that Wesley ever claimed entire sanctification. The Bowne attitude was to take the experience just as Wesley described it—a heart strangely warmed—and to judge it by what came out of it in the enlargement of Wesley's own life and in his influence on the life of the world. The test of all "experiences" must be in their fruit—the inner fruit of the believer's own life and the outer fruit of effect on others. There must be an intellectual and moral and volitional effect for good in an experience before Bowne would give it any spiritual significance. It was that insistence upon the content of experience that caused William James—a devoted friend of Bowne—to call Bowne a rationalist, and to insist that he, James, was more of a Methodist than Bowne. James, able though he was, was too prone to estimate the value of varieties of religious experience by the intensity of

their thrills. Bowne did not object to thrills, but he wanted ethical and spiritual content above all. He judged visions by what they led to. Saint Paul, he said, may have had a fit on the road to Damascus, but it was the only known fit to be followed by such mighty consequences. Thus he came to insist that the witness of the Spirit in a human life is to be judged by the inner assurance and peace on the one side and by the increasing worthwhileness of the life on the other, the conviction that we are on God's side and God is on our side working out with larger and larger expression of helpful good will to our fellows. For those spiritually overbearing brethren who seek to impose their will on their fellows in the name of inner vision, without objective helpfulness, he had nothing but resentment. His scorn was unbounded for those who thrust their own doctrinal views, or rules of conduct, on others in the name of their own religious experience. "If you can't believe in God the Father, and his Son our Lord, and the Blessed Spirit, without also believing that the whale actually swallowed Jonah," I heard him say to a group of conservative preachers, "by all means hold fast to the literalness of the narrative." Whereat the audience, which, to use his own words describing another scene, "had for a long time been effervescent, became ebullient and boiled over" in shouts of applause. Then Bowne added, "But don't ask me to do so."

Through articles in *Zion's Herald*, the independence and courage of whose editor, Charles Parkhurst, Dr. Bowne thoroughly respected, and through a series of little monographs Bowne fought sturdily for the right of the Methodist to follow his Lord in his own way—once the Lord had been accepted as Companion and Friend and Saviour. He would have the whole realm of religious life open to honest and sincere inquiry. He would have it kept free from the makers of inquisitorial and fussy rules like the amusement clause. Bowne had as little interest in so-called worldly pleasures as any human being I have ever known. I don't think I ever saw him speechless in sheer impotence to find words to express his feeling except once. That was when a noted educator, who shall be nameless here, referred to modern dancing as one of the race's supreme achievements in the realm of æsthetic.

To attempt to lay down rules about pleasures in a Book of Discipline, however, seemed to him a long, long descent from the high wisdom of Wesley's advice to take only those diversions which can be taken in the name of the Lord Jesus. To those who insisted on making arguments for the retention of the amusement clause he used to say that it was possible to make an argument for anything, if you could make an argument for that.

Bowne ruled his own life like a Spartan. He was simple in all his tastes—except that he had a discerning fondness for pictures and rugs and furniture of high artistic quality. What Wesley called softness and needless self-indulgence found no part in his daily program. He himself worked a longer day than he would have asked anyone else to work. The hours he allowed himself for recreation were very few and the recreation was mostly walking. Anything of any sort that would have interfered with his keeping "fit" was cast out. Keeping fit was his idea of Christian self-control. He imposed his rules himself, however. Let anyone else suggest rules and he became to Bowne as a heathen man and a publican. His rejection of amusement clauses did not mean a hankering for amusements.

The outspokenness of Bowne was of that refreshing breeziness which cleared the air for those in doubt, but of that infuriating vigor also which provoked an almost constant chorus of critical outcry. In 1904 he was brought to trial before his Conference—the New York East—for heresy. I have always felt that this was a rank indignity. Bowne's fault, like Mitchell's, was in saying squarely and openly what scores and hundreds of other men felt to be the truth. It would be easy, I know, to take the trial episode too seriously. There never was the slightest danger of a conviction, for in any fair showing the "regularity" of a thinker who made place for a community of persons in the Godhead—for a true incarnation of the Son of God; for miracles as gracious signs of divine favor setting aside the ordinary law to reveal an extraordinary purpose—was certain to stand out unmistakably. Strictly speaking, Bowne was far more orthodox than the majority of those who attacked him. One good bishop of those days used to lay mighty stress on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

Bowne was in the audience once when that bishop declared his belief in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as teaching the "every-where-ness" of God—a definition which any heathen who believed in God at all might accept. When the question of here-ay was raised Bowne yielded to the contention of his presiding elder, Dr. C. S. Wing, that the case might as well be tried out to get a charter of liberty for some of the younger men who were in danger of being intimidated by bishops and secretaries and presiding elders for saying what Bowne was saying. How strange it all seems now! Please remember that the times were different then. The bishop who was at first expected to preside at the Bowne trial naïvely declared that he would see the complainant bringing the charges and help him put them in better shape! The good bishop saw nothing wrong in that. Even if, however, any bishop had helped formulate the charges nothing important could have been established against Bowne.

I have said that there came a time in Dr. Bowne's life when his interests ceased to be primarily philosophical, specialist in high philosophy though he was. Bowne was one of the few specialists, by the way, who can see their own specialty in its relation to other fields. He would advise his postgraduate students, as he did me, to balance philosophy with something more practical. At the same period that a student would be working through Green's *Introduction to Hume*, Bowne would have him digging at some of the hardest problems in economics. Bowne himself laid no claim to specialized knowledge in economics, but he believed in the excellence of the work of Alfred Marshall of Cambridge, for example, and would send all his postgraduate students through Marshall. Marshall's interests, it will be remembered, are broadly humanitarian, of the John Stuart Mill pattern. In his last book, *Industry and Trade*, Marshall declares that his sympathies have been socialistic since Mill's *Fortnightly Review* articles in 1879—his sympathies, but not his methods. Bowne felt that Marshall combined a warm heart with a cool head. For Bowne the golden rule was always absolute as a disposition, but often valueless as a guide as to what to do in a concrete situation. I do not know how Bowne would have felt about many of the

social questions now up for debate. Quite likely he would declare that most of the disputants emit more heat than light. For sociology as a study by itself he had little patience, insisting that real social advance comes through the study of economics and politics and the social application of the natural sciences. We must not forget that Bowne died twelve years ago and much water has flowed under the bridge since he left us. I think a good many of his socially conservative friends are inclined to believe that Bowne would have been a mighty bulwark of the established order, financial and industrial, if he had been spared through the present days. It may be so, but I know that though Bowne voted for McKinley in 1896 he did so with the avowal that the gold-standard arguments as advanced during the campaign were worthless to the point of humiliation; that while some Goliaths of educational philistinism, benefiting by capitalistic connections, were "deploring" and "repudiating" the Sinclair stockyard revelations in Chicago, Bowne was declaring the righteousness of Roosevelt's following up the revelations with drastic recommendations; that Bowne had for years upheld the cause of woman's suffrage before it became popular in America; that he protested against any schemes for the uplift of the Negro that would abate by one jot the Negro's manhood rights; that he flamed out always against any violation of human rights anywhere. His attitude toward social progress has been misjudged because of his strictures against the radicals who would settle everything by moral appeal without dealing with concrete difficulties. He would have specific evils dealt with by specific methods. He told me more than once that he personally would like nothing better than to be editor of a newspaper with enough financial independence to be able to tell the truth about political and other "machines." "Somebody ought to run amuck among them," he said. Get at the facts, was his word. Radical social oratory he abhorred. Of course nothing can be worse than such oratory, except possibly socially conservative oratory.

Bowne's trip around the world in 1905 was a turning point in his thought life. Before that he had looked upon the problem of the so-called backward races in somewhat academic fashion.

The least satisfactory piece of writing which Bowne ever did, it seems to me, is an article twenty years ago on "Aberrant Moralizers" in which he took the ground that the backward races would have to be transformed or perish as world nuisances. When he started on that trip around the world I feared that he would be horrified by the spectacle of heathenism into a strenuous consciousness of Anglo-Saxon superiority. The trip worked the other way. He was indeed distressed by what he saw. Once in India he went to a multitudinously attended religious festival and was literally sickened by the reek of the goats' blood and the stench of the sweating crowds. Out of the round-the-world trip, however, came not merely a deep compassion for the Oriental peoples, but what is better, a deep respect for them—for China most of all. I heard him say a few weeks before he died that if he had his life to live over again he would teach in China. Instead of boasting of Anglo-Saxonism he declared that the Anglo-Saxon was only a pioneer race in the movement toward civilization, "a rough instrument to clear the way." "God has vast reservoirs of peoples of color which he will one day tap for the spread of Christianity." When he said that, I asked what he thought the effect on Christianity would be if the yellow races should overrun the world, as did the barbarians the Roman Empire. Is there not enough vitality in twentieth-century Christianity to Christianize such a mass? Bowne thought that in such event the Christian fire might smolder a long while, but would finally burst into redeeming blaze. "Such an overrunning never will happen," he said, "but it might be a good thing." He felt that the relation of the so-called Christian nations to China especially had been a positive horror. He wrote in *Zion's Herald* that the recollection that the Englishman who negotiated the treaty which fastened opium on China was the author of "In the Cross of Christ I Glory" ought to cause an actual shudder. Once in India he stopped with an American who thought it necessary during Bowne's stay to whip an Indian servant—the servant being a full-grown man. Bowne gathered up bag and baggage and moved out, telling emphatically why he went. I once aroused the ire of an American long resident in India by telling this story. "It is a slander," he said. "We never

really hurt our servants. I never have done anything more than switch them a little." As if Bowne were judging the indignity done the Indian by the amount of physical pain in the whipping! All this, however, is ancient history. The days of foreigners' whipping servants in India are about over.

An article like this would hardly be complete without some word as to Bowne in the classroom. His method was to lecture and to judge the progress of the student by frequent written quizzes. The student could come or not, just as he pleased. He could take notes or not, as he pleased. Pupils were seldom or never called on to recite. Everything depended on the answers on the quiz papers. The quiz questions aimed at testing the powers of the students to think for themselves. Many a time I used to look over the questions on examination day with a sinking feeling at first glance that I had never heard anything at all bearing on them. They were really new problems set for the pupils' solution.

The method of presenting the subject matter was to state it as clearly as might be, with most copious illustration, and then let the student make what he could of it. After going all reasonable lengths to make himself understood Bowne left the results with the minds of the students. An ecclesiastical editor once complained to Bowne that he wished he would state the more radical doctrines so that they would not be noticed! The advice was not followed in the classroom. It was assumed that whoever listened to Bowne listened at his own risk. "It is hard on some bottles," said Bowne one day when some students had been complaining about losing their faith. "But," he added, "it is good for the bottles that can stand it." One of his pet aversions was the "weak brother." He used to say that if it were a matter of abstention from meats he would abstain from meats for a weak brother as long as the world might stand, but he would not weaken his teaching for a weak brother. He would not allow anybody to interfere one iota in his statement of his conception of the truth. Be it said to the glory of Boston University that no suggestion of limiting his freedom ever came from president or trustees. Boston University broke the Methodist path for the newer biblical methods through the teaching of Dr. Mitchell, and the path for the newer

views of religion and religious experience through the teaching of Dr. Bowne. It does not detract from the glory of the university that other of our schools were presenting the same ideas. The difference was that Boston was treating them out loud and in the open, and was taking the risks. Bowne thought that a great and conclusive statement of the correct attitude of theological faculties toward debatable theological questions had been made by Dr. W. F. Warren, president of Boston University, in the *METHODIST REVIEW* during the Mitchell controversy. I do not suppose that Dr. Warren altogether accepted the Mitchell point of view, but his demolition of those who protest against such teaching seemed to Bowne to be complete. Dr. Warren maintained that all such problems as Mitchell was raising had to be squarely faced in theological schools and faced, too, in their fullest and most favorable exposition, if the schools were to produce leaders. Dr. Warren had a harder battle to fight for theological freedom than any other Methodist university president in our day. Bowne and Mitchell were for years constantly under criticism; they would never think of compromising, or of softening down their style, or of turning aside to non-debatable themes. Neither of them ever put into port to escape a storm. Dr. Warren must have felt the burden most grievously at some moments of crisis. A man of peace, he had to stand back of two of the most uncompromising fighters—once they were attacked—in the history of theological controversy. He stood, however, and gave ample reason for the belief of many of us that, in matters that universities really should exist for, he was the greatest president Methodism has ever had.

In his later days Bowne spoke much of his large hopes for the State universities. He had a premonition that the intellectual conflict for the future is to be so serious that only the best trained men can get anything done, and that the resources of the State will have to be put back of the highest education. Bowne was, of course, an ardent defender of denominational schools as making possible within purposely limited fields a fine, high grade of scholastic excellence. He refused calls to some of the largest non-denominational schools in the country, but he had not much patience with the argument that young people were sure to lose their

faith at State universities. Through fifteen years I have repeatedly thought of his point of view as I have been meeting students of State universities in personal conference. There is no better type of faith produced than that which is developed in an atmosphere of complete freedom, where the student hears even extreme puttings of scientific theories thrown out without regard to their effect on faith, and science is met by the strongest philosophic reasoning possible. He felt that the highest religious leadership should be placed at the greatest student centers. "Then," he broke out, "if students can't help losing their faith, they would better keep it under glass." Back in my days at Boston University there was not a man in any of the important chairs—I am thinking of Warren, Bowne, Mitchell, Sheldon, and Buell—who had not studied theories which seemed at the time dangerous, and studied in the land where they were most dangerous and from the men who taught them most dangerously. Perhaps this is the reason why the men graduated from Boston University have on the whole been so soundly conservative. They have been introduced to apparently revolutionary theories by men who have known how fearlessly to seize the good in such theories and throw the rest away.

Bowne was a prodigious worker. For the most part he himself read the quiz papers which his students handed in—an enormous task. In addition he wrote almost incessantly. Composition was rather a slow process with him, but he wrote without mental fatigue. He could write as long as his pen-wagging muscles could stand it. In the last five years of his life he dictated very largely. Dictated English is likely to be loose and badly proportioned. Not so with Bowne. His dictated English is if anything too tightly compressed. The last book—*Kant and Spencer*—was dictated throughout.

Some students of Bowne have thought of him as having the philosopher's traditional lack of interest in practical everyday matters. I do not share this opinion. He was a keen observer of the most ordinary affairs. At one time in his early life he had had much to do with teaming. He always liked to notice if a passing wagon was well loaded. Farming and gardening—espe-

cially rose-gardening—he understood with unusual thoroughness. His judgment of the fitness of men, too, for practical tasks was usually sound. By the way, it was a joy to see the quickness with which he could let the wind out of swollen eulogies and recommendations of men. He and I together once heard a good layman making a speech of recommendation urging a friend's fitness for an administrative post. Much high praise might have been spoken for the candidate, but what the layman actually said was: "I favor So-and-So because he is a fine judge of men. He has been around in the world a great deal, and is socially attractive, a wonderful story-teller." Bowne turned to me and said: "All those recommendations could be uttered in favor of the devil. He is a good judge of men. We have it on high authority that he has been around a great deal, and no doubt, if he were put to it, he could tell a number of capital stories."

I fear that this article will leave the impression of a sardonic and biting temper of criticism as the chief mark of the Bowne quality of mind. This would not be just, but the rarer, richer qualities had to be met in intimate personal contact and cannot be described. Moreover, the men who saw this side know that the great teacher would not have them speak of it. May I say, though, that I never knew a finer, purer soul. I never heard him say anything coarse—even minor vulgarities of speech disgusted him; I never heard him say anything mean; I never heard him say anything at bottom cynical. His personal religious life was intense. On at least one occasion, long after I had gone out into the ministry, he asked me the most searching questions about my personal religious experience I have ever been asked. I have heard him pray for his friends—including those in the skies—with such wistful kindness that his immense capacity for friendship stood forth as a surpassing revelation.

I wish he could have been spared a few years longer. He used to complain that he had never had time to enjoy even the glories of nature. The dark side of nature and of life weighed heavily on him, though he never doubted the goodness of the God of Christ. He used, in some moods, especially when he heard of ill fortune meeting any of his friends, to apply to himself the

words of Charlotte Corday—that she was not so constructed as to be able to be happy in a world like ours. Yet he wished for time to look at the world with a little more leisurely gaze. One March day as we walked in Longwood a drop of sap fell from a tree and splashed upon his hand. I shall never forget the eagerness with which he hailed this token of coming spring. “What do you want to see?” I once asked him as he talked of his wish for a few years of leisure. “Oh,” he replied, “just the coming and going of the seasons, dawn and sunset, night and the stars. I shall be grieved if I have to leave this world without a chance for a good long look at all these.” Almost the last time I saw him was at the home of one of his relatives in Brooklyn. A severe attack of grippe had weakened him and he confessed to me some slight apprehension as to his heart—“his pump,” as he called it. We talked three hours and finally I started to the door. He followed me out upon the porch, and said: “Well, we have started a number of things that we haven’t been able to talk out. If I don’t see you again we’ll meet some day in some fairer land where we shall have a little more light on these questions. Then we’ll take up our talk and finish it.” I got a fleeting glimpse of him once after that, but I like to think of him as standing on that Brooklyn porch looking toward “a fairer land where there is a little more light.”

PRESENT STATUS OF THE CONFLICT OF FAITH

BORDEN PARKER BOWNE

Died, 1910

THERE are two tendencies in human life, the lower animal and selfish tendency, and the higher moral and spiritual tendency. These appear throughout human history and in the life of every individual. The natural—that is, the animal—man tends to live on the sensuous and selfish plane, while the higher spiritual man seeks to find in life a loftier significance and to make a place for a spiritual existence. The conflict between these two tendencies has played a great part in human life and history, and has revealed itself abundantly in literature. This is what I mean by the conflict of faith. It is not limited to the Christian religion alone, nor even to religion in general, but it is rather an aspect of human life which reveals itself everywhere.

Man's effort for the spiritual view in life has had varying fortunes, but when we view it historically we see that there is progress. The spiritual conception has to adjust itself to the growing life of man and also to resist the tendencies from the lower side of human nature. In this way the struggle is necessarily one of slow progress. Moral and religious conceptions adjust themselves to the current thought and science of the time, and when there is not a properly developed intellectual life those higher views fall behind the developing intellect and thus are made to seem intellectually inferior. A good part of the so-called conflict of religion and science arises in this way. In addition, there is a tendency, already referred to, of the natural man to rest in the lower life and to form an appropriate philosophy for his justification. Slowly, however, the spiritual movement progresses. The literature of the conflict is immense. The principles, however, are few, and the problems are easily understood. Confusion is the chief source of our intellectual difficulties in the matter, and a lack of moral development is the source of our satisfaction with the lower and earthly conceptions. Our aim in this paper is to give results rather than argumentative details.

GAINS IN THE DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE

The lower sense life seems to need no vindication, but appears to be sufficient unto itself. Not so with the higher life of the spirit. The objects with which it deals cannot be sensuously presented, and they are often not obvious to the sensuously minded man. Hence it is easy to object to these unpicturable conceptions of the spiritual understanding that they are not proper objects of knowledge. In this way the lower view has commonly sought to justify itself by a doctrine of knowledge which in one way or another rules out any possibility of knowledge in the higher realm. This doctrine may be that of the old-fashioned sensationalism which frankly limits us to the animal range, or that of a more frank agnosticism which denies the possibility of any true knowledge of essential reality. Of course if these views can be made out, then the higher aspirations of man are intellectually baseless and must be reckoned as illusions and dreams. We consider the two doctrines in their order.

Empiricism of the sensational type is the first. According to this doctrine, sensations are the true originals of knowledge and all else is derived from them by their combination. According to Hume, there are two classes of ideas, vivid impressions and faint ones. The former are the impressions we receive through the outward senses. They give us all the reality of which we can know anything. The faint impressions are copies of recollections of the vivid, and their value consists entirely in the accuracy with which they report vivid impressions. Anything beyond these impressions are illusions and must be ruled out as such. If there seems to be anything more, it is due to the association of impressions in a kind of psychological chemistry, whereby the elements are united into curious mental compounds, yet such as never to get beyond their original sensuous character. This view is manifestly destructive to all of our higher faiths. In case of any idea which may present itself we test it by asking for its original, that is, for the impression from which it comes. If no such impression can be shown, then the idea must be rejected. The destructive effect of this upon all spiritual conceptions is

manifest. Let us ask concerning virtue, What is it? Is it a sense impression? Then it must be an odor, a color, a pressure, or some such thing. If it is not any such thing, then it is baseless. Religious ideas can be disposed of in the same way. God and the soul must be either impressions or else must be viewed as baseless. They are not impressions; hence they are baseless. The doctrine also leads with equal directness to the overthrow of all reason and science, for the fundamental ideas of reason, such as unity, causality, identity, and even the principles of mathematics, belong to the unpicturable conceptions of the understanding. They are not impressions or copies of impressions; hence they, too, are baseless. Thus science disappears as well as religion, reason as well as faith.

We have here the ground for the great hostility to the sensational philosophy on the part of high-minded men in general. Probably no more disastrous view was ever broached. An atheist might make a shift to maintain some ideas of conscience, moral worth, and dignity, and might also insist upon the distinctions between the noble and the base, the pure and the impure, the just and the unjust by falling back upon some supposed insight into the eternal difference of these things; but the sensationalist with his chemistry of association removes all these distinctions and leaves us nothing in humanity of which to be proud, reduces human nature to its selfish animal elements, and tells us that this is all. This has rightly been called a dirt philosophy, because it recognizes nothing but the lowest elements of humanity. All of our higher dreams vanish as having been at last found out.

This view would have been destructive if accepted and logically carried out. But in itself it was exceedingly superficial, and would seem to have been more a matter of disposition than of real thinking. At all events it was definitely set aside by Kant, who showed the self-destructive and superficial character of the view. Since Kant's time this doctrine has indeed lived along as a product of disposition, but it has had no intellectual standing. With Kant, however, unfaith, so far as it was based on the doctrine of knowledge, took another form. The crass sensationalism of the earlier time was displaced by a doctrine of agnosticism, the

claim that the mind by its very nature is shut up within the circle of phenomena and is incapable of reaching any true knowledge. In the earlier view sensations were all that could be known. In the latter view there is a great world of mystery which indeed exists, but which is entirely inaccessible to us. This gives us our modern doctrine of phenomenalism. We know only appearances, not realities; only phenomena, not things-in-themselves. This view for a time did good service in the cause of unfaith. Whenever any religious doctrine was mentioned which anyone chanced to dislike, it was very easy to dismiss it by saying that we could know nothing whatever of the things that lie beyond our ordinary experience, and that it was therefore not worth while to dream about them, as that could only lead to further illusion and very possibly to interference with our present life. In more recent times this view has especially been insisted upon by Herbert Spencer, who remands the whole subject of religion to the world of mystery, and commands us to content ourselves with observing the facts of experience without troubling ourselves about anything more.

This view in its extreme form is scarcely more consistent than the previous sensationalism. It was in the highest degree inconsistent in its reasoning, and also in its results. The notion that we know only phenomena was founded largely on the experiences of vision. Visual experience makes us acquainted with the distinction between things as they appear and things as they are. A sphere never looks like a sphere, a cube seen in perspective never looks like a cube. The parallel lines of the railroad track seem to converge, and in a visual world things are never or rarely what they seem. This makes it possible for us to distinguish between appearance and reality. It then becomes easy to generalize this experience and to conclude that we know only appearances and that the truly real does not admit of knowledge. But this generalization is hasty. It overlooks the fact that even in a visual world we continually rectify false appearances due to perspective by substituting geometrical measures and relations for our visual objects. Thus the house looks small at a distance, but we never take the house as it appears for the house, but the house as it is measured, so many feet on the ground and so many feet

high. The converging parallels of perspective we rectify in the same way, and so throughout the field of optical illusion. The appearances do not mislead, and the appearances are not what we know. The objects of knowledge are the things themselves as geometrically located, defined, and measured. When we bear this fact in mind we see that the easy inference from optical illusion to the general doctrine of a knowledge only of appearances is very weak, and needs to be reinforced by much more solid considerations than have ever been advanced for it. The doctrine further overlooks the fact that the great mass of our knowledge is not one of appearances at all, but one of causes; and the knowledge of causes is never anything that can be presented to the senses, but one which can be defined only in terms of relation under the unpicturable categories of the understanding. We ask ourselves how causes look, and then conclude that things which do not look cannot be known, but in the case of our own selves we see the mistake of this view. How does a soul look? It does not look. We have no sensuous intuition or spatial picture of ourselves. We experience ourselves in immediate consciousness, and we know ourselves in this way through our various activities. We do not know any apparent self, for there is no apparent self; but we know ourselves as thinking, feeling, willing thus and thus. Similarly with all knowledge of causation; we know causes through their effects and the order of their activities. This is purely a thought problem and not one which can be solved by eyesight of whatever grade of keenness. Had this fact, that we know causes through their effects, been duly observed, a very considerable part of modern agnosticism would have been seen in its baselessness.

Further moving along the same line, we readily see that no doctrine of agnosticism literally taken can ever be maintained, for when we go behind experience for its explanation it is manifest that we can say nothing unless we reach some intelligible cause standing in intelligible relations to the facts of experience itself. Hence an unrelated absolute in no causal relation to the world is a fiction of abstraction which cannot be used in any rational speculation. Equally an unknowable reality which

stands in no assignable relation to the order of the world, so that it would in some measure be defined and known through its effects, is equally worthless and equally inaffirmable. This whole family of unknowables then must be ruled out as fictions of abstraction and not accepted as possible existences of any kind. And finally, carrying the thought to its limit, we must declare that the conception of such a thing is distinctly empty. It has no content, it is only a phrase to which there is no corresponding conception, a mere verbal counter to which no significance can be given. As a result of these considerations the old-fashioned agnosticism may be looked upon as out of date, at least in expert circles. The net result of the Kantian criticism in this field has been to restrain the confident dogmatism of the pre-critical period. Positive and negative dogmatism alike have been greatly weakened, so that the way of rational faith is open. We do not expect so much from mere speculation to-day as formerly. We agree that we know only in part, but criticism has done the invaluable negative service of reducing the negative arguments in this view to their native nothingness. We see that thought roots in life rather than in speculation. We recognize the primacy of the practical reason. Kant did not succeed in limiting thought to the sphere of sense phenomena, but he did succeed in showing what a large element of relativity there is in our thinking and in showing how unwarranted the old-fashioned dogmatism is in any field of real knowledge. We may say that he showed that knowledge must be largely limited to the field of present experience, but he also showed that we have no right to make that experience all or final. It is really only the secondary revelation of being in our own consciousness, and we cannot pretend that it exhausts the possibilities of consciousness. There is, then, left all about us the possibility of unlimited extension of consciousness, either in our own future life or now in other orders of spiritual existence. This does not, indeed, amount to any positive demonstration, but it is of value as removing the limits of the ancient negative dogmatism which measured possibility by the present order, and mistook its own habits of thinking for objective and eternal laws of thought. By breaking down this dogmatism Kant has made it

possible for us to trust our human instincts again, our higher spiritual instincts as well as the lower animal ones. He has made it possible for us to breathe more freely in the presence of the order of nature; and, while he has thrown doubt upon many old supposed demonstrations, he has decisively set aside the whole set of ancient refutations of faith. Man is now seen to be not merely a speculative intelligence, but a living will with practical necessities, with instincts that are the outcome of life and which may well be trusted not to lead us astray.

Thus in the realm of knowledge the conflict of faith with unfaith is very strongly inclined toward the side of faith. The sensational views of man which were so apt to issue in animalism and selfishness have no longer any philosophical standing, and the recent agnosticism of the Spencerian system may be looked upon as obsolete. Instead of it we have, as already said, the way for rational belief left open. The primacy of the practical reason is assured. The weakness of the speculative reason, when it comes under experience and its indications, is clearly seen. Meanwhile life has the field, and it is permitted to see visions and to dream dreams, to proceed pragmatically, to accept those principles which are rooted in life as the product of life, as the principles which alone give life any meaning or save it from hideous collapse.

THEISM

There is a general agreement among thinkers in affirming an invisible being on whom the world and ourselves depend. This belief springs up spontaneously in human life and grows with the growth of intelligence. It is not primarily the outcome of reflective speculation, but probably has its deepest roots in the religious nature itself. This side of our being is the great source of our faith in God.

But this belief also, however spontaneous it may be in its origin, has to submit itself to the general test of intelligence. Accordingly, when we find ourselves in possession of it, we try after a while to test it and give reasons for it. In this way we reach the so-called arguments for God's existence.

In the great human struggle for a spiritual view of life vast

debate has raged around this question. Of course persons who had any grudge against religion have contended that there is no proof of the existence of God, but apart from this the traditional arguments have commonly been so implicated with bad reasoning or with obsolete science that they have been made the subject of quite a little criticism, much of which has been justified. Gradually, however, the matter is clearing up, and now we are in a position to see how the subject really stands and to see that there has been great progress in this field. We have come better to understand ourselves and our arguments, and to put them in ways better adjusted to present knowledge. When all these things are taken into account we can fairly say that the belief in God was never better founded than it is to-day. In a complex life like ours the reasons for believing are often too subtle and elusive to admit of exact expression, and when philosophy is undeveloped and knowledge is vague we often give poor reasons for good beliefs. This has largely been the case in the arguments for the divine existence, but we are now in a position to clear up the matter and to establish the essentials of the argument and to see it in its force.

A certain naïve oversight has thrust itself into the popular discussion of this subject almost from the beginning. It has been assumed somehow or other that nature is an existing ontological system which produces the whole series of visible effects about us, and it has been tacitly thought that this nature is something self-running at present and very possibly self-existent. At least we must not affirm anything beyond nature until we have exhausted all the resources of nature and natural causes. The result of this assumption has been that atheism has practically been excused from the necessity of proving its own sufficiency, and has virtually devoted all its strength to picking flaws in the theistic argument. There has been comparatively little attention given to showing adequacy of an atheistic explanation. Instead, the weakness of the theistic argument has been exposed. Now we have here a procedure in the highest degree superficial and illogical. In the first place, the existence of any such ontological nature as is here tacitly assumed is something very far from being

self-evident. Philosophical criticism has cast such doubt upon the assumption that the general and almost universal tendency among practiced thinkers is to look upon nature as merely the form of an agency beyond itself; in which case nature explains nothing. Spatially and temporally considered it is an order of change of which the causality does not appear in space and time. The problem then for all thinkers is, how shall we think of the causality at work in this great system of experience which includes not merely the outward physical world, but also the human as one of its most important and significant factors? Nature as a system in space and time is something upon which all investigators might agree. The orders of co-existence and sequence might be carefully studied and a vast amount of descriptive knowledge might be reached in that way. But none of this study would carry us into the world of power where true causal explanation has its seat.

Philosophical criticism shows us how naïve the atheistic assumption is which rests in nature as a sufficient explanation of the world of experience. Every speculator has to go behind this world of experience, and his explanation of the world must be judged by its own positive adequacy to the facts or its ability to satisfy our reason. Hence the atheist or the materialist is as much a theorist and a metaphysician as the theist. Each gives his account of that hidden world of power. The atheist regards that power as blind, mechanical, necessary, as not knowing itself or what it does, as moving by necessity out of the past into the future without thought or guidance of any kind. The theist, on the other hand, regards this hidden power as rational, conscious, self-directive, not pushed out of the past into the future, but forming plans and determining itself for their realization. And if anyone would decide between the two views he must put them both alongside the facts and consider which gives the better explanation, that is, which better satisfies the reason within us which is the source of all search for explanation. As soon as the matter is thus seen, at once atheism loses its appearance of holding the field and is required to show its own title deeds, and not merely to pick flaws in the claims of competing views.

In further abatement of a certain specious obviousness of the atheistic position we must remember that physical science itself has gone a long way toward making the problem of causality far more mysterious than critical thought supposes. A certain lack of imagination together with a certain ignorance really gives to atheism a kind of plausibility from the standpoint of unreflective thought. We look out into the world about us and we see the various objects of sense perception, that house, those trees, the hills yonder, and the land lying between. There appears to be nothing else in sight. Since then the senses report nothing more, we easily persuade ourselves that there is nothing more. Hence whatever is done is done by these material things. This notion, however, disappears as soon as we remember the teachings of physics and metaphysics. Physics itself, as just suggested, has made the world more and more mysterious in its essential causality. The rustic looks out on the heavens and sees the blue sky and the shining sun or the moon and the stars, and he is perfectly satisfied that he has seen it all. But the astronomer comes and the rustic's view vanishes. We are made acquainted with suns and systems and wonders unsuspected. Or we look into the pure air when the sun is shining, and we seem to be moving along in the midst of light which appears to us to stretch away indefinitely. But the physicist comes, and we find that the sphere of light which seems to encircle the world is a very small affair, the result of reflection and refraction of the sun's rays, while the earth itself is driving along in the deepest possible darkness of an ether vibrating but never luminous, light-bearing but never shining. And the chemist comes and tells us of the composition of bodies about us, so that they, too, are not in any respect what they seem. We hear of molecules and atoms and of vortex rings in the ether, and nowadays since the discovery of radium things seem to have grown more mysterious still. We seem to be immersed in a sphere of unpicturable activity all about us, manifesting itself here and there in a few sense objects, but for the most part not manifesting itself, yet all the while demonstratively real. When we follow out considerations of this kind we are introduced to a new order of mystery which makes the easy mechanical explana-

tion of traditional atheistic thinking seem almost fatuous in its superficiality.

Returning now to the general question, we see the theistic argument has two general forms, one based upon the doctrine of knowledge and one upon induction from experience. These two arguments are entirely simple in their nature and carry the conclusion with them.

The argument from epistemology is essentially this: That nothing whatever can be known except mind and its products, and hence that if nature is knowable by us it must be essentially a rational work, the expression of thought, which in turn presupposes a thinker at the other end.

At first sight this seems obviously false. We find so many things about us which apparently are just there. So far as their knowledge goes, all that we have to do is to use our sense of touch or vision or hearing and we are made aware of their existence. There is no mystery or wonder about it. But this is another naïve impression due to ignorance. The possibility of knowledge is really an exceedingly complicated thing and one whose implications are far-reaching. In the conversation of two persons it is plain that no thought leaves the mind of one and passes into the mind of the other, but each understands the other only as each re-thinks the other's thought. In order to perceive another's thought I must think that thought for myself. There is thought at both ends. Similarly in order to know any object I must construct the object in and for my own consciousness, and only thus does it become an object for me. This is plain when we reflect upon the conditions of perception as set forth by the physiologists. These conditions exist in some form of nervous change, are not the object in any sense, and are not like the object in any sense. They are simply stimuli against which the mind reacts by building up in itself its various conceptions which it then regards as reproducing a reality independent of itself. This is as near as the mind can possibly come to objects. Its objects are merely its own constructs which it projects as real. Now it is manifest that, if the thought activity within does not lie parallel to the order of existence without, knowledge

can never be reached, and this is all the more evident when we reflect that the great mass of our so-called knowledge is of the nature of interpretation. The sense world as it is given in sense is and can be a source of affections of our sensibility. These are fleeting and discontinuous, yet out of them we build the conception of a solid and abiding world which we regard as truly real; yet, primarily that solid world is woven all about us out of our sense impressions. If we regard it as being something more than thought, as truly real, we can only conclude that the world within is a thought world and as such exists only in and through a cosmic thinker whose thoughts we retrace in our studying and thinking. In short, the problem of knowledge implies that nature is a world of meanings, and this implies thought at both ends—thought at the further end to make nature the bearer of meanings, and thought at the nearer end to receive and rethink the meanings.

[This is the last article by Professor Bowne, being dictated by him to his stenographer in two hours the day before his death. It was never seen or revised by him, and is here given just as typed by the stenographer, excepting the necessary correction of some typographical errors. The article is not quite complete. Further discussion was undoubtedly intended. But it is amazing that an article in such practically finished form should have been verbally dictated in so short a time. Here follows a brief biographical sketch:

Borden Parker Bowne was born in Leonardsville, N. J., January 14, 1847, the son of Joseph and Margaret (Parker) Bowne. He graduated from New York University in 1871 with the degree of A.B., and received A.M. from his alma mater in 1876. He did postgraduate work in Europe at the Universities of Halle, Paris, and Göttingen, 1873-75. He served as assistant professor of modern languages in New York University, 1875-76, and during the same years was on the staff of the Independent. In 1876 he became professor of philosophy in Boston University, which position he held until his death in 1910, and at that time was also Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. He made a tour of the world in 1905-6, and lectured before the Imperial University of Japan and other educational bodies in Japan, China, and India. He was made an honorary member of the Imperial Educational Society of Japan. The Ohio Wesleyan University honored him with the degree of LL.D. in 1881, and the New York University in 1909. A bibliography of his published works is given elsewhere in this number of the REVIEW. Besides these he contributed many theological and philosophical articles to many reviews and newspapers. He died in his home, 380 Longwood Avenue, Boston, Mass., April 1, 1910.—EDITOR.]

SOME APPRECIATIONS OF BORDEN PARKER BOWNE

THERE are few leaders of the world of thought in religion or theology who would not gladly have joined in these brief appreciations of the life and work of Doctor Bowne. But the necessary limitations of space have confined us to a few truly representative scholars who here add their garlands of tribute to this monument to his memory raised by the *METHODIST REVIEW*.

SOURCES OF BOWNE'S POWER

Borden Parker Bowne was a great man; a man of intellectual and personal distinction. He was not rightly appreciated by his contemporaries, nor has he yet been assigned his just place. Although a university teacher, he exerted no great influence on the professional university philosophers of his day, at whom, for the most part, he looked askance, and who in turn looked askance at him. Yet it would be remote from the truth to say that he has been unappreciated. His students, his readers, clergy of nearly all denominations, many educators and leaders of thought at home and abroad saw in him a great man to whom they acknowledged high indebtedness. In an unpublished letter written after Bowne's death, Josiah Royce said, "I suppose that our agreements were rather on the increase toward the end of his work. I always prized him much."

It is worth while to try to find the sources of the power of such a man over the minds of his fellows. At least four sources of his power occur to the present writer. First of all, his thought and its expression were always clear. His language did not serve to conceal thought, much less the absence of it (as in some would-be philosophers). It was a transparent medium through which the thought was visible to him who was able to look; albeit even Bowne's limpid style was no remedy for mental myopia. Secondly, Bowne's mind had a remarkable grasp on the systematic whole of his philosophy at every point. His vision took in the

whole intellectual landscape, and his every utterance implied the background of his entire point of view. He "saw life steadily and saw it whole." Although his personalism was influenced by the empiricist Berkeley, the rationalist Leibnitz, the criticist Kant, and the idealists Hegel and Lotze (of such different idealisms!), it was far from being a vacillating eclecticism. Few thinkers have had more than Bowne the capacity for authentic, unified, synoptic vision of life. Thirdly, his skill in polemic was a source of power. He selected the strongest foes—the impersonalistic Hegelianism of his day, the empiricism of Mill, and the evolutionism of Spencer—and showed their intellectual inadequacy as compared with theistic personalism. Moreover, he had the wisdom to learn from the men whom he was attacking, particularly from the Hegelians and from Mill. Fourthly, the fact that he was a man of deep and sincere religious experience gave him an authority in discussing matters pertaining to religion that never attaches to one who approaches religion as its external critic. Philosophy for Bowne must be religious because life is religious; and philosophy is only an attempt to make life intelligible.

Bowne's name will always be held in affectionate and grateful memory by all who knew him either as his students or his friends.

EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Ph.D., now holds the chair of professor of philosophy, formerly occupied by Professor Bowne.

THE METAPHYSICS OF BORDEN P. BOWNE

The temper of mind which drives men to metaphysical studies is a temper which frequently makes it hard for them to take sides on vital issues. They see the difficulties in the pursuit of truth. They are sensitive to imperfections of evidence. They make it their first business to find tests of truth; and applying these tests they remain dissatisfied with the case brought forward by either side of a great controversy.

The result is that while many metaphysicians of the past generation were religious men, comparatively few were able to get beyond generalities in their thinking about religion; while many remained suspended in the agnostic, skeptical, or semi-

gnostical attitude which Kant's great influence, aided by the philosophies of Spencer and Comte, made prevalent.

We realize to-day that in matters of religion these half-way houses are no longer habitable; because he who holds his judgment in suspense effectively decides in the negative. And this realization is due largely to the labors of Borden P. Bowne and William James, men too great both in mental grasp and in personal character to be captured by the sophistical allurements of the non-committal attitude.

This does not mean that either of them simply threw skepticism aside and took from the array of possible doctrines those which best suited his temper and prepossessions. Theirs was no easy faith. To be sure, James taught the rights of the "will to believe"; but this will had first to examine all available evidences, had to make a consistent whole of its various beliefs, had to subject all its choices to the severe scrutiny of well-wrought experience: the scope of the will-to-believe had to be worked out with as much mental effort as other men had devoted to those intellectual proofs which James rejected. And to Bowne the winning of the right to faith was an even greater labor. He has often been ranked with James among the pragmatists because of his doctrine that the great sources of evidence for metaphysical truth are in life and not in logic—James himself thought that the difference between them was merely one of terminology. The real difference, however, was profound. For the "life" which provides the evidence of metaphysical truth was, for Bowne, not simply a state of resolve, or of feeling, but a state of empirical cognition. It is possible to *know* the truth, and not merely to choose it as one's adopted hypothesis. Life is will, plus thought and experience; and Bowne's critical achievement is that he worked out a view, which he was willing to call empirical because based on experience, but "transcendentally empirical," because the experience he was concerned with far exceeded the realm of the senses. In this transcendental empiricism Bowne anticipates the intuitionism of Bergson, without falling into the anti-intellectualism of the intuitionist position. To Bowne ideas which in abstract thought appear conflicting are *reconciled* in experience,

whereas to Bergson concepts are intrinsically abstract and conflicting. (See, for instance, *Personalism*, p. 259.) Thus he reaches faith not as against, but *through* the labors of critical thought.

The distinction of Bowne, therefore, is not that he was a taker-of-sides, but that while he was a leader of critical thought in metaphysics, a master of the weapons of Kantian analysis, he was *at the same time* a man of strong and earnest creedal affiliations—an institutional man. This was an achievement of exemplary importance to our American community of scholars. He made it clear that there is no advantage from the side either of truth or of technical scholarship in dwelling in "the universal," when the universal is opposed to the particular, the positive, and the historical.

The same temper of complete manhood in his thinking led him to seek to describe his standpoint in metaphysics by names having clear-cut significance. In his first book of metaphysics he announced himself unequivocally as a theist, and defined his theism in terms of the idealistic movement following Kant. Kant tried to be both a realist and an idealist, but found no satisfactory way of uniting the two motives; the natural result being that his followers diverged into different paths—Herbart and his school taking the realistic direction which insisted on the objective reality of the contents of experience, while Fichte and his followers took the direction of subjective idealism, and tried to deduce all experience from the self. Neither of these results could be satisfactory to a thinker so well balanced as Professor Bowne—so clear that the world cannot be merely an emanation of individual selves, that knowledge is knowledge of something external to the knower, and at the same time so clear that "the system of things is essentially a thought-system." In holding to both of these truths, Bowne was aided by the thought of Lotze: all reality is active; and there is an infinite, though ineffable, difference between thought which is merely contemplative and thought realized in action. There can be no merely passive reality, but if reality is all describable as "thought realized in act," then it is both objective fact, as the realist claims, and also transparent to thought,

as the idealist claims. Theism thus solves the difficulty bequeathed by Kant to subsequent idealism.

But the name theism was still not definite enough to convey all that lay in Bowne's metaphysical thought; the word "immanence" is needed—so that our eyes in seeking for God shall not direct themselves into the empty regions of cosmical space, but into the heart of the world where he lives and works—and "immanence" itself is a word which may mislead unless one adds the word "personalism." It is the unequivocal insistence upon this attribute of personality in all that is real which marks Bowne off from most of his idealistic colleagues. Most recent idealists dread the sharp outlines and apparent limitations of personality as applied to God—to some extent they avoid the name God for that very reason; Bowne dreaded, on the contrary, the shadowy vagueness of the impersonal principles appealed to in substitute. Royce held that reality is individual, adding the comment that all individuals are one in God; to Bowne, this comment savors of a quantitative mysticism, for to him the union of man and God is not one of identity or absorption, but rather one of mutual harmony or coincidence of purpose, which consists with, and indeed, presupposes the distinctness of selfhoods. Personality is the ultimate principle; it cannot be explained by anything else, but everything else can be explained by it.

Thus "personalism" becomes the distinctive name for Bowne's contribution to metaphysics, and as a summary account of the curve of metaphysical speculation since Kant, there is no more powerful and convincing chapter in American metaphysical writing than that of Bowne on "The failure of impersonalism."

A word should be added in regard to the consistent dignity of Bowne's writing. There is nothing in it that is trivial, nothing that is not thought-filled and thought-provoking. It is throughout the work of a mind of distinction and power. Its effect and also its intrinsic interest are permanent.

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.

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BOWNE A QUICKENING SPIRIT

"He is a quickening spirit" was Bowne's expression of supreme approval. It meant to him that a man had passed beyond the merely conventional, and had begun to think and act from the glowing center of life's values. Bowne was keen to detect in his students the will to enter into this world of spiritual reality. They responded to his faith in them with an eagerness and abandon that gladdened his heart. It was his power to awaken the scarcely suspected spiritual energies of his students that has given him his eminent place among the intellectual and moral leaders of his generation. For those who caught his spirit he made all things new. We admired him for his intellectual acumen, his mastery of incisive and pungent expression; we marveled at his grasp of literary, historical, scientific, and philosophical resources; but we revered him for his quickening power over our inner moral and spiritual life.

What was the secret of this power? No analysis can do justice to the subtle influences that flow from one life into another. We are inter-spiritual beings, and find ourselves only in fellowship with others. Personality has no barriers to interpenetration, except indifference. When such a commanding nature as Bowne's comes into contact with a group of students, the process of interchange is like the blending of light with light. Perhaps the dominance of his personality arose chiefly from his intense appreciation of life's higher values; for he knew as but few know what was most worth while.

This passion for the spiritual values made Bowne impatient of mere conventionalities, especially if they stood in his way. Because of this he was misunderstood by many. They thought him an iconoclast, a radical, a dangerous antagonist of established order. Some of the more timid among religious leaders actually thought him a subverter of the faith. But as a matter of fact his thinking was conservative because it was radical. He believed not less, but more, than his anxious ecclesiastical friends. This is often true of thinkers. They are willing to trust reason to reach a satisfying conception of life, and they find their trust

honored in a large way. It is the only kind of trust that can reach and grip a group of students. Tradition has its place, but can never for the real student be a substitute for intellectual insight. The inquirer wants to find the man who is not bound, who, giving thought its utmost liberty, can reach a conclusion that throws light on experience. Bowne had this power in unusual measure. His resulting beliefs were simple, sublime, adequate, because they expressed his deepest grasp of experience. That these insights, which came through a study of life, should be in harmony with Christian truth, made his inspiring influence the more effective. Many a student, as he listened to the great teacher, learned for the first time what vital, regenerative Christianity really meant. It is one thing to believe doctrines because the church stands for them, or the Scriptures teach them; it is quite another to grasp these truths as issuing from a critical study of experience. They then become immeasurably more real; and at the same time they bestow upon the Scriptures and the church an authority that these can acquire in no other way.

Bowne's philosophy, culminating in a conception of the self as the all-explaining principle, flooded with light some of the most mysterious doctrines of Christianity, especially the divinity of Christ. Bowne had a seer's knowledge of man as bearing the divine image. The more he probed into the mystery of selfhood, the more clearly he saw that man is a true microcosm, that his spiritual capacities are inherently infinite and their limitations are all from without, that these limitations have only a temporary significance and may conceivably be progressively overcome, that self-realization means nothing less than the infinitation of the human personality. Is it strange that a teacher who could set forth convincingly such a conception of human personality should be a quickening spirit? Students of the New Testament know that the burden of Christ's teaching was man's divine sonship. His own generation and many that came after were unable to bear this high doctrine of the divinity of man. But we are re-discovering it in such philosophy as Bowne's. It is the hope of the future for Christianity, and through Christianity for the human race. It justifies the most spiritual, aggressive, vital, re-

ligious activity. It is the ideal in the light of which every problem that confronts the present day must be met.

GEORGE A. WILSON.

George Arthur Wilson, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Syracuse University, will be remembered as writer of the remarkable article in the *METHODIST REVIEW* of September-October, 1920, on "The Place of the Will in Religion."

BOWNE AND PRESENT-DAY THOUGHT

Whoever lays claim to originality in philosophy must possess either the hardihood of conceit or the assurance of ignorance. The ground has been so completely covered since the days of the early Greeks that at best one can hope only to put old truths in new ways or with new emphasis. The world of philosophy is not likely to be greatly disturbed by the claim of a brilliant mechanical engineer that the ages have waited for his own (to him) novel discovery of the meaning of personality. Under the light of critical examination the touted discovery is found to be but the coining of a new phrase in which to express a very ancient idea.

This foreword is perhaps necessary to guard the reader from presuming that the writer is to make great claims of originality and novelty for Bowne, though we have known none other in this generation for whom we would have made them so willingly. That Bowne owed much to those who had gone before him should be gladly conceded. No one would have been more ready to acknowledge the debt than Bowne himself. He received much undoubtedly from Lotze, though he was never the faint shadow of Lotze that some would make him. Lotze was weak in his metaphysics and in metaphysics Bowne was strong. Lotze's system lacked grounding and Bowne was conscious of the fundamental nature of this lack. This may have led him to incur the charge of ingratitude toward Lotze. To suffer the misunderstanding was certainly more noble than to point to fatal discrepancies in one to whom he felt so deep a debt of obligation. Bowne's debt to Kant and others can be acknowledged without in any way invalidating his independence.

The rarest and most valuable of gifts in philosophy is after all not originality but clearness. If one were asked the dis-

tinguishing feature of Bowne's work it should very likely be answered, clearness. When viewed from this standpoint, the real quality of Bowne is perceived. He is then seen, we believe, to be in the great succession of world philosophers. Because of this quality of clearness Bowne was a forerunner in many positions towards which the world of modern thought is more slowly making its way.

We have come in modern thinking to look askance at the immoderate claims of the Spencerian formulæ. This doubt is not now the possession of the religious alone, it is now admitted by both philosophy and science. We are able in the more serious after thought to see that we were beguiled into the notion that description is identical with explanation, a fallacy which is the fertile resort of every blameworthy schoolboy. It is Bergson who compares the Spencerian doctrine of evolution with the child who cuts up the puzzle picture in order to have the illusion that in putting it together again he has created it. Now that it is so commonly pointed out we have no difficulty in seeing it. We now wonder at our uncritical prepossessions, and are amazed at the singular thrall which, like the belief in witchcraft of other days, once held us. But when young Bowne ran full tilt against this fallacy opposition to it was scientific anathema. Even the theologian had made haste to agree lest "the smell of fire should be found upon his garment." The more logical thinking which has come with time, save where the clay gods of materialism are still thoughtlessly worshiped, is a rare testimony to the foresight which sprang from intellectual clearness.

Take likewise the growth of the pragmatic test, which may reasonably be claimed as the distinctive element in American philosophy. This phase of thought is generally connected with the work of William James. It is no detraction from James to call attention to the fact that the distinction of Bowne's philosophy from that of the idealists with whom he is most frequently classed, lay just in his insistence upon the pragmatic test for truth in both philosophy and religion. In the publication of these views Bowne possessed the priority. Will it be offensive to call attention still further to the fact that Bowne did a larger work, in that he not

only laid down a method for judging truth but also accompanied it with an appropriate metaphysics? When, then, claim is made for pragmatism as the distinctively American philosophy, it is but fair to include Bowne as a pragmatist.

Present-day science has been awakened from something akin to slumber by the new-old doctrine of relativity. Whether Einstein succeeds in winning the acknowledgment of science is beside the point. Relativity is in the air. The truths of relativity were clearly seen and recognized by Bowne, as they had been by philosophers before him, in his doctrines of time and space. In other words he did not permit the dominant materialistic and scientific obsession to close his eyes to the facts. In that day he set forth the relative nature of space and time in such a way that it accords with the present demands of science and of life.

There are many indications of a popular return of interest in the study of personality. There are some indications of such a revival on the part of philosophy. This revival must eventually be seen as something more than a passing egotism. It is a demand to know the nature and meaning of selfhood. Whatever else may be true, nothing else can be quite so important to the welfare and happiness of humanity. Into this widening stream of interest has run the confluent of Bowne's thought. There can be no doubt of the reality of the place which his thinking has already taken, nor of the significance which his thought will bear for the future of that movement. The true recognition of the place of personalistic thinking has not yet come. We are still possessed by the deadly materialism which insists that the inconsequential is the real. Psychology maunderingly boasts the distinction of having done away with the soul. But light is on the horizon and there is promise of a better dawn. The morning star of this greater humanism was Borden Parker Bowne.

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING.

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THE EMPIRICAL FACTOR IN BOWNE'S THINKING

If I were to give a general estimate of my loved and revered teacher, Doctor Bowne, I should have to repeat much that I printed in this REVIEW in July, 1910. Instead of repeating, let me endeavor to answer a single question: What seems to me now, after the lapse of more than a third of a century since I sat in his lecture room, to be the most certainly true and important contribution that he made to the mental habits and the mental furniture of us his students?

One's answer to such a question will reflect, of course, one's response, during the intervening years, to our rapidly changing world and to recent types of thought. Bowne's views were formed at a period so different from 1922 that, startling as the statement may be, it is literally true that he did not and could not conceive of most of the critical problems that are characteristic of to-day. Of course it is possible to generalize issues, and to say, with truth, that in one form or another the old questions persistently recur in human experience; yet there is change as well as permanence in the issues. In a growing world we start from different data; we are moved by different interests; our tools are different, and our tests also change. If, then, Bowne's definition of problems, his methods, and his solutions are somewhat out of joint with our own reflection, this is but an instance of the universal dynamics of thought in a changing social world. A generation hence the critical thought of to-day will have become equally remote from the students who will then be finding their own way in their own world.

Thus it is that our *systems* "have their day . . . and cease to be." This is true of the greater as well as of the lesser luminaries in the philosophical firmament. Yet all through the history of philosophy, factors of permanent value, "broken lights" of the inclusive truth, are embedded in the successive systems. The part of Bowne's thinking that seems to live on in the greatest vigor in our minds to-day is the empirical rather than the dialectic or speculative factor. And the particular empirical content that looms most significantly in the retrospect is the observable

facts of religious and moral life to which he insistently called attention. He turned multitudes of minds away from religious, theological, and metaphysical conventionalities toward certain of the living, dynamic realities of experience. In spite of his strong liking for dialectic, in spite of the tendency of many to estimate him in terms of a system, I believe that we are nearer the truth, and nearer his own conception of himself, if we remember him most for the eagerness and the pointedness with which he reverted to primary data.

Who among his students and readers can have failed to be impressed by his almost constant warnings against "merely verbal thinking," the "fallacy of the universal," "logomachies" or "logic-chopping," and "taking the order of thought for the order of reality"? He who never tired of dialectical contest nevertheless made "the field of life and action" his supreme court of appeal as against "the arid wastes of formal logic."

In the words last quoted there is reflected a second persistent tendency, namely, the ethical valuation of all experience. If, now, we contemplate these two habits together—the empirical and the valuational—we shall be able to see that he was working upon, or at least toward, certain of the problems that have taken acute forms among us since his own thinking reached its maturity. If he did not enter the field of the psychology of religion in any technical manner, he was unquestionably moving toward it. If his psychology was restricted to structural concepts, and was one-sidedly a psychology of knowledge in the logical sense, nevertheless his emphasis upon "life and action" implied a correlative functional point of view. If he never fully appreciated what one may call the historical inevitableness of pragmatism, yet he himself helped prepare the way for it! Finally, if he did not apprehend the depth of the social factor in mind, morals, and religion, nevertheless his metaphysics of immanence and his own faith in a loving and lovable God—these two taken together make for hospitality to a thoroughgoing recognition of the social in its primordialness and its ultimateness.

This may not be evident to one who approaches Bowne's mind through his metaphysics. But then metaphysics was to

him not the main thing, but rather a sort of police force with which to defend the life and the liberties that he prized. Turn to his *Principles of Ethics* and you shall see that he does not intend to deduce the moral life from a theory, but theory from moral life. Note that he consciously endeavors to unite "the intuitive and the experience school of ethics." His affinity with utilitarianism is unmistakably close, and he comes as near to an evolutionary view as to assert that duty is not completely determinate because what is good has to be found out in part by the historical process.

Or turn to his writings that deal with the Christian life. What gems of practical wisdom they are! And they are gems, not because they are deductions from his metaphysics, not because they are compacted systems, but because they are so simply and directly objective. "We must fall back on good sense, that general sense of reality and soundness without which the moral life becomes a series of snares and loses itself in silliness and fanaticism. We must point out that the essence of religion lies in the filial spirit, in the desire to serve and please God; and then we must point out that our all-inclusive religious duty is to offer up the daily life pervaded and sanctified by the filial spirit, as our spiritual service and worship of God" (*The Christian Life*, New York, 1899, p. 106).

He was probably quite aware of the fundamentally empirical quality of his own primary procedures. His dialectic was consciously secondary and defensive—one might say disinfecting. It did not profess to discover or demonstrate the real, but only to remove obstacles from the real and from the perception of it as real. We are to find and know reality by action and interaction; by giving play to our sense of need; by contemplating historical developments, and judging values; by revising thought and conduct and trying again.

That he did not *develop* this view of experience, but left it for the most part in the background of his reasonings, is to be accounted for, no doubt, by the thought-situations that confronted him through most of his career. On the one hand, he beheld the rule of dogmatic and muddy notions of evolution and of natural

law, with an almost faddish agnosticism as prime minister. On the other hand, the ecclesiastical forces were mostly under bondage to traditionalism reinforced by another muddy metaphysics. His calling was to help clear up the confusion. This he did in part by his metaphysical "reworking of concepts," but also in important part by direct appeal to experience.

GEORGE A. COE.

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BOWNE VS. DETERMINISM AND PANTHEISM

I first met Professor Bowne at the gathering of the alumni of our common alma mater, New York University, the year that I graduated there (1881), when he was back to celebrate the tenth anniversary of his own graduation. He was then about to issue his *Metaphysics*. Later, at Yale, I read the work with President Porter and formed a high opinion of the philosophical ability of its author, an opinion which was strengthened by the reading as they appeared of each of his subsequent books. My last meeting with Dr. Bowne was in May, 1908, when, at the close of a notable course of lectures which he delivered at the Yale Divinity School, he was for twenty-four hours my guest. After spending a delightful afternoon together, and, at dinner at my house, meeting the other members of the staff of the Yale department of philosophy, Dr. Bowne gave a most illuminating and inspiring address before the Yale Philosophical Club on the outlook in philosophy. He then spent the night at my house, and the following forenoon we took a long walk together to the top of East Rock. We had much delightful conversation, and I was deeply impressed by his simple, open, and engaging personality. I can well understand the charm which intimate personal intercourse with him must have had for those privileged to enjoy it.

Philosophical labels, party catchwords, "schools," evidently had little attraction for Bowne, and great names did not awe him. He had profound reverence for truth and eagerly and fearlessly sought it, unintimidated by such lions in his path. While generously appreciative of the labors of others, he had to think through the great philosophical issues for himself. In this sense he was a decidedly original and independent thinker who had a clearly thought-out philosophy of his own. This gave his discussions freshness and effectiveness, made them thought-provoking, and gave them great weight with thoughtful readers.

While evidently widely read and accurately versed in the literature of philosophy, Bowne showed little of the mere scholar's or historian's delight in the subject. What supremely fascinated and interested him were the fundamental, the essential, the vital issues involved. Even in his detailed discussions of Kant and Spencer he instinctively fastens attention almost entirely upon these issues.

All Dr. Bowne's writing is characterized by directness and great clearness. There is nothing involved or misty. It is never necessary to read a sentence twice to get its meaning. His style resembles that of the best French and the older English rather than that of the German masters of philosophy. Indeed, his style is so lucid that one is almost tempted to say that, at times, the incautious reader is in danger of being carried by it, without realizing the fact, across chasms that require careful bridging.

I have read all of Professor Bowne's books, many of them several times, and am glad of this opportunity to acknowledge my personal indebtedness to them for much stimulus, help, and enrichment. His philosophical system has well been named "Personalism," and its essential features are too well understood to require statement. There are, however, two aspects of his teaching which seem to me of such especial significance and such enduring value that I cannot resist alluding to them in spite of the limits to which I am restricted.

In the first place, I would call attention to the significance of the personalism, which he expounds and defends, for a sound epistemology. No better test of a philosophical system or doc-

trine can be found than to demand of it a tenable theory of knowledge, or to demand that it be shown to be consistent with such a tenable theory. No philosophy but a sound personalistic philosophy can meet that test. Dr. Bowne has done an important service to sound thinking by making this clear. I know of no philosopher who has so ably and so persistently insisted upon the impossibility of basing a theory of knowledge on any necessitarian system, materialistic or pantheistic, any system, that is, that robs the finite person of essential freedom. Bowne never tires of insisting that proper rationality is possible only to free agents, persons, and that on the plane of freedom alone truth and error first acquire significance. There are passages in practically every one of his books that ought to be regarded as classical on this point. The effective use that he makes of this position is admirably illustrated in his criticism of Spencer (cf. *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, p. 240; *Kant and Spencer*, p. 270f.).

Secondly, I would call attention to the great value and significance of personalism as a defense against pantheism (and, of course, against materialism). Personalism, insisting as it does upon the self-determining activity (freedom) and the ontological otherness of the human personality as respects the Absolute on the one hand and other finite persons on the other hand, furnishes an impregnable bulwark against pantheism. Undermine finite personality, as personalism conceives it, and you open the dyke that lets in the pantheistic flood that turns creation into "a vast dead sea occupied by God alone." Here it is that Bowne's form of personalism diverges sharply from the numerically monistic personalism, or absolute idealism, of so many of his eminent contemporaries, that of the late Professor Royce, for example. The inevitable and destructive consequence of such pantheism is vividly portrayed by Bowne in many passages (cf. *Theism*, p. 216).

Other features of Dr. Bowne's system that are profoundly significant might be mentioned did space permit. It goes without saying that a philosophy that bases itself, as Bowne's does, upon the incontestable and immediately known facts of human selfhood, accurately analyzed, furnishes clarifying insights into many perplexing metaphysical problems, and furnishes the soundest possible

basis for ethics, pedagogy, and civil society, and that it alone can give an account of the relation of the human self to the divine self which does not imperil either and upon which religion may securely rest.

GEORGE M. DUNCAN.

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PROFESSOR BOWNE'S SERVICE TO PHILOSOPHICAL INSTRUCTION

Nearly a quarter of a century ago, while reviewing for the *Philosophical Review* the second edition of the *Metaphysics* of Borden P. Bowne, I made the following remarks:

"The general plan of Professor Bowne's work seems to me admirable, although as the discussion progresses beyond the realm of purely physical conceptions, that plan is not worked out so completely as one would wish. Metaphysics is conceived as a working-over of the notions. The interpretation of reality which arises in popular thought upon its first reflection is taken as the starting point, and changes are made only gradually, when the inadequacy of principles first assumed has been shown. It results from this that by the time the student has gained insight into the emptiness of the lower category, his mind has already supplied the higher category involved. Moreover, the higher category arises with such vividness and strength that no violence is done to the mind's healthy instinct for reality. The method facilitates philosophical insight, and avoids that feeling of general illusion which seems fated to attend the reading of discussions like those of Berkeley. Again, the relation of metaphysical study to science is more apparent in a work like this than in one which follows more closely the plan of either Kant or Hegel. As a student, I found that the works of Lotze and Bowne threw much light for me upon the principles and conceptions of science, and then upon Kant and Hegel; and while teaching I have seen many students to whom Professor Bowne's *Metaphysics* first opened clearly the portals of philosophy. Perhaps the Hegelian movement of thought will prove in the end too strong for Lotze and his followers. Neither Lotze nor Bowne exhibits sufficient strength in the higher

reaches of philosophical reflection. But in leading the student's insight up to the point where those higher discussions become significant, I know of no book superior to Bowne's *Metaphysics*. And even in regard to the general result views like those of Professor Bowne form an important and significant protest against the adequacy of the current Hegelianism."

Reflecting upon these comments in the light of the intervening years, I seem to note three changes. First, my experience with dozens of maturing students has made me more and more appreciative of the service which Professor Bowne's writings were adapted to render them. Secondly, his own scholarly insight became more adequate as the years advanced, or at any rate came nearer to meeting my own needs. Thirdly, my experience with philosophical debate and with the drift of recent controversy has made me more vividly conscious of the worth of a mediating position like his; with its strong dash of Aristotelianism, as contrasted with the Simon-pure brand of Hegelianism. As marking a stage in the development of these changes, I may cite a passage from my review of *Kant and Spencer* prepared for the same journal some ten years ago:

"The present reviewer has been accustomed to regard Professor Bowne's writings as useful, especially throughout the middle reaches of a student's philosophical education, but as less effective in developing and sustaining the highest insights. The *Kant and Spencer* probably does not succeed in removing entirely the measure of adverse criticism that might seem to be implied in such an estimate, but it modifies the estimate to such a degree as to advance by several stages Professor Bowne's philosophical reputation."

Somewhat later in the same review I said concerning the treatment of Spencer: "It appeals to me as the most serviceable assemblage of fair and analytical criticism of Spencer's position which we possess. Few studies could be more fruitful for the student at a certain stage of progress than the perusal of these three volumes of Spencer, checked at every step by reference to Bowne's destructive criticism."

Subsequent use of this book with classes of senior and gradu-

ate students has amply vindicated the judgment here expressed. Other volumes, like *Personalism* and the *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, have had a similar breadth of appeal and a similar power to lead on into the higher realms of reflective thought. And the upshot of it is to challenge our high regard for this thinker, who not only led the scholarly reflection of his own great denomination, but also greatly facilitated the passage into higher philosophy for hundreds and probably thousands of students of all types of thought.

E. L. HINMAN.

Edgar L. Hinman is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.

BORDEN P. BOWNE

My knowledge of Dr. Bowne is based upon the reading of practically all his books, attendance for several years at his lectures at the Grove City Summer School, and personal conversation and correspondence. I would sum up my impressions and appreciation of him as follows:

I. Dr. Bowne was a remarkably clear and keen and strong thinker in the field of philosophy. This is a field in which such clearness is often conspicuously absent and its presence a rare virtue. Many books on the subject give the impression that they are a mixture of mist and mud and one wonders what they are all about and even wonders whether their authors themselves ever knew. They fulfill the definition of a metaphysician as "a blind man looking on a dark night for a black cat that isn't there!" No reader of Dr. Bowne would ever think that he was such a blind man looking for such a dark and non-existent object. Right or wrong, he is at least always understandable and ordinarily is clear as sunlight. He sees things steadily and sees them whole. His pages appear to be sharp photographs of reality. His idealistic monism was worked out into a consistent system in which all the parts hung together and presented an aspect of striking convincing truth and rationality. While reading his expositions of it one could not help feeling that he was under the spell of a mind that could make idealism look more nearly reasonable and right than any other system of thought.

II. Dr. Bowne's crystalline thinking expressed itself in his philosophical and literary style, which is wonderfully clear and beautiful. He wrote as he thought, in straight lines and sharp outlines and in picturesque form and illustration and beauty. He had a remarkable gift of stating abstract subtle metaphysical matters in simple and yet lucid terms, and his pages are singularly free from the technical language and lingo of the professional philosopher that makes philosophy such a jungle to many readers. His style is original and gets out of the beaten track into fresh pastures. He had a gift for coining pregnant phrases and new turns of expression. Epigrams sparkle on his pages like dew on the morning grass. No other philosophical writer known to me equals him in this point. Keen wit and kindly humor also flash out on his pages like the play of summer lightning. And he wielded a sharp and scintillating rapier of sarcasm with which he could expose a fallacy or puncture a bubble of conceit with fatal effect; sometimes he was tempted to use this dangerous gift with undue severity. Perhaps it was partly due to this that other philosophical writers did not always give him that recognition to which he was entitled. His pages are the most brilliant philosophical writing of our day and will long remain as a difficult standard and model for others to imitate.

III. The writer's personal recollections of Dr. Bowne are a precious treasury in his memory. In his public lectures he was remarkably successful in popularizing metaphysics so that the common people heard him gladly. He could expound these abstract matters in the language of the street, illuminate them with apt illustrations, and kindle them with the sparkle and shimmer of humor, so that every listener kept alive and alert. He was the soul of kindness and courtesy, and when wearied after a lecture would gladly remain to continue conversation with any who lingered for explanation on certain points. His beautiful Christian character and spirit shone out through all his ways and words, and he was literally a living gospel. The writer was indebted to him for help, not only from his books, but also from personal conversation and correspondence, and he was pleased to read the manuscript of my book, *The World a Spiritual System*, and kindly to

commend it. He was a rare spirit, and now that he is gone many will feel that we shall not see his like again.

JAMES H. SNOWDEN.

James Henry Snowden, D.D., LL.D., is Professor of Systematic Theology in the Western Theological Seminary (Presbyterian), Pittsburgh, Pa. He has written many theological works, such as *The Coming of the Lord*.

FROM BELOW UPWARD, OR VICE VERSA?

I am glad to have the opportunity of expressing my personal indebtedness to Professor Bowne and my admiration of his work in philosophy. I have found his work successful and inspiring in all the wide circle of philosophical thought. From Metaphysics and the Theory of Knowledge to Ethics and Psychology and to other subjects connected with philosophy I have followed him and found him to be a safe guide and a sure thinker. His incisive criticisms of theories he opposed were as remarkable as his lucid exposition of the views he advocated. If I were writing an estimate of his work I might have something to say in criticism of some of his views. Here I wish to dwell on one aspect of his manifold activity. I wish to point out how he insisted on the right of each philosophical department to insist on using its own concepts. Mathematics had its own sphere and its own technical language. Physics brought problems not to be solved by mathematics. Chemistry was distinct from physics, and biology, while using all that could be learned from mathematics, physics, and chemistry, has its distinctive problem. So also with psychology and ethics. His drastic criticism of Herbert Spencer was, in the end, a demonstration of the impossibility of Spencer's main contention. Professor Bowne always insisted that you can never explain the higher from the lower, but always the lower from the higher. This may be made clear by a statement of its opposite from the article "Psychology," in Hastings's Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics:

In short, the hypothesis of the self as a vivifying force, though it undoubtedly gives a sense of comfort and satisfaction to many minds, is nevertheless useless. It is of no service whatever in a scientific sense, and that must be the final test in a science of psychology. Its acceptance cannot be advocated on this ground. The doctrine is really an inheritance

from Kant. The leading idea of his philosophic reconstruction of experience was the presentation not of one single all-important synthesis (Hume), but of a whole hierarchy of them, forming an easily exhaustible system. But Kant failed to draw the proper inferences from their idea, and from what success he achieved in applying it in detail. He failed especially to see that the data of experience and the forms which emerge from them must synthesize themselves *from below upward*, according to common laws. In the search for a source of synthesis he then looked upward instead of downward, and found the synthetic unity of apperception, the consciousness of "I think." The efficacy of that notion is nothing but synthesis itself, and so nothing was gained of the whole procedure.

From below upward—the issue is clear. His view is the very opposite of that maintained by Professor Bowne in all his works. We are familiar with this idea in the attempt to derive everything from Matter and Motion. We have read innumerable attempts to derive physics from mathematics, chemistry from physics, biology from chemistry, and so on. Biology has had to fight a fierce battle for the right to use its own concepts for the description and explanation of the phenomena of life. But the endeavor to derive the higher from the lower has been significantly reenforced by the movement known as psycho-analysis, by the endeavor to make instinct the guiding power of rational life, the manufacture of "complexes" to explain social life, and by the synthesis of sentiments to explain the foundations of character. To these tendencies the principles set forth by Professor Bowne are fundamentally opposed. He always lays stress on the activity of the self.

In organized knowledge the constructive mental activity is still more manifest. New knowledge is so far from passing from the object into our mind, that is, it is not given even in our perceptions themselves, but is constructed by us at great expense of time and labor (*Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, p. 86).

The causality of freedom means self-determination. This is a causality which looks to the future, and is not driven by the past. It is a causality which forms ideals and plans, and devotes itself to their realization. Instead of being shoved out of the past, it is self-moved into the future (p. 97).

Self-determination is a notion which can have no place in the "from below upward" theory.

We have seen that concepts without immediate experience are only

empty forms, and become real only as some actual experience furnishes them with real contents. Hence there is an element in self-knowledge beyond what the understanding can furnish. This is found in our living self-consciousness. We conceive some things but we not only conceive, we also live ourselves. This living, indeed, cannot be realized without the conception, but the conception is formal and empty without the living. In this sense intelligence must accept itself as a datum, and so not as something given from without, but as the self-recognition of itself by itself (*Personalism*, p. 288).

One quotation to show that Professor Bowne had always in view the *from below upward* view which is so prevalent to-day:

It was assumed as a matter of course that that which was temporarily first in psychological development was the truly real, or the material out of which all later developments were made. Accordingly, as the earlier phases of religion, like the earlier phases of all things, were pretty crude, it was supposed that these were the true originals and essential meaning of religion. Now all this has passed away. We have come to see that this historical study at best could give us only the order of temporal development, without deciding whether there was not some immanent law underlying the unfolding. We have equally come to see that no development is possible without assuming such a law, and that the true nature of a developing thing can be learned, not by looking at the crude beginnings, but only by studying the full unfolding of the finished product. If we would know what intelligence is, we consider it in its mighty works and not in its first blind gropings. So if we would know what religion is, we must consider it in its great historical manifestations, rather than in the dim imaginings of undeveloped man (*Personalism*, pp. 266-7).

JAMES IVERACH.

James Iverach, M.A., D.D., author of *Evolution and Christianity* and other theological works, is Professor of New Testament Language and Literature in United Free Church College, Aberdeen, Scotland.

THE BOWNEAN SMILE

Bowne's entire career was under my eye. In a way he was one of my boys. I helped to prepare him in mathematics and some other studies for New York University. I remember him by his smile, with which I became familiar in 1866, when he was a pupil, four years younger than myself, in my classes at Pennington Seminary. His face wore a look of perfect comprehension and something more, a purely intellectual smile as if he found some jubilee in thinking.

That same smile—enhanced, expanded, sublimated—shone from the chair of philosophy in Boston University during many masterful and momentous years. The mental luminosity behind it was like a system of indirect incandescent lighting, which inevitably made Professor Bowne's class-room a place of clear seeing and comprehension, the throne-room of intelligibility. His students say his smile in the class-room had at times a caustic cutting edge.

Daniel Curry called Bowne "the greatest metaphysician of this age, perhaps of any age, greatest because clearest." Without regarding Dr. Curry as a specially competent appraiser of the philosophers of the ages, it is certainly true that Bowne's pre-eminence was largely due to his superior clearness in realms where clarity and convincingness are difficult, in which he excelled Professor William James, who showed signs of being sensitively aware of his near-by formidable rival. Borrowing an expression which Bowne used in another connection, it may be said that James' "intellectual implements were less thoroughly sterilized" than Bowne's. The fascinating and brilliant Harvard professor's lenses were sometimes misted by unphilosophic emotions steaming up from sub-intellectual depths. In the lingo of to-day, Bowne was less temperamental. The atmosphere of his mind was cooler and nearer akin to pure mathematics and exact science than to poetry and sentiment. This made for absolute philosophic and metaphysical clearness.

Because of this, many others besides his students resorted to Bowne with their difficulties. Many came from afar to sit at his feet. A Yale graduate desired to enter the Methodist ministry, but thought he could not accept some of our doctrines. After failing to get sufficient light in two theological schools he sought Bowne, who quickly cleared the Yale man's way by showing him that those doctrines as he had conceived them were not Methodist, had no proper place in our theology, but were rooted in and belonged to the Calvinistic system of belief. This young minister was only one of a multitude.

The friendly relations of Harvard with Boston University, which visibly culminated last year in the conferring of LL.D.

on President Murlin, have not been disturbed by occasional rivalries in philosophy, metaphysics, or other departments. That Harvard's Law School could ever have wandered off, lecturers and students, to Boston University, might be counted among improbabilities. Yet even impossibilities have a habit of happening. That a Methodist preacher from America should sit with a committee of the House of Lords considering in secret session whether to recommend that the ancient coronation oath be modified at one point for the coronation of Edward VII, and, after listening to the committee's discussion, should express his views on the subject, being requested to give his opinion, and should then see the Lords decide, by coincidence, in accordance with his advice, that the oath be not modified—that is well-nigh incredible, but in this amazing world the improbable is often the likeliest thing to happen. And this happened.

The New York East Conference was familiar with the Bownean smile during thirty-two years. Non-participant in Conference business and discussion, his principal contribution to its sessions was the honor of his unobtrusive presence and his inimitable smile, which became noticeable on occasions.

In 1887, when Bishop Hurst called the name of Borden P. Bowne, his Presiding Elder, B. M. Adams, responded: "What! Is that great metaphysician on my district? Well, I don't know much about him; haven't seen much of him; met him on train one day; asked him if he was enjoying religion; said he was; I thought that was saying a good deal for a metaphysician. I guess he's all right, Bishop. Nothing against him." When Professor Bowne, arriving next day, was told of this, his smiling comment was, "By *faith* the Elders obtained a good report."

Bowne's smile was seen at its best, shining with purest ray serene, when, years later, the peace of the New York East Conference was invaded by a rash outsider striding in to prefer charges of un-orthodoxy against the ablest defender of our faith at its foundations. A tyro tackling the master mind of Methodism, whippet barking at a great Saint Bernard! The charges were characterized by what President Eliot of Harvard calls "a frugality of intellectuality." It was ludicrous, but the Confer-

ence, with forbearing courtesy, kept a grave face, and appointed a trial committee to hear the charges and report; gave the case full right of way to beat its brains out against a stone wall. The committee in several sessions listened to all the accuser had to say, and then the fifteen men, without conferring or leaving their seats, cast fifteen votes for absolute acquittal.

During the hearing Bowne's countenance was a study. Over all shone the familiar smile, entirely benign, yet whether it was tinged with more of compassion or more of irony, and whether what I thought I saw was really on the face or only in my imagination, this deponent saith not. It resembled the smile of Professor Santayana of Harvard as described by S. K. Wilson: "It demanded no reciprocity, did not angle for response, was not susceptible of diminution by confronting bovine incomprehension. It was Jovian, Olympian, fed from within by its own spiritual light."

It was while the great teacher, in answer to the charges, was declaring explicitly and fully, with deep and solemn joy, his utterly orthodox faith, that the smile I knew from his boyhood shone with supreme radiance. For the New York East Conference that was the crowning moment of Borden P. Bowne's membership in it.

With lofty intelligence and lowly self-abnegating spirit he lived his pure beneficent life until April 1, 1910, when Heaven granted him the felicity of ceasing at once to work and live. From lecture room to couch he passed and was not, for God took him.

Did the smile linger on his face afterward, or did the freed spirit carry it up to meet the approving smile of his Lord? It seemed fit to be immortal.

WILLIAM V. KELLEY.

[Dr. Kelley needs no introduction to the readers of the METHODIST REVIEW, of which he was the distinguished editor for twenty-seven years.]

THE PUBLISHED WORKS OF BORDEN P. BOWNE

1. *The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, 1874. Although referred to in later life by Professor Bowne himself as "a youthful book which I published many years ago, when there was not

much fear of the proprieties before my eyes," it has maintained itself almost down to the present as one of the most thorough and decisive, as well as clearest and raciest, criticisms of the Spenceian philosophy.

2. *Studies in Theism*, 1879. Professor Bowne used to say that from the purely literary point of view he regarded this as the best book he had written.

3. *Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles*, 1882. Bowne's *magnum opus*, a comprehensive work of extraordinary insight and power, in which he expounded what he then called his "objective idealism."

4. *Introduction to Psychological Theory*, 1886. A searching criticism of the "new psychology."

5. *The Philosophy of Theism*, 1887. A more systematic and compact work than *Studies in Theism*.

6. *The Principles of Ethics*, 1892. This book is regarded by some as Bowne's most valuable work. He here exposes with relentless rigor the inadequacy of the ethical theories of the past, insists on the necessity of uniting the intuitive and experience schools, and finds the aim of conduct not in abstract virtue but in fullness and richness of life.

7. *The Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 1897. A revision and expansion of the epistemological material that had appeared in the earlier work on *Metaphysics*.

8. *Metaphysics*, 1898. This work completes the revision, begun in the preceding volume, of the *Metaphysics* of 1882. Bowne here characterizes his system as "transcendental empiricism."

9. *The Christian Revelation*, 1898. A booklet.

10. *The Christian Life*, 1899. A booklet.

11. *The Atonement*, 1900. This booklet and the two preceding companion volumes attracted wide attention and were by some regarded as heretical. Professor William James referred to them as "wonderfully able rationalistic booklets."

12. *Theism*, 1902. A revision and expansion of *The Philosophy of Theism*. We have here as compact and masterful a presentation of the theistic argument as is anywhere to be found.

13. *The Immanence of God*, 1905. An application of Bowne's philosophy to some of the problems of religion. Its main thesis is expressed in the statement that "the undivineness of the natural and the unnaturalness of the divine is the great heresy of popular thought respecting religion."

14. *Personalism*, 1908. This title expresses better than either "objective idealism" or "transcendental empiricism" the characteristic and distinctive element in Bowne's philosophy. "I am," he said toward the close of his life, "a Personalist, the first of the clan in any thorough-going sense." As evidence of Bowne's extraordinary mastery of the subject matter and terminology of philosophy it may be noted that the six lectures in "Personalism" were dictated to a stenographer in six sittings of about two hours each. The dictations were, of course, later revised, but the revision did not materially alter either the substance or final form of the book.

15. *Studies in Christianity*, 1909. A series of essays on religious subjects, including the three on *The Christian Revelation*, *The Christian Life*, and *The Atonement*, previously published.

16. *The Essence of Religion*, 1910. A series of sermons edited by Mrs. Bowne and published shortly after Professor Bowne's death.

17. *Kant and Spencer: A Critical Exposition*, 1912. This work is made up of class-room lectures which Bowne had dictated to a stenographer but which he had not revised for publication. The revision was made by Mrs. Bowne, assisted by two or three former students.

It might be added that at the time of his death Professor Bowne was about to publish a work under the title, *The Present Status of Faith*. The essays that were to be included in the volume had all except one been written and had appeared in various magazines. The last one, which was to be the first in the book, was most of it dictated to a stenographer the day before his death. But the volume has not been published.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON.

Albert Cornelius Knudson, Ph.D., D.D., formerly Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in the Boston University School of Theology.

has recently been transferred to the chair of Systematic Theology in the same institution.

PROFESSOR BOWNE AND THE METHODIST REVIEW

No name has been more closely associated with the METHODIST REVIEW for the last forty-seven years than that of Borden Parker Bowne. The following Index is given:

In 1875, pp. 97, 415, there appeared two very able articles on his first book, *The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, by Professor Martin, of the University of the City of New York, from which institution Dr. Bowne graduated in 1871.

The following contributed articles by Professor Bowne have appeared in the REVIEW:

Some Objections to Theism. 1879, p. 224.

Ethics of Evolution. (A drastic criticism of Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics*). 1880, p. 430.

The Significance of the Body for Mental Action. 1886, p. 262.

Explanation—A Logical Study. 1888, p. 649.

Philosophical Idealism. 1889, p. 395.

Evolution and Evolution. 1893, p. 681.

Some Popular Mistakes Respecting Evolution. 1893, p. 849.

The Natural and Supernatural. 1895, p. 9.

The Speculative Significance of Freedom. 1895, p. 681.

Ethical Legislation by the Church. 1896, p. 370.

Aberrant Moralism. 1900, p. 247.

Mr. Spencer's Philosophy. 1904, p. 513.

Morals and Life. 1909, p. 708.

A Letter from Borden Parker Bowne. 1910, p. 619.

Jesus or Christ? 1910, p. 177.

The Supremacy of Christ. 1910, p. 881.

Appreciations of Dr. Bowne and his philosophy have appeared in contributed articles as follows:

J. I. Bartholomew: The Ethical Value of Bowne's Idealism. 1898, p. 543.

George Albert Coe: Borden Parker Bowne. 1910, p. 513.

Ralph T. Flewelling: Bergson, Ward, and Eucken, in Their Relation to Bowne. 1914, p. 374.

Besides the extended discussion on his first published book, mentioned above, the following notices of his works have appeared in the REVIEW:

Studies in Theism. 1879, p. 775. *Principles of Ethics*. 1892, p. 994.

Theory of Thought and Knowledge. 1896, p. 934. *The Christian Revelation*. 1898, p. 998. *Metaphysics*. 1899, p. 332. *The Christian Life*. 1899, p. 1016. *The Essence of Religion*. 1911, p. 325.

THE ORTHODOXY OF BOWNE

COLLATED BY THE EDITOR

IN the spring of 1904 at the session of the New York East Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, of which Doctor Bowne was a member, charges of heretical teaching were brought against him by a member of another Annual Conference. These charges were wholly based on passages taken from several of his published works. He was charged with teaching:

1. Doctrines which are contrary to the Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

2. Doctrines which are contrary to the established standards of doctrine of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

First Specification. He denies the Trinitarian conception of the Deity and also the moral attributes of the Deity as set forth in the first and fourth Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

(This specification was followed by extended quotations from Bowne's *Metaphysics* and *Philosophy of Theism*.)

Second Specification. His teaching on miracles is such as to weaken if not destroy faith in large portions of the Old and New Testaments. His views on the inspiration of Scripture are contrary to the teachings of the Scriptures themselves, contrary to article five of the Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and tend to destroy faith in the authority of the Bible in matters of faith and practice.

(Quotations from Bowne's booklet on *The Christian Revelation*.)

Third Specification. He denies the Doctrine of the Atonement as set forth in the second and twentieth Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church and as taught by our established standards of doctrine.

(Quotations from Bowne's booklet on *The Atonement*.)

Fourth Specification. He teaches such views of the divine government and of the future of souls as to destroy the force of

Christ's teaching about the future punishment of the wicked and the future reward of the righteous.

(Quotations from *The Atonement* and *Metaphysics*.)

Fifth Specification. He teaches views on the subject of Sin and Salvation, on Repentance, Justification, Regeneration, and Assurance of Salvation through the Witness of the Spirit that do not represent the views of the Methodist Episcopal Church as expressed in our standard works of theology.

(Quotations from *The Christian Life* and the *Philosophy of Theism*.)

The Conference session was held in Simpson Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., under the presidency of Bishop Cyrus D. Foss, April 6-12, 1904. The Select Number appointed to represent the Conference in the trial was made up of fifteen of the most distinguished names in that body, many of them outstanding leaders in the church at large. Here is the list: J. E. Adams, D. W. Couch, John Rippere, Francis B. Upham, Herbert Welch, J. O. Wilson, A. H. Wyatt, Francis L. Strickland, George Preston Mains, C. H. Buck, S. O. Curtice, David G. Downey, Charles L. Goodell, John Wesley Johnston, William V. Kelley. The Rev. Dr. Frank Mason North was appointed to represent the bishop in presidency at the trial. Dr. James Monroe Buckley appeared as counsel for the defendant. The prosecution was represented by A. C. Eggleston, B. F. Kidder, and Arthur W. Byrt, by appointment, whose function was chiefly to secure for the complainant, who was a member of another Annual Conference, his full legal rights at the trial.

Of those who took part in the proceedings the following names are now recorded in the Roll of the Dead: James O. Wilson, Albert H. Wyatt, Charles H. Buck, Borden P. Bowne, Arthur W. Byrt, Asahel C. Eggleston, David W. Couch, James Monroe Buckley, John Rippere. Surely these crowned members of the church triumphant must now wonder, as they meet in that unclouded light, at the folly of this petty warfare of the church militant in which they were compelled to take part.

The extracts from the testimony of Professor Bowne collated in this article are very fragmentary and, of course, cannot be con-

sidered as a complete Confession of Faith. Perhaps for that the best source would be Bowne's *Essence of Religion*, a volume of sermons. But these fragments will possibly furnish a slight glimpse into the workings of his mind on religious questions in their relation to speculative thought.

It is not possible in the space at our disposal to give the very lengthy quotations from the works of Bowne which were submitted as evidence of his heresy. Nor is it necessary, for these very able speculations in the philosophic realm have nothing more to do with the concrete values of religious faith than the theory of logarithms with the Declaration of Independence. It would be quite as proper to accuse the author of a textbook on arithmetic with heresy because he nowhere tries to show how three can equal one.

THE FIRST SPECIFICATION

After the alleged evidence against him had been presented Professor Bowne took the stand.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND BRETHREN: I am astonished with a great astonishment to find these things brought forward as proofs of a Unitarian view. They really have no more connection with the specific doctrine of the Trinity than they have with the binomial theorem, or the Roosevelt administrative policy of the Panama Canal. Those propositions would prove me guilty of stealing horses just as quickly as they prove me guilty of Unitarianism. I simply cannot make any reply whatever to these first pages. I can make no reply because there is absolutely no occasion. I was arguing in a general way some points in epistemology, etc. And as I go along, I make these statements with as utter innocence of any thought or bearing on the Trinity as could possibly be. That I must simply rule out.

In the next place, a statement is made here as to the relation of the world to God. I say the world is neither in nor out of God in a spatial sense, and that God is neither in nor out of the world in a spatial sense. That is, God is not a great circumference with the world inside of him. Nor is God a spatial circumference here with the world outside of him in picture form. In thinking in these regions, thought carries us at once beyond the regions of spatial picturing. The world depends unpicturably upon the divine power. We do not think of the thoughts of the mind inside of the mind in the spatial sense. Thoughts are not in the mind spatially. Neither are they out of the mind spatially. But thoughts are in consciousness. We think and we know that we think. That's the end of it. The world is not in God spatially, and God is not in the world spatially.

A. C. Eggleston: Unpicturably means unreality?

Professor Bowne: What do you think?

A. C. Eggleston: I want your meaning.

Professor Bowne: If any one will read this kind of thing, he must read it in thought terms, and if any one will read it he must read it at his own risk.

A. C. Eggleston: It is merely a question of clearing yourself.

Professor Bowne: I do not believe that it has ever before been misunderstood. I should say that unpicturable does not mean unreal.

G. P. Mains: When writing these matters did you have any thought of the Trinity and the moral attributes of Deity?

Professor Bowne: Not in the slightest.

G. P. Mains: In other words, you were not engaged in theological questions?

Professor Bowne: Not in the least.

J. W. Johnston: When you were writing, had you in your mind certain theories, and were you not trying to convert these theories and offer us something that would give standing ground?

Professor Bowne: Technical questions of theology were not in my mind at all. . . . I was trying to straighten out our fundamental theology and theistic thinking. You know we have had a great atheistic gust in the generation just passed. Those are the questions in debate in the generation just over, all of which I saw and part of which I was. . . . It goes away back to the pre-Socratic times, etc. Not the slightest theological bearing is discussed here. . . . In my writing, I take up a doctrine and throw myself into it. I am not setting forth my own view. The matter does not seem to call for any further statement. The final word is given here.

J. M. Buckley: I think you ought to comment upon each one of these several statements.

Professor Bowne: There is a Trinitarian argument. I am a Trinitarian of the Trinitarians. I published a sermon in Zion's Herald on the Incarnation, in which I set forth that our Lord had existed before his Incarnation. That sermon was published not very long ago. I am a Trinitarian of the Trinitarians. So I set out to make my view as essentially Trinitarian. But you must not assume that this is a work on the general philosophy of Theism. It was not a work that intended to deal with it. It was not. . . . All this argument, which was meant as Trinitarian, and which is Trinitarian, is brought here as proof that I am a Unitarian. . . .

In my *Metaphysics* I have set forth at length the relation of the finite spirit to the divine, to God. And there I have with all my might sought to maintain a sufficient separateness of the finite spirit as over against God to make provision for another life. A point on which I have always been most strenuous. This particular point here had not the slightest bearing on this matter.

J. M. Buckley: Into this question we have no cause to enter. Kindly explain wherein you are distinguishing from pantheism in this proposition.

Professor Bowne: As to pantheism, the essential distinction between pantheism and the idealistic Theism which I hold is found in the freedom and self-hood of mind. Now, we have this measure of self-hood, this measure of self-direction whereby we are constituted persons with the power of self-control, to some extent, constituted moral persons, subjects of a moral government. That is not pantheism. And that is my view. . . . As to this other question, all that that statement means is that by way of speculation we should not get very far into the nature of God.

THE SECOND SPECIFICATION

Probably the longest time in the trial was consumed in consideration of Professor Bowne's attitude on the Doctrine of Sacred Scripture. The complainant could not understand the pedagogic methods of the accused. Bowne's book on *The Christian Revelation*, like many of the others of his works, was not an expression of his own full faith, but an effort to help troubled minds to find a road to faith. He therefore deals not with confessional maximums of belief, but with the essential minimums of faith. He is concerned with saving to the modern mind the fundamentals of Christian truth. But he would not mean by "Fundamentals" what is now being propagated by some fossil survivors of seventeenth century Protestant scholasticism and who are trying to load up the Christian consciousness with a lot of extra-confessional stuff.

After many extended quotations from his works had been made and interpreted by the complainant, Professor Bowne continued his testimony.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: It hardly seems worth while to take up your time. You know very well that these biblical questions have been burning questions of late years. There has been a great deal of uncertainty in popular thought, especially among educated people, graduates from our high schools and colleges, and those who have been familiar with the literature there, and when I wrote this book, or these books rather, I meant to meet difficulties which are in the minds of those persons. Philosophy is not everybody's fad, and so biblical discussion is not everybody's fad; and this is so in the religious use of the Bible and biblical questions. There is many an old saint whose reading is "The Lord is my Shepherd, I shall not want," and there is a religious use and a great use of the Bible by a great majority of people. But then there are these other questions which belong to scholarship and which, in the long run, are very important. In the confused condition of things it has seemed to me

very desirable to reach some point of view which would serve as a kind of *modus vivendi*, and so I have raised the question, What is the central thing in Revelation? and I have said it is the revelation of God. It tells us what God is, what he means, what his relation to us is, what is his purpose concerning us, what he is going to do, and what the meaning of life is. Now I consider we get through Revelation certain ideas which I call the "Christian Revelation," the essential thing, and I believed it was important to fix our thought upon these central things in order that we might have the great value of Revelation. For, really when we take the book from many a point of view, and look around for specific treatises in speculative theology, it does not seem that we have much of value, and when you look upon it as a Revelation of God we see the significance of it. We as Christians are living in the light and power of certain great Christian conceptions which are here, have been here, are believed here, and will be here as long as the world endures. . . . If we hold these central ideas we are Christians. I think you will admit that I affirm nothing here. I affirm nothing as to the composition of the Pentateuch or the Second Isaiah. A great many scholars at least agree concerning the Pentateuchal question; that we find something originally written by Moses, but also redactions and additions. Let that turn out as it may, they still have the Christian idea. Or "The Second Isaiah." They still have the Christian idea. Now these are questions for expert scholars. I do not claim the ability to decide them, and I know very well that many cannot; they are questions for expert scholars, and will be decided by expert scholarship, and nothing can be settled by hue and cry. Those must be settled by scholars, and we must be perfectly assured that, in the long run, the truth will make its way—*truth will make its way*. In the meantime, we fall back on the great essential ideas of God, what he is, what he means, and we live in those ideas, and we rule our lives by them. It is a *modus vivendi* which I conceived, and to secure such, I wrote the book.

Now concerning page 65: "However we insist on the presence of mythical and unhistorical matter in the Bible, it has not prevented God's highest revelation of himself. . . . All we can insist upon is, that the record, the legend, the myth, if there be such, shall not obscure the purpose of the whole, the Revelation of God."

My thought is that the revelation of God is the great central thing. There are persons who say it is a myth and unhistorical matter; and I say, well, suppose that is so? nevertheless, it does not obscure the great thing, the great revelation of God; the important ideas concerning God, what he is, what he means, these come to us along the lines of revelations in the Scriptures.

Dr. Buckley: The complainant in this matter has mutilated the passage and withheld from the church and the committee a very remarkable passage which runs in the other direction. I will read from the book and request the committee to compare what I read with what is presented in the charges: "However we insist on the presence of mythical and unhistorical matter in the Bible, it has not prevented God's highest

revelation of himself. This is the treasure which the vessel of Scripture, however earthen, demonstrably contains. What the Christian thinker should maintain is the divine presence and guidance in the rational movement as a whole. He need not concern himself about details whether for better or for worse." Why that was omitted in the affirmative proposition concerning nature or revelation I do not know, but that was omitted.

Professor Bowne: Now with regard to the remarks on pages 79 and 80. I think that there is no question that the Jews spoke of the supernatural in a way that showed that God was the agent in all things, and they referred things to God without reference to a secondary, intermediate causation. The Lord said this, the Lord said that, etc., in which case they may have been entirely correct in the standard of causality. In other words, had we seen anything that looked divine, it would have looked as the plague of locusts looked, or like the plague of grasshoppers in Kansas now. The locusts flew very much like as they do in the west. This does not seem like a divine power in the matter. As I said in the book, suppose an Armada should be sent on the coast of Palestine, and one of the old prophets had described it, he would have described it in the form of a divine standard: "The Lord sent out his lightnings and he blew upon them and they were scattered," etc., etc. But if you had been there, and had seen just such a blow and a scattering you would have believed that the Lord directed them and not angels flying about and raising a wind. That is all that means.

Now, with regard to this other passage: "When we come to the distinctively miraculous, to that which breaks with the natural order and reveals the presence of a supernatural power, we may still look for some of the familiar natural continuities. Miracles which break with all law would be nothing intelligible." While we believe in a good deal that is supernatural without affirming that it is miraculous, we believe in the divine presence in our lives, but we do not mean by that that we have angels or anything of that kind coming and directing us. But we believe that our times are in God's hands. And so our lives go on, and we still believe we are in God's hands. There would be a supernatural guidance without anything miraculous grating with the laws of life and psychology. I believe that all the processes of nature are supernatural. They obey the divine will and are carried on with the ever-living will in which we live, and move, and have our being. I do not think everything is miraculous. On the contrary, there are other ways of doing things.

But, suppose we come now to the distinctly miraculous. How think of it? It would be no more divine than the outgoings of the world; no more dependent upon God than the sparrow which does not fall without the Father. What is the meaning? Why, it would be necessary to attract sense-bound minds who would otherwise be immersed so that they might know God as theirs.

A. C. Eggleston: Do you believe that?

Professor Bowne: I am a crass supernaturalist.

Dr. Buckley: Speak of the Resurrection of Christ.

Professor Bowne: "Miracles which break with all law would be

nothing intelligible." That sentence as it stands is not very clear. It means this: that when God works miracles, still there is a great body of law and that, connecting the miracle with these other things through that body of law, there is no break. Suppose God wrought a miracle and enlightened a common person. We can imagine a distinct break. Take Saint Paul's case. Law was such and held in such a way that God did not make Paul a new being without some reference to the old body. When he wanted to work a miracle he worked for us. God might have performed the same miracle in the mind of Peter and James as in the mind of Paul. The miracle was wrought on the foundation of law, and Paul was able then to go on with all that back-lying amount of law and nature and developing into something which, without a miracle, James or Peter could never have reached.

A Voice: Do you apply that to the Resurrection of Christ?

Professor Bowne: I believe in the Resurrection of Christ. I believe in it.

A. C. Eggleston: You say: "With this view you can dispense with everything else." What does that "everything else" convey? Is it a general feeling that whatever was said—

Professor Bowne: Of course the language must be applied to the subject under discussion. If we are able to hold the Christian view concerning God and man; and if we are Christians and have that, we are Christians. We can let everything else go that need be. It must apply to a great many persons. Many are not sure of this or that. But I say if you can hold on to God and Christ and to the view of the relation of God to us, with the Christian view of what God is, and the meaning of life and destiny, leave out other things.

A. W. Byrt: Let other things go.

Professor Bowne: It is unessential for Christianity. I do not hold that in order to be a Christian one must believe that the ax swam.

D. G. Downey: (Quoting.) "When we consider it as a dogmatic treatise in abstract speculative theology, or as a text-book in ethics, or as anything but a revelation of God, it is easy to doubt whether it has any special and abiding religious value." The Professor does not intend to teach that the Bible is not a good text-book in ethics?

Professor Bowne: It is a question that we shall put first. It used to be a good way on works apologetic to begin with the supreme difference in Bible teachings in ethics. There were deep and profound essentials found in the sacred books of the East. And the answer was always then, People have to rummage about among other sacred books to find something as good. They made a good talk about the Golden Rule. They said they could not find anything like that anywhere, and they rummaged about in the works of Confucius and pre-Christian writings, and there were a lot of books and a lot of talk, but I have said the important thing is the Doctrine of God, and out of that comes the very important theological teaching. But the central thing is the revelation of God. Dr. Harris' book in which he makes the whole discussion of revelation, turns on the title, *The Self-Revelation of God*.

That is the new form which Apologetics has taken on with all those whose writings command much attention now. The central thing is God! There is a very excellent little book, now out of print, entitled *The Chief End of Revelation*, much better than recent works. In this the especial emphasis is the revelation of God. All the ethics and theologies are important. I do not think with regard to abstract theology that that thought leads into the ground, but I remember this, that there was a theology which taught that in God there was one essence, two processions, three persons, four relations, five notions, and a circumincession.¹

Dr. Kidder: In the passage referred to, pages 41 and 42, as a quotation you say: "This conception of a dictated book has always ruled popular theological thought, and for manifold reasons. The notion of a revelation through history, through the moral life of a community, through the insight of godly men, is comparatively difficult and uncertain." Do you give these two as the only interpretation of inspiration of God's revelation to man as recorded in the Scriptures or out of the Scriptures? Do you mean that the revelation through history, through the moral life of the community, comparatively uncertain though it be, is the better revelation or the more accurate revelation of God?

Professor Bowne: I think that is the way revelation has been made. Revelation has been made in that way, and that the Bible has not come through such dictation. There may be passages, here and there, where it says, "The Word of the Lord came to me."

Dr. Kidder: Then the conception of a dictated book you rule out?

Professor Bowne: I lay that aside.

Dr. Kidder: Then we have no other alternative except this, "through the moral life of a community, through the insight of godly men." If that is the only other alternative, does your conception of the Bible mean that God is still making a progressive revelation of himself with equal authority by which he made it through Isaiah, Paul, and John? You say there is a middle ground that is not defined. In other words, as Bishop Foss said, referring to Dr. Horton's lectures at Yale, does God still reveal himself to us in precisely the same manner as he did to Isaiah and Paul? Or did those men have the inspiration of the Holy Spirit of God revealing himself to them, so that they spake with authoritative utterance?

Professor Bowne: It would depend altogether upon the contents of the revelation and the cogency with which they appealed to Christian thought. As a matter of fact the Christian Church has agreed that we have received a revelation through those men which outranks the revelation in any other way. If anyone should start up with a revelation that was distinctly contradictory to the revelations which came through those men, we should think this new revelation was a mistake. At the same time it is also perfectly clear that the subjects which they had, have been brought out in their meaning in the light and life of the church, as the Spirit was promised to lead us into Truth. The early Christian Church

¹The reciprocal existence in each other of the three persons of the Trinity.—Webster.

accepted the germ, had no such clear ideas as we have. I say nothing at all about it, but there is a question whether Saint Paul himself had as clear a conception of what was meant as we have now. We cannot separate the authority of the Bible from the authority of the church and the authority of the Christian Conference [consciousness?] that would set up one as independent of the other. This question of authority is something which can never be settled except in practise. To attempt to discuss authority in an abstract way, and get it drawn out in logical formulæ, always ends in confusion. Precisely the same thing you have in the general question of certainty. How do I know that I am saved? The next thing is to plunge into the very depth of uncertainty. I fall back upon the use of our faculties, and reach such certainty as experience gives. And so with regard to the Bible and religious certainty in general. There is a great blunder that the churches largely make. First, we have churches resting on the authority of the church. It is a perfectly easy thing to explode. Then we have the Protestant Church with the authority of the Bible, and it is perfectly easy to take that abstract thought and make it uncertain. We have the authority of the church and the Bible, the authority of the religious community, all the work of God, including great conflicts, vital functions, but there is no possibility of separation. I do not believe, for instance, that any church would long consent to accept statements in the Bible which were agreed upon as distinctly contradictory to reason and conscience. On the other hand, I do not believe that reason and conscience would very long support themselves without the use of the Bible. I do not think that either one of them would support themselves without the Christian community in which the Christian life were going on.

Dr. Kidder: The point has not been quite reached. We will set aside the "dictated" conception of the book, and we accept the manifestation of God's presence to the human mind and heart in spiritual relationship now. But Jesus said, "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me," and Paul said, "All inspiration, given of God, is profitable . . . for reproof," etc. . . . In another place, "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The point is this. The church at large has held that through the writing contained in the Scriptures there is a special concentration of light touching man's relationship to God that does not come with equal authority through any inspiration that a man may receive directly from and now apart from those sources. And in these statements here there does not seem to me to be any necessary acknowledgment of that fact, although there would not be any necessary denial of it. And I would like an interpretation, whether this "insight of godly men" is equally authoritative as that of the prophets.

Professor Bowne: One cannot say everything at once. I have said elsewhere that this knowledge of God, which I have spoken of as of

¹It is rather singular that no one at the trial called attention to this mistranslation of John 5.39. What Jesus did say was "Ye search the Scriptures," etc. In other words, our Lord condemned the Jews for going to a Book to find life, instead of coming to the Person of whom the Book testifies.—Editor.

exceeding value, a great source of light and inspiration, "the light of all our day"—that this comes to us along the line of God's revelation to man through his Son. If any modern prophet arises I should be willing to listen to what his revelation might be, and probably discount it.

A. C. Eggleston: Where do you make a difference or distinction between the "insight of godly men" and "man's invention"?

Professor Bowne: Insight is one thing, and invention is another. . . . Revelation leads to insight.

A. C. Eggleston: How did Moses come upon that wonderful characterization of God, "long-suffering, full of compassion, and that will not acquit the guilty." Did he get that from his insight?

Professor Bowne: God gave him the insight. That is the way I should put it. I suppose he had the insight that God was there.

A. C. Eggleston: I suppose that too. But now about this "inerrancy of the Bible." "And thus it appears how barren and practically irrelevant is the abstract question as to the inerrancy of the Bible" (page 57). How does that come in there? "The doctrine is of no practical interest."

Professor Bowne: Well, it is not. Let me talk about that for the moment. I am speaking of the "absolute inerrancy of the Bible," the technical inerrancy, such absoluteness of statement as forbids the notion of mistake. . . . For instance, the inscription on the Cross in several forms; there is a high probability that one was not exactly so. Then you have thousands of different readings in the manuscripts, and it is plain that there cannot be absolute equal inspiration in everything. The great thing is to obtain its general trustworthiness. One says, "If you admit inerrancy at all, how can you be sure of anything?" I say, that is an abstract question which does not admit of answer and which doesn't need any.

Dr. Buckley: I would ask, Dr. Bowne, whether you believe that the revelations in the Bible have come with abiding power and definiteness in the world's thought and life, only along the line of God's revelation of himself and God's providence.

Professor Bowne: All this I steadfastly believe.

Dr. Buckley: I am asking whether he believes certain things here; I would like to find out whether he believes these things. Do you believe that when you compare Christianity with outlying religions we feel its measure of superiority?

Professor Bowne: All this I steadfastly believe.

Dr. Buckley: When we compare it with the revelation of nature, etc.

Professor Bowne: All this I steadfastly believe.

THIRD SPECIFICATION

The charge as to heresy on the doctrine of the Atonement was wholly based on extracts from Professor Bowne's little book, *The Atonement*, in which he criticizes substitutionary, commercial and governmental theories as being based on excessive literalism

in exegesis. Whether or not any specific theory of the Atonement is definitely set forth in our Methodist standards is very doubtful. But on the fact of the Atonement Methodism stands firm and so does Professor Bowne, as will be seen in his testimony which is here given.

Professor Bowne: Our wheels drag heavily. My purpose in writing this booklet was as in writing the other. However clear theologically that may be in itself there is certainly a great deal of misunderstanding among many thoughtful young people who are trying to consider this question on the basis of their good sense, and view of right and wrong, etc. I had a letter from a woman in Washington which was an attack on the doctrine of the atonement as a rational doctrine. She set forth all the difficulties that were in her mind. I refer to that as an illustration of the kind of cases that I meet very often—young people in colleges especially. And it was to help them, not to instruct theologians, that I wrote it.

Now, first of all, as I think I have said here, I have declared the Christian Church has always held that the great work of divine grace has been wrought for the salvation of men. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son." "The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto . . . but to give himself a ransom for many." I could give you many quotations. I believe most emphatically, without any reservation of any kind, in the great redemption wrought by our Lord. And, as I have said here in another passage, in my thought there is nothing beside. The great work of grace has been wrought. The Father gave the Son for the salvation of men. That is what I consider to be the fact of the atonement. There is nothing which demands theorizing. It is the expression of the divine love for the blessing and the salvation of men. Up to this point we have a fact. But then the rational nature always insists upon rationalizing, systematizing its views, and of course that demands thought. Now, out of that come the various theories of the atonement. The church has always held to the fact. It always will. The fact given up, there would be nothing distinctively Christian, nothing left worth preaching. The incarnation for the purpose of atonement to mankind is the very gist and evidence of Christianity. But then as to the theories. Now you know what very crude theories were held at an early date. The mind of the race went into eclipse brought about by having heathen notions thrown upon the Christian mind; there were a great multitude of these which were pagan notions. The Christian thought remained in that condition and then they began to rationalize in theory, and from that time it has gone on down to the present day and we have had a great many theories, and we have still many now. Dr. Miley in his book on the *Atonement* quotes somewhere one who says, "There are thirteen theories of the atonement." But Dr. Miley thinks that some of these do not so differ as to be separated. And the end is not yet. What have these men been trying to do? To form a theory of the atonement. These theories of the theologians have been in the highest

degree unsatisfactory, and I have sought in a fashion to say things, not to give an entirely new interpretation but an interpretation of the atonement which is in entire harmony with the Scriptures, more in harmony with the present type of Christian thought, with all the enlightenment there has come to it in the illumination of the Spirit and of experience, more in harmony than the theories which have hitherto obtained among us. And a good many of the Bible students find what I do not find. There is not an entirely satisfactory theory. The work of grace is set forth in a variety of ways in the temple service and Roman law. Paul gives no consistent view. He says a good many things all of which are significant and of value, but we have not a perfect system in the Scriptures and not in theology. Neither have we in our Methodist teaching. Our Methodist teaching was originally somewhat a satisfaction view. It remains a modified satisfaction view in the Southern Methodist Church still. In our own church it has gone over somewhat to the governmental view, set forth by Dr. Miley, but that by no means commands the acceptance of all the members of the church.

Dr. Couch: Do you urge the governmental view?

Professor Bowne: I reject anything which needs to be carried forward. It was carried forward from the things behind it, but we are compelled to go on.

Dr. Couch: "That God might be justified, and become the justifier of him that believeth."

Professor Bowne: All these expressions I accept. It is a matter of interpretation of what these things mean. I myself use the Scripture terminology with great freedom. I have no difficulty with using such a hymn as "There is a fountain filled with blood." I can sing it with great zeal, but after you have said that, how do you interpret it? It is an adumbration with a great meaning behind it. We try to get the meaning into the minds of men. I do accept and use the language of the Scriptures. It has never occurred to me to find the least difficulty in them. I do not butt against analogy. I am after meanings.

Now it is said that I have spoken against "satisfaction." That term—satisfaction. We have a satisfaction and a substitution theory, and when I speak of satisfaction it is not satisfaction I am speaking of. I am speaking practically of that doctrine of penal substitution, *penal* satisfaction, which our church rejects. And when I say, "It is a satisfaction that does not satisfy," it means that. If that view were true, perfectly true, exactly correct, then it would follow that since the work of Christ all for whom Christ died would be necessarily free from the consequences of sin. The Calvinists always drew that conclusion, and the Calvinistic Universalists always draw that.

Now, I use the term satisfaction with regard to that theory. Dr. Miley draws himself that conclusion, and makes it one reason for setting aside that view. And I found him drawing precisely the same conclusion, and I say a great many things, unfortunately expressed perhaps, that we are having a satisfaction that does not satisfy, and an expiation that does not expiate, because we are left to bear the visible consequences of

our evil doings, and that leads to the suspicion that on this view some of the unseen consequences may come around to us.

We are setting forth simply the logic of the doctrine. Various views are given and finally we must interpret this work of God and his grace in accordance with our ethical ideas. We cannot interpret it satisfactorily on the forensic plane.

FOURTH AND FIFTH SPECIFICATIONS

On these final charges much less time was taken in the trial and Dr. Bowne was called upon for but little testimony. This seems to us somewhat unfortunate, for questions of Christian life and experience have a pragmatic worth far exceeding dogmatic opinions.

But the Select Number were crowded for time. As is often the case, many moments had been consumed with technical discussions as to procedure. And then they had to give a reasonable range of time for the final arguments of the complainant and Doctor Buckley.

Here is a short statement as to the defendant's views on future punishment. Evidently Professor Bowne was wholly in harmony with the desire of God to save all men, *if they would let him*.

Professor Bowne: The only force of this charge is that I am a Universalist. I am not. I would like to be if I could, but I am not.

Dr. Couch: Would you like to be?

Professor Bowne: Only in this sense; I should like to believe that it was God's purpose finally to bring all souls into obedience unto himself. I should like to have that faith if I could. I am not a Universalist. As to these remarks about Metaphysics and the light, I have said simply that, left to Metaphysical reasoning, we should not get very far concerning the future of the soul. That is all. Any positive conviction we have depends on our moral nature or some word of revelation.

Dr. Buckley: I ask him whether he believes that there will be any probation after death, for a person thoroughly instructed in the gospel of Christ in this world?

Professor Bowne: I do not know of any such thing, and I should feel perfectly unjustified in telling any one, "You shall have another chance."

THE VERDICT

After two hours of interesting argument by the prosecution and the defense, the full Select Number of Fifteen being present,

votes by ballot were taken on each of the Five Specifications. The result in each case was the same: Sustained, none; not sustained, fifteen.

The verdict of the Committee was expressed as follows:

The Select Number, to whom were referred the charges against Borden P. Bowne for "disseminating doctrines contrary to the Articles of Religion and our Standards of doctrine," report:

That all the evidence and testimony offered by complainant and defendant in this case have been received and carefully considered, and that counsel for each has had ample opportunity for the presentation of arguments.

That the Select Number, by unanimous vote taken by ballot, find and decide that of the five specifications none are sustained, and that the charges are not sustained.

(Signed.) FRANK MASON NORTH, Chairman.

WM. H. BUNOWIN, Assistant Secretary.

THE PICTURE OF PASTOR X

ARTHUR W. HEWITT

Plainfield, Vt.

THE gloaming fell on Drew Forest. My lecture was over in the school of the prophets. Dr. Edwin L. Earp said, "I should like to hear you speak on this theme: What are the necessary qualifications of a rural pastor?" Instantly I recognized the most significant of all themes touching the country church. Wentworth's *Algebra*, the yellow old book with warts on the cover, used to teach us that x stood for the unknown. Doubtless the ideal minister is still Pastor X. But the question raised that spring evening on the campus at Madison makes me want to imagine him—the pastor I should like to be. Let us think, then, on the only proposition that is of any importance at all to the "country church problem"—as it shouldn't be called: "What elements are necessary in a rural pastor? What qualities within him foreordain his success, the absence of which will doom his failure?"

In this article we shall consider those qualities which relate primarily to his office as preacher and pastor; in another those which relate more to his spirit and personality. I have already made it clear that the rural pastor needs to be a man of large intellect. He must also have:

1. *A wide variety of intellectual interests.* The rural pastorate must be long enough to develop policies covering many years, and the preacher must not be monotonous or narrowed to a few themes only. But length of pastorate is not the reason for demanding variety; it is not merely a question of the bottomless barrel. In the heart of the city are many churches, ten or fifty. Dr. Blossom is a poetical preacher and little else; no matter, out of all the city he gets a full house of his kind. Those who do not like it can go elsewhere. Dr. Firebrand of Theatre Row is very sensational. It does no harm—those who do not like it may go elsewhere. Dr. Psychologicus likes to preach on the Teleological Significance of our Subconscious Psychoses, and it is all right, out

of all the urban ant-hill he will have his audience. Dr. Ephemeron is strong on topics of the day, Dr. Antiquarian on history. It does not matter what predominates over the mind of any city pastor, he will always find enough of his kind to fill a church if he is in a city. What is still more important, the people who do not like his kind of preaching can surely find a place to go where they can be fed with what they can digest. But if the rural pastor who has solitary charge of the whole country-side should be narrow in his interests or have but a few themes or tones, he soon has a small and classified audience. The fatal thing about it is that the sheep of his pasture have no other green grass. The rural preacher must be able to minister to all varieties the human mind can take. He must be able to forage far afield from his own natural hobbies.

2. *Imagination* in large degree is necessary to the country pastor. Life is real, not academic, to folks who live close to nature and work with their hands. They do not care for abstract thinking. They may be as intellectual as their city brothers, probably would average to be more so, but the man who interests them in his preaching must put things with picturesque reality, vividly and concretely. Their own thinking is so. Hang your pictures on the walls of the soul and folks will look at them long after you are done speaking. Illustrative preaching is the first to grip, the last to be forgotten. When you were told that it was ninety-three million miles to the sun, you merely thought, "A long way—guess I won't go!" but you were astounded at such distance when you knew that an express train traveling day and night without stop would reach the earth to-night if it had started from the sun the day Elizabeth took the throne of England; that a babe with an arm long enough to reach the sun would die past eighty before he could feel the burn by nerve-transmission. Early in the war some one spoke of a billion dollars and it didn't mean much to us till we learned that there had not been a billion minutes since Christ was born. A minister told his congregation that the Christian population of the world was five hundred and fifty millions. They sat listless, imitating Homer. Then he made his facts alive and they listened. "Such an army of men marching single file past the door of the church, without rest day or night, would take

forty-two years to pass; if stood in single file out into space, they would reach 178,000 miles more than the distance from the earth to the moon."

"If your Honor wad but permit me," said old Edie Ochiltree to the Earl of Glenallan in *The Antiquary*, "auld Elspath's like some of the ancient ruined strengths and castles that ane sees amang the hills. There are mony parts of her mind that appear, as I may say, laid waste and decayed, but then there's parts that look the steever, and the stronger, and the grander, because they are rising just like fragments amang the ruins o' the rest. She's an awful woman." It was pure imaginative description.

Recently I had to speak at the funeral of Maria V. Duke, one hundred and two years old. To moralize on the length of her life would have been dull, but there was a fascination in thinking that when our aged friend was born, King George III was still to have three years on the throne of England. It was the year when Madison gave way to Monroe. Only four Presidents had ruled our country and not a President since Andrew Johnson was then born. There were only nineteen States in the Union, not one west of Indiana. Scott and Byron were in the height of their fame. Wordsworth, Campbell, Shelley, Southey, Coleridge, and De Quincey were in mid-career. John Keats had not published his first book, and Charles Kingsley was not born. Among the little eight-year-old boys of the day were Charles Darwin, Edgar Allan Poe, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Alfred Tennyson, William E. Gladstone, and Abraham Lincoln. Browning and Dickens were only five, Thackeray was six. Mrs. Duke was nine years old when Adams and Jefferson died; ten years old when the first railroad in America was laid; twenty-nine years old when the Mexican War broke out; and Napoleon had gone to Saint Helena only two years before she was born. So one finds imagination useful even at a funeral. You have only to watch your older audience while you are preaching in an illustrative manner to the children, to learn how imaginative presentation of truth grips the heart. It is especially true of rural people whose thinking is pictorial and concrete. Most of the words of Jesus which survive are of this kind. Jesus was a rural-minded minister.

3. The rural minister must have *power over primal emotions of man*. These are still not only dominant, but *evident* in rural life. Camouflage and artifice do not disguise them. Neighbors know their neighbors, and the pastor knows them all, the very heart. With endless variety of intellect and beauty of imagination one might preach, yet fail to move and grip and direct these forces of emotional power so that they result in acts of will. It is possible to be a highly entertaining rural preacher without rousing a passion for the kingdom of God and directing it into activity. The sharpest rebuke I ever received was given one Sunday morning by an old man who meant me a kindness. "I've been highly entertained this morning," he said. I forgave him, and later I buried him, but I never forgot him. There were no converts that morning. Preaching must not only start the machinery of rural thought and emotion till it runs like the engine of the automobile; the clutch must be thrown in, so that there may be goings. "Let us go against Philip" is the test of oratory.

4. The rural preacher must be *evangelistic*. There is no way to keep a country church alive without the evangelistic tone in the pulpit and the evangelistic spirit in personal interviews. So often I have seen it transform a rural church. When I was a boy on my father's farm I saw the outright conversion of a sinner past fifty years old because my student pastor, Edward Wells, asked me to covenant with him in prayer for the man, believing the promise, "Again I say unto you, that if two of you shall agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven."

I was not twenty-two years old when in May in the first year of my pastorate in little Glover our Epworth League signed pledges, each person by persistent effort to seek to bring five persons to Christ within a year. There was no plan or thought about special evangelistic meetings. But in October of that year we had to begin a series which lasted for seven weeks. Strong sinners were transformed. There were twenty-nine adult accessions to the little church. On two successive Sundays I baptized as many as could stand at the chancel.

In Plainfield I gave out some cards entitled "Personal

Worker's Pledge," the legend whereon was this: "With God's help I will try my best to lead two unconverted persons to Christ in this present year. I will pray for them every day and will work for their conversion until it comes." If they cared to do so, I asked my people to write on the back of this card the names of those for whom they chose to be evangelists. This was to be in strict confidence, but it was done so that I might better know how to help them. I asked that no one choose to seek more than two souls (or three at most), so that there might be a perfectly definite effort. The pledges were signed and returned to me. There was no public announcement, no demonstration. The currents of prayer were rolling toward the great deep. It was in the midst of a political campaign, myself to be the elected candidate (by nomination from my own church), but we gave it no attention. The Almighty could manage that. Our citizenship was celestial. We were hounds of heaven on the trail. The house of God was crowded at the November communion. The altar rails were not long enough to hold one soul more than was baptized that morning. Seven times the altars were filled for the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Vivid with reality were the words, "Therefore with angels and archangels, and with all the company of heaven, we laud and magnify thy glorious name, evermore praising thee, and saying, Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Hosts, heaven and earth are full of thy glory. Glory be to thee, O Lord most high! Amen."

5. Another need of the country pastor—you may laugh if you wish, I do not know how else to say it—is an almost hypnotic *power of psychological suggestion*. Some men have this to a remarkable degree. Modern advertising uses it with great skill. Some ideas are strangely vital. They grow like weeds. The mind is fertile soil to him who knows how to use it. We educate by direct suggestion what we can, but that is not what I mean here. Find the thought that is germinal. It may be one wholly incidental (so it seems, but you know better) to the main purpose. Drop it in some fertile cranny of the mind that another man would not have recognized at all. Subconsciously, in the night as dreams are made, it will grow and bear fruit. Lives can be made or marred by this power. Such vital thoughts, dropped inci-

dentally, have grown to bless me. One of them, in William Black's *Life of Goldsmith*, has taught me to look to my work, not to public opinion. "It is not what is written about books that makes their destiny, it is what is written in them." One weed-growing thought carelessly dropped by an elderly friend has maimed me, "And you know a man's friendships are formed before he is forty." Though it is years ere I shall be forty, when I meet a man who is past that age, I find myself confident that he will never receive me into intimate friendship. It is an unconscious barrier—it is foolish, I admit—but a weed-growing thought got caught in my soil—I wish it had been a better seed. The power of conversationally suggesting dominant thoughts is of great importance in the country. There are not so many distractions, amusements, varieties of brazen challenge to the attention as in the city. Country thoughts run deep, strong, unchecked. They ride like Jehu furiously onward. I have seen rural people absolutely obsessed. Sometimes it is by their neighbors. Sometimes it is by their fears. I knew a poor unbalanced fellow who thought each year that he had some new fatal disease. He once went to the physician, pulled off his shirt and asked the doctor to hunt for germs on his back. Vital evil thoughts had overgrown his sanity with nothing to counteract them.

Such power of suggestion requires great sympathy. Magnetize your man. Go into his soul with him. Throb with his thoughts. Lead him to your will. You will be surprised at your power. I was sent by the State Board of Education to reverse the policy of a very determined principal of a State School. I was the listener. With all sympathy I led him over the long trail of his talk. In sly moments when he did not know it, I got my plan before him in a wholly incidental way which I seemed to forget while emphasizing other things. At last he, seeming not to realize at all that I had suggested it, made the proposition as his own. I hesitated. He argued for it until he was convinced, then I consented, on behalf of the Board of Education, to allow him to introduce the policy I was sent to enforce. He thought it was his own.

Rural pastoral visits are sometimes long. If they have any

importance more than that of passing social pleasure, there are certain principles which should never be ignored.

1. *Do not often blame.* If you know a soul is guilty, lead him where he can feel the rebuke of God heavily as need be, but it is dangerous to assume to be the messenger of that rebuke. Above all things never assume that misfortune is a punishment of sin. Remember Jesus and the tower of Siloam. Remember Job. When he was in utter misery his friends thought, "Surely Job has sinned." God knew what they meant to do, so he sent a dream on purpose to restrain them, to make them stay at home and mind their own business. The voice of a terrible spirit had said, "Shall mortal man" (that is, shall you, Eliphaz) "be more just than God?"—more ready with condemnation? Like all hardened hearts, Eliphaz thought the sermon fitted somebody else, and ran to trouble Job with the very dream by which God tried to command him to keep his mouth shut. Let us almost never blame—I do not say never, for I have been guilty. There was a man whose re-enacted program was to be converted, to get wholly sanctified, to have the "latter rain," then live again in a "backslidden state." His wife did not enjoy religion—at least not his. But the time came when, torn with cancer and near the grave, she longed to find God. Her husband was selfishly coddling his own feelings in a "backslidden state." I tried every gentle means I could to bring him where he could comfort her. Finally I said to him, "This is the last time I shall ever ask you. I have tried to bring you to God, and you know the road. I have talked with you, I have prayed with you. Your wife is dying and wants to find God, and you will not help her; it is the wickedest thing I ever knew; if you let her die without helping her to God I shall believe you are a damned soul; I shall never invite you to God, I shall never pray for you again."

2. *Never minimize the sorrows of another.* A lecturer, Dr. Roland Grant, defended Job's wife somewhat in this way: If Job's wife had said, "O well, Job, cheer up! This isn't so bad as it might be. You might have had more boils," Job would have looked sourly over his topography and snarled, "Where?" When she said, "Poor Job! God is hard on you; there couldn't be one

more boil on your poor body!" then of course Job said, "O yes! right there under the elbow is room! See?" If Mrs. Job had said, "Job, be thankful for the blessings you have enjoyed, and think how much worse off you might be," Job might or might not have cursed God, but he would have been sorely tempted to curse Mrs. Job, after which he would have nursed his miseries in proud sulkiness. But Mrs. Job is wise in comfort. "Curse God and die!" she says. She paints Job's woe as unbearable, very well knowing that his whole soul will rally in defense of God's goodness and in patience with his lot. However it was with Job, anyone who goes to a person in affliction and tries to cheer him up by asking him to think how much worse things might be has said the worst thing he could say, except one—and that is, "Think how many people are so much worse off!" The afflicted will not receive the comfort, but he will spontaneously dislike the comforter, for he thinks him (in most cases rightly) unsympathetic. Suffer with your people to the depths of grief. Never minimize their sorrows.

3. *Always encourage full self-expression*, whatever it be. It may be confession, it may be pouring out of sorrows, it may be just talk. Whatever it is, the place where we begin with any doctrine of ours is the place where self-expression ends in the other man. Try it earlier and your effort will be tossed back futile on the flood of his unburdening. These burdened hearts must unload. They must have their talk out in their Protestant confessional. Many a problem is solved in stating it. Many a grief is comforted in the telling. Many a man tells what a fine visit he had with his friend, but doesn't remember that himself did the talking. After full self-expression, if there is anything we should say, God will tell us, but the best comfort we give is given when we let some poor soul lay his burdens on us, just as we lay our sins on Jesus.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

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FOR those who believe that our Lord is appointed not only to save and to console the world, but to rule it with the rod of his mouth, there is in the Washington Conference and the situation which it has created a deep significance. It was the first international Conference of its kind to be held in the new world and the atmosphere differed much from the air which diplomatists had breathed hitherto at Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London. The city itself was beautiful in a simpler way. Not one of its great buildings—not even the Executive Mansion—was called a palace. There was no opera house for a gala performance. The gold lace of the bureaucrat had become the black coat of the citizen. The only court function was a dignified banquet to the delegates at which the President and Mrs. Harding were hosts. The wheels of history were not clogged, as at Versailles, by etiquette and ceremonial. The facts were left in command of the symbols.

Here, too, one saw fulfilled the saying that there is nothing hid which shall not be revealed. The Conference negatived secrecy in international affairs. The statesmen of America were candid, not only among themselves but to their guests. They laid all their cards on the table. When they talked with the newspaper men of the United States, we—foreign correspondents from France, Japan, England, China, Italy—were invited to be present. We heard all that was said. And the result was that Secretary Hughes, having thus set an example of frankness, could insist that others also should disclose fully what was in their minds. It was not enough for him that some Power should demur to disarmament or whatever else was proposed. He called for the reason: "You say it can't be done—why do you say it?" From the open Bible this Baptist proceeded by a direct route to open covenants, openly

arrived at. Just as he claimed the right of full knowledge in religion for the layman, so he claimed that same right in diplomacy for the citizen. It was merely as a tradition that French was used in the debates. The treaties, like the Scriptures, were declared and translated in the vulgar tongue. The language in which the Bible is most widely read has become by an amazing destiny the language which is most generally understood by the nations. For Wiclif and Tyndale the Conference was a triumph.

It was with prayers that the Conference opened. At the solemn obsequies in the incomparable cemetery of Arlington, it was the President himself who invoked "Our Father, which art in heaven," and for the first time on this planet science, supposed to be godless, rendered his voice audible from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. The very inventions of men praised the Almighty. It was an event which could not be dismissed as a mere form. That it startled some of the delegates was obvious, but they dared neither smile nor sneer. They might think it strange, out of place, emotional, old-fashioned. But it was sincere. It touched the hearts of millions. It had to be treated with respect. It struck a note, to challenge which would have been an unpardonable discord. After the wave of rationalism which has swept our civilization, the old sanction, accepted equally by Oliver Cromwell, by George Washington, and by monarchs on their thrones, was deliberately restored. And if God were Father, it followed that nations are brothers, a brotherhood either of David and Jonathan or of Cain and Abel. The choice lay no longer between peace and war, but between fraternity and fratricide. We might be foes, we might be friends, but we were all in the family.

Who was the man that uttered an asseveration so tremendous? Personally, the President is modest, gentle in demeanor, and wholly devoid of the assertive manner. But he is the head of a state, the wealthiest national unit to-day in the whole world. This was the circumstance that impressed the Japanese. They had landed on the Pacific Coast. Thence they had traveled for a whole week over continuous territory. They had seen a long succession of cities. They had noticed evidences of incalculable natural resources. And their journey had culminated in the pro-

nouncement that, over all this development as over their own, God is a Father, giving his children their daily bread. Where, perhaps, some of the delegates were merely annoyed, the Japanese were aroused. Here was Western civilization revealed in a new light. They had studied the German army. They had studied the British navy. They had reckoned up the uses of force on land and sea. But here was not force—here was faith, and faith was to the Japanese a new and untried factor. If they accepted it, the reason was largely because, as we have seen, good faith and entire frankness walked hand in hand.

When the Conference was first summoned, there was an idea in some quarters that we should see a struggle between nation and nation. There would be France combating the dark shadow of Germany and Japan resisting the United States over China. It was even anticipated by some prophets that Great Britain would be in collision with other countries over the reduction of her navy. To some extent there were these rivalries, but the real argument at Washington lay not between nation and nation. It was not the countries as such that clashed. It was two philosophies. The choice that had to be made was a choice between Faith and Force. On the one hand, there were those who thought with Longfellow's saga:

Force rules the world still,
Has ruled it, shall rule it;
Meekness is weakness,
Strength is triumphant,
Over the whole earth
Still is it Thor's-Day!

On the other hand, there were the others who had courage to act by the next stanza:

Thou art a God, too,
O Galilean!
And thus singlehanded
Unto the combat,
Gauntlet or gospel
Here I defy thee!

To the astonishment of the sophists, there was a gospel, a God's-spell, binding the deliberations of those, some of whom had

thought little of God's name. They found that they were of a Spirit that they knew not of.

Indeed, one realized how it might have been that even ten righteous men would have saved Sodom and Gomorrah. At Washington there were individuals who counted for so much. About Secretary Hughes everybody was struck with a radiance which meant more than optimism. He was there, not to hope great things but to do the things that are possible. Neither an optimist nor a pessimist, he was a meliorist—a man who, instead of creating a new world or condemning the old one, would be content to leave the world as it is, only better. His plan was to take the next step only, *but to take it*—not to stand still, because it is only the next step. In his presence it was impossible for men to mistrust one another. He ran the Conference precisely as a church or a Sunday school should be run. He believed the best in the delegates; he assumed the best—took it for granted. He was the anti-cynic. He went about doing and being good. He was a sensation and a success simply because, having been appointed a statesman, he remained a Christian. Even the doubts of Mr. Balfour were resolved into certainties on that point. He perceived at once the true metal.

For those who dispute the value of free churches in a free state, here after all is an object lesson. Everyone in Washington knew that the Quaker blood in Herbert Hoover and the Baptist blood in Secretary Hughes made a profound difference. Everyone also knew that there was in M. Briand, the prime minister of France, nothing lacking of eloquence, charm, force, except this spiritual background. He could argue, appeal, convince; all that he failed to do was to believe. Germany had made it too difficult. What Mr. Hughes uttered was the first word of Christianity. What M. Briand said was the last word of pure reason. He was courteous. He was logical. He was polite. But he was also skeptic. He would not trust himself—he dared not trust France—to walk on the water to a great reconciliation in Europe.

When the Conference met, there were two subjects on the agenda, Disarmament and the Far East. Of these, the Far East had precedence and it was indicated plainly that without a settle-

ment there, the United States could not agree to call off her shipbuilding program. But in the Continental Hall, where the galleries and the floor were crowded, it was apparent from the first that public opinion was thinking much less of Shantung and of the Open Door in China than of the plan to turn swords into plowshares and spears into pruning hooks. At the green baize tables Senator Borah had no seat, but the cheering showed that he had the people, even the Senate, behind him. The Japanese learned that this country wanted not war but a fair deal—this and nothing more. American Imperialism so called was found to be a myth. The argument that commerce must be promoted by arms was shattered. Even Judge Gary of the Steel Corporation declared for a reduction in what would have been the use of steel for armaments. With great foresight, he has concluded that throughout the world there is more and better business to be done in the building of bridges than in the building of battleships. Compared with the volume of needed reconstruction, the trade to be found in further destruction is a mere detail.

Hence, what happened was that the complicated questions of China and Yap were referred to Committees from the first and were handled with just the privacy needed for a friendly discussion and also with a persevering patience which was beyond all praise. On the other hand, the issue of Disarmament was made the subject of an immediate challenge. Mr. Hughes announced at the first of the plenary sessions his schedule of scrapped ships, and at the second such session Britain agreed. The action of Japan was here very interesting. For weeks she demurred to the Five-Five-Three proposal. It was not only or mainly that she wanted to save her latest battleship, the *Mitsu*. That was only a spectacular detail. What concerned Japan was the problem of naval bases across the Pacific. Between San Francisco and India, there are four stepping stones—Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and Singapore. Guam is unfortified as yet and hence the American fleets, which have only an effective battle radius of two thousand miles, cannot, from Hawaii as base, defend the Philippines, still less attack Japan or cut her off from China. If Guam were to be transformed into a base like Malta or Gibraltar, then the Ameri-

can fleets could be advanced to that station and in the event of war could strike their blow. Guam was thus the touchstone between a prospect of ultimate peace and war; perhaps, I should rather say, between a horizon of faith and a horizon of force. The Navy Department, regarding the strategy of the case, as was its duty, was fully aware of the immense importance of Guam. Mr. Hughes, however, agreed to abandon the right of fortifying the islands of the Pacific other than Hawaii. It was a decision as momentous as the Rush-Bagot Agreement which left the Canadian frontier and the Great Lakes without a fort, a battleship, and a gun. It was a whole-hearted act of trust in the good intentions of the Japanese people. For Japan is left with an unchallengeable navy in her own waters and with the largest and best equipped army to back it, saving only the army of France. During the next thirty years Japan is, as it were, placed upon her honor. Without serious interference, she can play the straight game or she can play the crooked game. The hope and belief is that, in her own interests, she will maintain her diplomacy in close touch with that of the democratic peoples.

At this prospect Great Britain was, of course, much relieved. She had dreaded more deeply than she dared to confess the possibility of a conflict in the Far East in which the first blows would have been struck, not at the comparatively distant and well-protected United States of America but at the much nearer and much more vulnerable India and Australia. That there should be at least a breathing space was, indeed, something gained. It meant that India could continue to find herself, struggle to her feet, develop a common citizenship, evolve a Parliamentary system, railways, irrigation, schools, colleges, banks, hospitals, missions. It meant for China much the same. The needs of these two vast countries, if not identical, are at least very similar. And we soon found at Washington that the only real reply to Japanese aggression in China is China herself. As long as Chinese officials are corrupt, are ready to sell their country and its future to the highest bidder, squander the taxes and pilfer the loans, it is futile to fight for the integrity and independence of their territory. We were driven back to the old maxim that countries are governed

neither better nor worse than they deserve. The Chinaman, the Japanese, and the Indian are alike in this—that they cannot expect to have a better citizenship until they have better citizens. Their need is our need, namely, what is given to the world of wisdom and healing in Christ. The statesmen have done their part. They have kept the peace. But as the Roman Empire discovered, a peace imposed by power alone is not enough. It is the peace of man, not the peace of God. The Roman Empire declined and fell into indescribable chaos. Over the peace there must reign, if it is to last, the Prince of Peace. As the soldiers who contend against flesh and blood are withdrawn, their places must be taken by the soldiers who wear the panoply of God. The physician must fight disease. The engineer must defeat the desert and the drought and the famine. The teacher must conquer ignorance and prejudice and superstition. Women must raise their own sex from the dead. The Washington Conference will have succeeded or failed according as the Christian missionary reaps the rich results in a harvest of souls.

So much for the East; what about Europe? Apparently, the Conference here accomplished nothing. What Europe wanted was a settlement of her finances and disarmament on land. She got neither. Italy would have gone right ahead and made such proposals, but France was as yet unconvinced, and it was deemed best to make sure of a smaller cargo rather than to add to it and risk the ship. But about ideas there is always this quality—they permeate. The Conference may not have helped Europe, but it has certainly left Europe wishing. A deadly blow has been struck at the Devil's doctrine that wars are inevitable. Europe has been forced to look beyond her feuds to great continents where there are—in her sense—no wars at all. She has discovered that as a war-making and war-preparing civilization she is not the rule but the exception. She is literally less sensible than mid-Africa. In the march of progress she must sink from the van to the rear unless she disarms. France, with one soldier to forty citizens, cannot compete with Canada, where there is one soldier to two thousand citizens. It makes the difference between solvency and bankruptcy. Ten years ago European credit was the standard for

all credit. To-day that credit is often lower than the credit of Mexico.

No one realizes this more fully than Mr. Lloyd George. He also is a Free Churchman—in fact, a Baptist like Mr. Hughes. By descent both men are Welsh. To secure disarmament in Europe is Mr. Lloyd George's—indeed, the British nation's—one desire. It is not only submarines against which they argue. They want to belong to a continent as free of troops and guns as are North and South America. They want commerce, friendship, some of the joy of life, after all this horrible gloom. Hence, the meetings between the British prime minister and M. Briand, the French prime minister, and his successor, M. Poincaré. The parting of the ways is indeed momentous. It is not merely a France defended by Frenchmen that Europe has to deal with. It is a France defended also by Africans. It is the black man enrolled to fight the white man's battles. It is the Moor, the Algerian, the Tunisian, and the Negro, taught not the secrets of a more abundant life but the poisonous mysteries of a more abundant death. It is Christendom committing suicide at the hands of a hired Othello.

Unless there be disarmament on land, with guarantees for France in which she can feel confidence, it is hard to see how this chill prospect can be avoided. But if France could be reassured, she might be to-day the leader of Europe to a general recovery. And here it is impossible to ignore an element in the situation with which Protestantism throughout the world will find that it has to reckon. There is a new Pope in Rome. Obviously, he is the ablest, the most formidable Pope there elected for many centuries. And for a simple reason. He has realized that his church is now confronted, not by monarchies but by democracies and with democracies; therefore he proposes to come into contact. The ridiculous fiction that the Pontiff is a prisoner of the Vatican has already gone by the board. To the Catholics of the new world he has, moreover, tendered a frank apology for the refusal of the Conclave, when electing him, to await the arrival of the American cardinals. And over the world, so far as his flock extends, he has declared the old mediæval truce of God. Twenty-five nations are now represented at his Court, or double the number maintaining ambassa-

dors there before the war, and among those nations are Great Britain and Holland, whence came forth once upon a time the Pilgrim Fathers. It is assuredly a challenge to evangelical Christianity.

Regarded in the broad light of history, the aim of the Roman Catholic Church, namely, to keep the peace, however valuable it may be and however praiseworthy, can hardly be considered in itself sufficient. It was the pretensions of the Bishop of Rome which, after all, sundered the Catholic Church into East and West and these same pretensions stand in the way of the reunion of Christendom and even of cooperation within the one essential Faith. It is not enough, then, for the Pope to settle his quarrel with the King of Italy and the French Republic. If the forces of religion are to be mobilized for the preservation of peace throughout the world, the Roman Catholic must grip the hand of other Christians as if it were his own and must recognize that God fulfills himself in many ways. It is illogical that we who at so great a distance endeavor to follow the Christ, should tell the Germans and the French to cease from hating one another, if, within the Body of Christ, the members thereof are at war with one another over some political matter like endowments or the temporal power, or over some ecclesiastical matter like an apostolic succession. By this alone, says he, shall men know that ye are my disciples, when ye love one another.

For the price of peace as of liberty will be eternal vigilance. The scraps of paper have been duly inscribed, but only in the doings of each day are they to be interpreted. The open door declared for China, the equal facilities to be assured on her railways for the traders of all nations, the anathema pronounced on poison gas and the misuse of submarines and even the evacuation of Shantung, are pledges only to be fulfilled not by force but by faith. In the officials of various nations there will need to be an honest intention. It is not in the verbiage of treaties that civilization has ever failed, but in morale; and the fountain of such morale is not to be discovered in politics.

For the issue that is slowly emerging from this confusion is not any struggle between nation and nation, as organized by gov-

ernments. It is man, as man, and woman, as woman, that demands attention. There, at Washington, you saw the European of the new and the old world, the Frenchman, American, Englishman, Belgian, Canadian, Italian, sitting side by side with the Chinese, Japanese, and an Indian like Srinivasa Sastri. The Declaration of Independence announced racial equality for citizens of the United States. But it took three generations to realize that ideal to the extent of abolishing Negro slavery, and the question now is whether and to what extent we are to have racial equality for mankind. It must ultimately come, but how? The statesman cannot tell you. He can only feel his way dimly from point to point. But to the Christian the path ought to be plain. It is his privilege to answer that men and women will become more and more evidently of one family as they grow into the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ. It is the animal in us that bites and devours; it is the ideals that unite. To feed and cherish the best that is in the citizenship of all nations, to eliminate the worst, and to administer a Saviour's pardon on the past, which is to us alone unpardonable, should be the mission of all who in these days profess and call themselves Christians.

LET THERE BE LIGHT

A Review of "Public Opinion and the Steel Strike"

JAMES C. BAKER

Urbana, Ill.

THE first volume on the Steel Strike,¹ issued by the Inter-Church Commission of Inquiry, has been universally recognized as a piece of investigation characterized by sanity, scientific thoroughness, and moral vision. Its facts have not been challenged. No answer has been made except that Judge Gary himself has announced a purpose to do away with the intolerable and inhuman long hours of the steel industry. The promise is yet unfulfilled.

The Steel Strike Report is inescapable. It will continue to make its case inexorably, and will form one of the great molding documents on the human rights of labor. Even the Chicago Tribune, in a leading editorial on the \$10,000,000 of material improvements announced by the Steel Corporation as a contribution to the unemployment situation, closed with this stinging suggestion, "Now is the chance to put into operation the eight-hour day, and so give the employees of the Steel Corporation a *chance to live as well as a chance to labor.*"

The Great Strike is an excellent medium through which to study the working of public opinion and the sources upon which it is based. As the title suggests, the second volume² now before us is concerned with such a study. It reports on "the opinion reflected by the press, opinion as checked or controlled or molded by the relations of industrial companies to the organs of civil government in industrial communities, the opinion of groups of workers, opinion as influenced by reports of spies, opinion as to conceptions or misconceptions of foreign-speaking communities."

This supplementary volume does not merely give the documents upon which the conclusions of the first volume are based.

¹ *The Steel Strike of 1919*, Harcourt, Brace & Co.

² *Public Opinion and the Steel Strike of 1919*, Harcourt, Brace & Co.

It contains illuminating and valuable studies of the various sides of the great struggle. These studies are of immense value in giving insight into the whole labor situation in this country. The startling revelation through them all is the immense power over the agencies of public opinion exercised by the Steel Companies.

Again we must record our profound appreciation of the great service rendered by the Inter-Church Commission of Inquiry. It has turned on the light of knowledge, giving definite and concrete information secured by trained and competent men. The names and records of these men are given in the preface. They are not radicals, but men of assured standing, and the entire report was supervised by Heber Blankenhorn of the Bureau of Industrial Research.

We need light, the light of concrete facts. Many a Christian man's conscience is not at work on vital social concerns which threaten the well-being of the community, because important facts concerning conditions have not become a part of his conscious life. His moral sense has not been awakened because he does not know.

The present Canadian premier, MacKenzie King, has said, "The final solution of the problem of industry lies with an educated and intelligent public opinion." The controlling purpose of the Inter-Church Commission of Inquiry was to make a contribution to this end. The motto of this volume might well have been "Let there be light."

I

First of all, light is turned on the industrial spy system, than which there is nothing more corrupting nor dangerous in the whole labor situation.

The revelations of this book, which at first seem utterly unbelievable, should be studied in the light of the history of industrial disturbances. Then we make the appalling discovery that these revelations are a "typical spadeful out of the subsoil of business enterprise" to-day. Most great corporations have a "reptile fund" for espionage. Such a system is to be expected in no-conference industries. It is an "integral part of the anti-

union policy." The Commission says that it studied industrial espionage "not because it was sensational, but because the steel companies regarded it as customary." It shows the state of latent war existing in the industry at all times. It is an "armed-camp system."

Much to the surprise of the investigators, a great mass of material was turned over to them freely because of this fact that the spy system was a part of the integral policy and was considered as a matter of course. One company gave them six hundred spy reports for examination, together with copies of the contracts with the agencies, black lists, lists of agitators, secret denunciations, etc.

There were found to be two sorts of labor spies—spies directly in the employ of the steel companies as an integral part of the management, always at work, and spies hired from professional labor agencies. Both kinds were used in the steel strike. One detective concern said that it had five hundred "skilled operatives" at work in the latter part of November, and another concern boasted that it was able to put ten thousand armed men into the field inside of seventy-two hours.

In the mass of testimony upon the character of these men, there was entire unanimity that many of the agencies rely largely on men, and often women, of a shady or criminal record. The United States Commission on Industrial Relations ten years ago said, "The fact that these men may have a criminal record is no deterrent to their being employed, and no check can be made on the men sent out by these companies on hurry calls."

The investigation now before us shows these men at work within and without the labor unions, stirring up strife, engineering raids and arrests, and inciting to riot. They are men who live and thrive on the trouble they make. If the object were purposely to create violence among the men, no device would better serve the end. They keep the war temper alive. They are skilled in devising trouble if they do not find it. There is one well-authenticated story of instructions to create race riots between the Italians and Serbians. The States Attorney of Chicago openly charged that the operatives of one of the detective companies

committed sabotage, assaulted persons, attempted to stir up class and race prejudice, and fomented disorder in order that strike breakers and troops would be thought necessary.

The appalling thing about this whole matter is that in every great strike private detectives and police agencies have been at just this sort of work. The last big strike in Denver brings the same tale. The recently issued report of the Federal Council of Churches on the Denver Tramway strike states that the bloodshed can be traced more directly to the imported gunmen than to any other cause, and one of the first acts of the Federal Army officers upon arrival was to disarm them.³

The firing-squad type of mind still determines the policies of many great corporations, and the United States government permits them to have their bands of mercenaries.

Even from the standpoint of finding out what the employees are thinking, the reports from these under-cover men are generally unreliable and misleading. "The most sincere of manufacturers, misled into substituting espionage for some sane method of industrial relations with his workmen, would ransack these reports (six hundred referred to above) quite in vain for any real revelation of why his workmen struck." "The employers are working under the impression that they are thus protecting themselves from misinformation and also from the possibility of injury. But, as we have seen, they are in reality placing themselves at the mercy of these spies in the same manner as every despot in the

³ The latest discussion of the spy system is a report just issued under the direction of Dr. Richard C. Cabot of Boston, published in *The New Republic* in the spring of 1921, a report which closes with a discussion of "The Spy System and Violence," from which I take the following passages: "Industrial espionage—the heart of so much labor trouble and the inspiration of so many horrors—a thing at first approached by us incredulously, but finally accepted as irrefutable. Anaconda confirms Calumet. West Virginia substantiates Colorado. The street cars of Denver are a parenthesis in the story of the Steel Strike." "It is a strange thing that these direct action employers of ours, these Garys and Woods, are willing to stake their reputation as citizens upon the acts of such men as these spies of industry, and their cousins the gunmen and the scabs." "The system puts both employer and employee at the mercy of a power which is, at best, unscrupulous; . . . it lays labor open to corruption, misleads capital into folly, injustice, and, often, actual crime; . . . creates wherever it appears a turmoil of unrest and rage. . . . An institution completely damnable, ethically, socially, and economically." At the examination of some of these spies in West Virginia by the United States Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Senator McKellar finally remarked, "(I will say that it violates every idea of right that I ever had. I never would have believed that a thing like this would happen, and I am not surprised that you are having trouble down there in Mingo County."

After the Homestead strike in 1892 the Senate Committee of Investigation said, "Your committee is impressed with the belief that this is an utterly vicious system, and that it is responsible for much of the ill feeling and bad blood displayed by the working classes." After the New York Central Railway strike in 1890, a justice of the Supreme Court of New York, in the midst of a vigorous protest, said, "It is enough to condemn the system that it authorizes unofficial and irresponsible persons to usurp the most delicate and difficult functions of the state, and exposes the lives of citizens to the murderous assaults of hiring assassins, stimulated to violence by panic, or by the suggestion of employers to strike terror by an appalling exhibition of force."

past has placed himself at the mercy of those who brought him information."

II

Again, light is turned on the failure of the press of Pittsburgh to fulfill its public trust as an organ of public opinion. Four hundred issues of the seven daily English language newspapers in Pittsburgh were examined as they appeared during the first two months of the steel strike, and with conclusions such as these. There was only one example of first-hand and independent investigation. There was no statement of the strikers' side of the controversy despite the fact that the demands were for better working conditions, the 6-day week, 8 instead of 10, 12, or 14 hours a day, for recognition of labor's right to organize, their living conditions, etc. "Special correspondents sent in later from other cities found in a single issue of one weekly, *The Survey*, published in New York, more actual news of the above sort than in all the files of the Pittsburgh newspapers."

Not only was there no statement of the strikers' side but there was continual misrepresentation of facts and a persistent attempt to discredit their case.

The strike was continually called "un-American," "Bolshevik," "radical," charges which have been thoroughly disproved.

The news was colored from the beginning, in the very days when it was increasing, to indicate that the strike was broken. At one period of the strike the newspapers of the Pittsburgh district had informed the public that 2,400,000 men had gone back to work in the steel industry in one city in which about 50,000 are normally employed.

During the progress of the strike the utterances of both Protestant and Catholic clergymen which were in accord with the policy of the United States Steel Corporation were prominently displayed, while statements and sermons of ministers who criticized the civil officers in Allegheny County in an appeal for fair American treatment for the foreign-born were suppressed. Between September 27 and October 8 over thirty full-page advertisements, denouncing the leadership of the strike and calcu-

lated to undermine the morale of the strikers, appeared in the Pittsburgh newspapers. Altogether, not less than one hundred and fifty articles and items were carried in Pittsburgh newspapers during the strike, tending to support the contention that the strike was fraught with disorder on the part of the strikers, although there was practically no first-hand investigation. These newspapers took no stand for civil rights and the freedom of speech and assembly. Instead they supported every effort to deny these rights. "The Pittsburgh papers were not only a failure as a public institution during the strike; they committed overt acts of support for policies which were against public interest."

Bishop McConnell has summed up the effect thus: "During the Steel Strike the newspapers repeated practically the same statements not week after week, nor day after day, but *every* morning and *every* afternoon. Because of the sheer force of the repetition, a character almost of inevitability was given to the claims of the steel employers. The labor leaders themselves at times despaired before the steadiness and vastness of the newspapers' output of statements against them."

In the light of the revelations of this report, The Nation was entirely justified in speaking of Pittsburgh's "Prostituted Press." It is a heinous example of the way in which the wells of public opinion may be poisoned.

Further, the Pittsburgh press naturally colored the press of the entire country. The public had no way of getting at the causes of the steel strike or the incidents connected with it. Consequently, there was a lamentable lack of enlightened public opinion. There was no aroused sense of justice and sympathy. There was no great moral protest which must inevitably have come, had the facts been known.

III

Light is also thrown on the violation of civil rights in Western Pennsylvania.

There are signed statements and affidavits from many towns showing that the right of assembly was denied, that arrests were made without definite charges, and that the State police rode

down men and women out on peaceful errands. The record of police brutality is perfectly ghastly and there was no redress. Even the governor of the State made no reply to a protest supported by over one hundred sworn affidavits.

It is a terribly grave thing to interfere with fundamental democratic rights, and only the most serious situation demands such interference. The public officials of Pennsylvania insisted that they interfered in order to avoid disorder and violence, but their contention is not borne out by the facts. These rights were not denied in the striking districts of West Virginia and Ohio. For example, in Steubenville, where eight thousand men were out on strike, three or four meetings were held every week without any disturbance of any sort. The same right of assembly was freely exercised in Youngstown, Canton, Cleveland, and other cities, and no trouble developed.

The strikers of Western Pennsylvania had every reason to conclude that private interests and public authorities were working together against them. According to the mayor and sheriff of Johnstown, the State police did not come at their request, but at the request of the officials of the Cambria Steel Company.

It is significant to remember also that in a number of instances the federal officer was directly related to a member of the steel companies. The sheriff of Allegheny County was the brother of an officer of one of the subsidiaries of the United States Steel Corporation. The mayor of Duquesne, who said that "Jesus Christ himself could not hold a meeting in Duquesne," was the brother of the president of the McKeesport Tin Plate Company. Many other similar relationships are given between public officials and employers.

This section of the book is an illuminating revelation of the way in which local government may be controlled by private corporations.⁴

IV

Light is also thrown on the attitude of the pulpit. The Pitts-

⁴ In connection with this part of the report, it is well to read Chafee's book, *Freedom of Speech*, and to ponder such a sentence as this from that book: "To conduct arguments by violence, even if that violence is employed by government officials under the guise of law, is contrary to sound political policy and other constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech" (p. 197)...

burgh Federation of Churches undertook an investigation on their own account early in the strike, but when the plans of the Inter-Church Commission of Inquiry were known they decided to turn their investigation over to this Commission.

"An inquiry on the relation of the churches to the strike was deemed necessary on the following grounds: 1. The church as a social institution of persistent influence could not help having a relation, positive, negative, or neutral, to so widespread a social episode as a large strike; 2. The churches in certain localities in the past had been described as having definite relations to the labor policies of steel companies; 3. Individual preachers during the strike publicly took the side of the companies or of the strikers." The investigation took into account only the churches of Allegheny County and for the most part the Protestant churches.

The outstanding thing in this particular investigation is the lack, on the part of the ministers, of reliable and complete information in regard to the issues involved. The clergy relied chiefly upon the Pittsburgh newspapers and steel mill officials for such knowledge as they had and they must bear the blame for not having carefully sought to understand both sides of the controversy.

In the light of the steel report one realizes more than ever the value of such journals as *The Survey*. Sources of independent information such as this should be regarded as an indispensable part of every minister's equipment.

There is a sinister side in the fact that there was at the time, and has been since, an attempt on the part of employers to limit the freedom of the pulpit in speaking on the issues involved. The Employers' Association of Pittsburgh, through its vice-president, William Frew Long, has left us no doubt of this issue. Following up the famous bulletin sent out on January 15, 1921, advising non-support of the local Y. W. C. A., because of its adoption of the social creed of the Federal Council of Churches, a second letter was sent out on March 21, 1921, which closed with an attack on the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America as the agency continuing the work of the Inter-Church Movement. It says: "The radical and bolshevik elements in the churches seem to be cooperating through the Federal Council,

and many of our members are expressing themselves as determined to *discontinue financial support of their respective churches*, unless they withdraw all moral and financial support of the Federal Council." This is in line with the attitude which many of the employers took during the strike itself.

The issue is a vital one. One of the finest statements that have appeared of what is involved is Professor Harry F. Ward's "Which Way Will Methodism Go?" in the September issue of the *METHODIST REVIEW*, out of which the following sentences are taken: "It, therefore, goes without saying that the church whose utterance and policies can be dictated by the dominant economic faction for the time being will have small part in the new world that is now making. It will be only the temporary court chaplain in an unstable régime. Also it will have thrown away its commission to stand above the conflicts of mankind for the solidarity of humanity, and left the world in its hour of supreme need to lose the way of life through trusting itself to the outcome of a struggle of self-interests." "The heart of the matter is, of course, the independence and spiritual authority of the pulpit, and they go together."

Harry Emerson Fosdick has spoken in a truly representative capacity when he said, "May I be permitted to suggest that these gentlemen have somewhat seriously misapprehended the temper of the Christian ministry of America. I am speaking for multitudes of my brethren when I say, 'Before high God, not for sale!'"

V

Light is also thrown on the mind of the immigrant showing what a lack of knowledge there is about the "foreigner" and the ready credit which is given to wild rumors. "Physically, linguistically, and mentally segregated, the masses of steel workers live in worlds of their own. What influences move these worlds is an unanswered question to most good 'Americans' and for the most part an unasked question."

However, not only are Americans ignorant concerning the minds of these immigrant peoples, but these immigrants do not know themselves. The workers of various nationalities living

apart, worshiping at separate churches, have not had a common consciousness, nor have they understood their common needs and common grievances. It was found that the labor unions had done much to change these un-American conditions by uniting these groups, bringing about mutual understanding and overcoming race prejudices.

There is an interesting chapter on the welfare work of the United States Steel Corporation, giving deserved recognition to what has been done in the way of pensions, housing, safety, sanitation, libraries, etc.; but with the insistence that these must not, cannot, be listed "as a substitute for those elements of an intelligent labor policy which would recognize the workers' rights in industry."

We close, as we began, with a quotation from MacKenzie King, "The public has a right to be informed impartially on the merits of situations which threaten its well-being." Not only does it have a right to be informed, but it must be informed for the very safety of the common life. There is nothing more terrifying than the revelation in "Public Opinion and the Steel Strike" of the way in which the responsible agencies of public opinion, whose duty it is to enlighten the citizens of the nation, may be prostituted and controlled.

THE ROMAN QUESTION

BERTRAND M. TIPPLE

Rome, Italy

SINCE the twentieth of September, 1870, there has been a Roman Question. The main facts on the subject, concisely stated, are as follows:

First, the legal position of the papacy in Rome and in the palaces which the papacy occupies is regulated by a law of the Italian government which the Vatican has never been willing to recognize or accept.

Second, Between church and state in Rome there exist no official relations of any nature whatsoever.

Third, The Holy See maintains officially its protest against being stripped of temporal power, still laying claim to it. There is in force now a constitution of Pius IX according to which at the election of a new Pope the cardinals swear that whoever shall be elected will yield none of the rights of the church. (One understands, however, that the Pope has the power to free himself from this oath whenever he deems it wise.)

For years through its diplomatic channels the Vatican has sought to know the attitude of other nations toward the Roman Question, and at times has made it the key of all its European policy.

Moreover, the Vatican had interpreted its *non expedit* as an official *non licet*. That is, tying all Italian Catholics to its policy of protest, it formally prohibited them from participating either as candidates or as voters in national politics, thus holding them apart from any share in the political life and power of their country. Catholic sovereigns of other countries were forbidden to come to Rome to visit the king of Italy. For example, the emperor of Austria, Francis Joseph, received King Humbert of Italy at Vienna, but he failed ever to return the visit at Rome. When the president of the French Republic, Loubet, came to Rome to visit Victor Emanuel III (1906), Pius X issued a lively pro-

test to all the governments with which the Holy See was in diplomatic relations and refused to receive the president. Then followed the lay reaction in France, the Law of Separation, and the diplomatic break between Paris and the Vatican.

Now all this is changed. After the celebrated interview of Benedict XV with the French journalist Latapié (see Liberté, 21st of June, 1915), which aroused lively discussions among the Allies as to the attitude of the Holy See toward the belligerents, Cardinal Gasparri declared officially (June 27, 1915) that the Holy See awaited "the adjustment of its position (in Rome) not by intervention of foreign arms but by the triumph of those sentiments of justice which he hoped would become ever more widely diffused among the Italian people." This declaration in no wise compromised the advantages which the Holy See might have expected from the outcome of the war in the event of a final defeat of Italy.

It is well known that the prominent Catholic deputy of the German Center, Erzberger, sent to Rome by his government before Italy entered the war to work with Von Bülow especially among the Italian Catholic elements to prevent Italy from abandoning her neutrality, had ready a proposal for the reestablishment of the temporal power with the cession of a part of the city of Rome to the Pope and guaranteeing to him through the Tiber and the sea free communication with other powers.

In any case, Gasparri's declaration guaranteed that the Vatican would not intrigue during the war to recover its temporal power, and further stated that the Roman Question virtually no longer existed, at least in connection with the outcome of the war; that it was a question between the Holy See and the Italians. This was a long step ahead for Italy.

After the war, the *non expedit* was abolished, although no official announcement was made to this effect. The Vatican permitted Catholics to form a Catholic Party in January, 1919. The Catholics have accepted without reserve the unity of the nation with Rome as capital, as was seen, for example, when one of the Catholic Party, Sig. E. Martire, member of the City Council, favored the celebration of the semicentennial of the occupation of Rome by

Italian troops, even making a special motion in the name of his party.

Article 8 of the Constitution of the Catholic Party, which deals with the religious question, says: "Liberty and independence of the church in the full discharge of her religious teaching; liberty of and respect for Christian conscience, which are considered as the foundation and bulwark of the life of the nation, of democratic liberties and of the ascendant conquests of civilization in the world."

Finally, the prohibition against visits of Catholic sovereigns to the head of the Italian nation in Rome, the capital, was officially removed in the Encyclical, *De pacis reconciliatione Christiana*. But the following "joker," so to speak, was added: "At the same time, however, we solemnly proclaim that this our concession, counseled, or better, granted because of the gravity of the present times, must not be interpreted as a tacit renunciation of sacrosanct rights. . . . Nay, rather, the protests which our predecessors made many times we renew even in these circumstances and for the identical reasons."

HISTORICAL RÉSUMÉ

Well known are the vicissitudes through which Italy passed, until in 1859-1860 the new kingdom was established. This new kingdom, with a decision not to be checked, decided to reunite to itself Rome as the capital. The Republican Party, supposing that the Piedmont Monarchy, traditionally Catholic, would never dare to take Rome from the Pope, took upon itself the completion of Italian unity on an antimonarchical platform.

But the first Parliament of the new kingdom in March, 1861, after two most vigorous speeches of Count di Cavour, president of the Council, proclaimed Rome the capital, thereby placing upon the government of the king the duty to carry out the vote.

France, who in 1849 sent an army to destroy the Roman Republic and to open to Pius IX, an exile at Gaeta, the gates of the city, maintained at Rome an army of occupation. It was necessary before all else to persuade France to withdraw these troops. After treating with her at length, an agreement was finally reached

in 1863 by which the French Empire did withdraw her troops from Rome.

In 1866 Italy, allied with Prussia, secured possession of the Veneto, although compelled to leave Trent and its province and the Upper Adige in the hands of the Austrian Empire, which also continued to hold Triest and Istria.

After this, another great step toward Italian unity, there flamed anew in the Italians the desire to repossess Rome. In 1861 Giuseppe Garibaldi, gathering a body of volunteers in Umbria on the borders of the Pontifical State, began his march on Rome. Whereupon France, obeying the famous *Jamais* of the Empress Eugenia, hastened to send troops in defense of the Pope. These two armies met at Mentana, where the *chassepot*, the new French gun, did such marvelous execution that the Garibaldini were scattered.

In 1870, after the first great defeat of the French and the fall of the empire, the French troops were withdrawn from Rome. This was the moment to act. Public opinion clamored with a loud voice for the occupation of the city and the Republicans, the Party of Action, began to move. The monarchy hesitated. It sought to accomplish the undertaking without the use of force. A secret message was dispatched to the Pope to induce him to agree that Italian troops should occupy Rome peacefully. Pius IX refused, and then the expedition under General Cadorna was ordered, which on the 20th of September, after brief resistance of the Pope's army, entered Rome through the breach of Porta Pia. A few days later, it seems by invitation of the Cardinal Secretary of State, Antonelli, the Leonine City, that part of Rome where the Vatican is, was also occupied.

And thus arose the Roman Question, the second phase of which has been characterized by protests, pontifical claims, and strife between church and state. This strife has been generated by the church, for the Italian government, almost frightened by its own audacity, not only abstained from every act which could in any way offend the spiritual liberty of the Holy See and the consciences of Catholics, but in 1871, after very lengthy discussions in Parliament, enacted the Law of Guarantees, by which the

spiritual sovereignty of the Pope was recognized and to him were conceded the same immunities as those of the king of Italy. To him was conceded the free use of the Vatican and of other palaces, and most generous provisions were made for the complete liberty of pontifical diplomacy. An annuity of about three million lire was also assigned to the Holy See.

A second part of the law fixed the fundamental laws of the ecclesiastical rights of the new kingdom. The right of *exequatur* and of *Regia Placet* were reserved, that is, the approval of civil authorities for the nomination of bishops and of parish priests; for the rest, the relation between church and state was fixed in the most liberal manner possible. Though the monastic orders were suppressed, the religious congregations continued to exist without any difficulty or vexation. Headquarters of the various monastic orders were recognized in Rome. Parochial livings remained intact with their possessions. The property of episcopal residences and of the head cathedrals was converted into bonds of the public debt and the income paid to the holders of said properties. The property of other lesser church livings and of the suppressed congregations was converted into a fund for public worship, the income from which was devoted to ecclesiastical uses and especially to increase the incomes of poor parish priests.

The law provided for a more organic systematizing of ecclesiastical inheritances, but on this point nothing was ever done. The Law of Guarantees was a little later declared a fundamental law of the state.

The Italian state was disposed from the beginning to internationalize this law, and the Vatican, accepting the new arrangement, might have placed itself most easily under the guarantee of the European powers. But it preferred to repudiate the law and to resist, so fortunately nothing was ever done about internationalizing it.

From the beginning the difficulties of a practical adjustment were many, but they were gradually overcome, more than all else because of the good sense of the Commissario of the Borgo—the head of the police department in that section of the city where the Pope lives—Giuseppe Manfroni. His son, Professor Camillo

Manfroni, has published the *Memoirs* of his father, and this volume throws much light on the atmosphere and life of Rome during the first ten years of the kingdom.

In 1878, when the first king of United Italy, Victor Emanuel II, died in the Quirinal Palace, he received the last rites of the church. The monarchy has always had its own court chaplain and a church of its own, the Sudario, where the sovereigns on certain occasions attend religious worship.

Nevertheless since 1870 the Holy See has refused to recognize the new state, has refused the Law of Guarantees and the annuity of three million, providing for its own expenses by the offerings of the faithful. From that time the Popes have never set foot outside the Vatican, whence has arisen the legend about the imprisonment of the Popes, so useful to stir the pity of the faithful.

Until his death, Pius IX frequently renewed the most energetic protests against the intolerable condition "forced upon him in Rome by the usurpers." A Pope little diplomatic, he made no positive move to take again "his" city, but held always that the new state of affairs was precarious and that Providence would be the first to intervene in behalf of the Roman pontificate and the restitution to it of "The Patrimony of St. Peter" (Rome and the province of Rome).

When he died, Cardinal Gioacchino Pecci, a Roman born in 1810, ascended the throne of Saint Peter and assumed the name of Leo XIII. He pursued the policy of his predecessor. Not only this, but through diplomatic channels he began to seek allies and sponsors for his cause. He nourished the disputes between Italy and Austria; he hastened the reconciliation between the German Center and Bismarck by forcing German Catholics to vote for the famous military law of 1870, counting upon Bismarck's backing in return for this, which was asked for in his name by the Papal Nuncio Galimberti.

When William II was in Rome the first time, he went to visit the Pope in a carriage with horses which had been brought from Berlin for the occasion, starting from the German Legation accredited to the Vatican. The Pope brought up the question of Rome, but the conversation was rudely interrupted by a blow to

pontifical etiquette with the entrance into the audience chamber of Henry, brother of the emperor.

After this episode, Leo XIII turned his hopes to France, and initiated his policy of benevolence and conciliation which led to the rallying of the Catholics to the republic, to the great disappointment and grief of the monarchists.

Before his death in 1903, sending out some of his court on foreign duty, he gave the red cap into the hands of the cardinals, saying with force, "Remember always that Rome is ours!"

With Pius X, made Pope in August, 1903, we note the first change. This pontiff occupied himself above all else with Christian democracy and modernism. He viewed with terror modern democracy gaining rapidly in the ranks of the proletariat, penetrating diabolically into the church, threatening at one blow the two authorities, religious and civil, according to his conception. He devoted himself, therefore, to persecuting tenaciously Christian democracy and Modernism, and, without abolishing the *non expedit*, he allowed the Catholics to vote, throwing their force in the political elections to the conservative side, and in the elections of November, 1904, the first Catholic deputies were elected. (One should not call them, however, according to a subtle ecclesiastical distinction, *Catholic* deputies.)

He did not change in the least the severity of his protests against the usurpation of Rome. As we have recalled, when Loubet, President of the French Republic, came to Rome, Pius X protested most energetically against the homage he paid in the pontifical city to "him who imprisons" (the Pope). At any rate it was under Pius X and certainly by his authority that Monsignor Rossi, archbishop of Udine, during the "Social Week" held by the Catholics in Milan, spoke of the internationalization of the Law of Guarantees, arousing a storm of discussion.

THE WAR

The war has shaken Italian society to its depths and the spiritual phases of European life are changed in many particulars. As touching our subject, we must note the following:

(a) By considerations of a general character, the Vatican

was obliged in the first days to desire and to favor Italian neutrality.

(b) The Vatican declared that it had assumed a position of strict neutrality. To guarantee this and to watch it, France and England sent their representatives to Rome. This declaration required that the Holy See should not contract with either of the belligerent parties for any advantages for itself in case of victory by one or the other of the parties. The offer of Erzberger and of Germany, therefore, was a pass on one side only.

(c) Italy, for her part had, by Article 15 of the Treaty of London, guaranteed herself against any eventual concessions on the part of her Allies toward the Holy See to her damage, by having the decree passed that representatives of the Vatican should not have seats around the Peace Table.

(d) The Law of Guarantees worked during the entire duration of the war in a most satisfactory manner. With consent of the Vatican, diplomatic representatives to the Holy See from enemy countries were asked to move to Switzerland. But the Holy See itself could during all the war communicate uninterruptedly through its own couriers, free from censorship, with all the world, and ecclesiastical functionaries, even of the enemy nations, could come to Rome without molestation.

(e) The greater part of Italian Catholics, although strong neutral tendencies, fostered by the old clericals and the new socialists and often favored by the clergy, were rife among them, did their duty toward their fatherland in peril, and felt themselves bound to it by strong chains of affection. After this, to attempt to withhold Catholics from full adhesion to Italian unity with Rome as capital would have been impossible. Pontifical claims would thus lose what they must depend upon for their strongest backing. Hence the declaration of Cardinal Gasparri referred to and the consent given for the foundation of the Popular Party.

Since the war the Holy See has been stronger diplomatically. France has resumed diplomatic relations with it, England has sent a Mission Extraordinary, and the smaller nations have become willing of a sudden to send their representatives to the Vatican court. In the Orient religion and politics are still closely con-

nected. Religious and ecclesiastical questions, therefore, acquire a great importance, inasmuch as there are still plans to develop and intrigues to carry on among those peoples. Often it is necessary, or at any rate opportune, to pass through Rome.

But, on the other hand, the religious sentiment among all the people has in some way become purified. The more is felt the need of a rebirth of spiritual values in the soul, the less are they inclined to concern themselves with the small questions of prominence, of privileges, of political power, of rival creeds in which the Catholic Church loses so much of its real force. In this new atmosphere the papal claims to Rome could not do otherwise than lose rapidly in importance.

In the Italian kingdom one notes a similar duplex phenomenon. The war has set before the church an Italian kingdom such as never before existed, such as perhaps Italians never realized before there could be, so great and so highly respected in the world. The Italian state is no longer a servile body-slave, who is always afraid of having committed some grave fault and therefore raises his voice to inspire fear in others and courage in his own heart by the noise he makes. The Italian state knows now that there is no longer any other nation who could or who would like to lay hand on it by force, and compel it to a solution unwillingly. It knows that the scrupulousness with which it fulfilled before the entire world those sacred duties imposed upon it by the Law of Guarantees concerning the absolute independence of the spiritual power of the Pope has won for itself the confidence and the trust of all. Even German public opinion, which at the outbreak of hostilities hastily proclaimed the failure of the Law of Guarantees, being much inflamed and badly informed, recognized later with a certain feeling of loyalty that Italy had failed in no respect to fulfill her pledge of honor.

The Italian nation has recently passed through a most grave internal crisis, being threatened by a proletariat revolution such as the Russian. To save themselves from this peril many have turned toward the Church and the Popular Party. The help of this party has been useful to the State, but for its support the State has had to pay well.

The Vatican has never dared to attempt to force a solution corresponding to its real desire. In the Bonomi Cabinet the Minister of Justice and Public Worship was a member of the Popular Party. To quiet the alarm of the Liberals, Bonomi was obliged to announce to the House of Deputies after this nomination that the new minister would apply the laws of the State without any change whatever under the responsibility of the entire cabinet—even that Law of Guarantees which the Pope refuses to recognize. A curious mix-up, in truth!

PRESENT DEMANDS OF THE VATICAN

What are the demands of the Vatican? The possession of Rome and a vast territorial zone? No. The attitude of the Popular Party, seconded by the Vatican, excludes this.

For a certain time they talked of the internationalization of the Law of Guarantees; but now the Holy See declares that it does not wish this. Such a measure is, on the other hand, a thing so uncertain and little trusted that not even the keenest casuists or the most ingenuous theorists of Germany in their disputes at the outbreak of the war succeeded in telling just how it should be done.

After the question of attempting to come to an understanding with the Holy See was raised by *The Messagero* the 12th of last May, the Vatican collaborator of *The Tempo* (June 2), a person in a position to understand well the thought of the Cardinal Secretary of State, Sig. Ernesto Buonaiuto, wrote:

The Law of Guarantees was conceived and shaped under the predominant preoccupation to yield nothing of national territory to the Pontificate which might represent a diminution, real or apparent, of the sovereign rights of the Italian state. One comprehends to-day that a like preoccupation has prevented the State from discerning and valuing in their entire reasonableness the motives which have prevented the Holy See from accepting a law which placed it in a position of ill-concealed subjection. . . . Were only a square centimeter of territory necessary to the supreme authority of Catholicism for the exercise of its power, it is necessary that that square centimeter should not come to him as being graciously intrusted to him by an outside power; it is necessary that it should be his exclusive and undivided possession. It is expedient, then, that this old and cumbersome Roman Question should reach a satisfactory solution; that Italian policy should be persuaded that it would not be a

diminution of the rights of the State to give over to the full possession of the Pontiff that zone of territory which is necessary in order that he may stand in the presence of all the world as one perfectly secure from any interference and free from subjection to any particular nationality.

The debate in the Italian press was very general. The Liberal papers took part with calmness and showed a desire for pacification, but without discussing the conditions imposed by the Holy See. So that the Holy See, realizing that there was no hope of success and not wishing the impression to spread in other countries that negotiations were already on foot and near to a satisfactory conclusion, cut the whole matter short in the *Osservatore Romano* (the official Catholic daily) by declaring that there was no probability of an immediate accord. An article by the editor, Count della Torre, stated definitely and clearly the same conditions that had been indicated by the writer in *The Tempo*, the chief demand being absolute territorial sovereignty, even though within most restricted borders.

Senator Ruffini, a learned professor of canon law and formerly minister of education and now for many years a professor in the University of Turin, speaking for Italian liberal thought, passes this judgment:

What is this thesis which the Vatican outlines? Alas! it is the old, cast-aside and condemned thesis—the ancient right of sovereignty by the grace of God. But what of that solemn and imposing plebiscite, never denied and now strengthened by fifty years of the most explicit and unequivocal pronouncements? Does not this count for something in these times of auto-decision of peoples? And will not Italians ask, Have you been compelled to separate much of our national foundation from its statutory position without consulting us at all? This question will come from a people once conquered but now conquerors, and what is more, from a government once less civilized and liberal but now very advanced and very democratic. Now, since by its own admission a government of the Catholic Church could not exist, as Count di Cavour long ago observed, unless it should become an absolute government with a parliament and a Chamber of Commerce and all the appurtenances of a democracy, how, we ask, could even ten free Italian citizens be humiliated by being made subjects of an ecclesiastical government?

The most recent document which states Vatican thought on the subject is the interview granted by Cardinal Gasparri to the above-mentioned Buonaiuto for the *Secolo* of Milan, published on

September 29—an interview which the *Osservatore Romano* hastened to deny, but its authenticity is proved by the well-known intimacy between the two men. In this interview the cardinal talked of free maritime communication of the Holy See with foreign nations. This request presupposes, evidently, something else which is not mentioned, namely, the recognition of absolute sovereignty of the Holy See upon territory of its own, let that territory be even the Vatican alone, for which in order to have free communication, it would be necessary to extend the borders to the Tiber. For the question of liberty of communication has no meaning, if it does not imply an eventual, however small, pontifical state, which would be obliged, under present conditions, to pass through another state for its communication with other nations.

But will the Vatican hold to the conditions expressed and implied? It is very significant that according to Cardinal Gasparri the request for free communication could be made a point of debate, when once the great fundamental question has been solved. But Cardinal Gasparri knows how grave and, we think, insurmountable difficulties prevent the acceptance of the Vatican's point of view, and he confesses that the men who to-day govern do not seem to him to be adapted to confront so arduous a task. The Holy See is waiting for its man.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENTS

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

"THE GLORIOUS COMPANY OF THE APOSTLES"

OUT of the heart of discipleship the apostolate was born, by a process of spiritual selection. From among the eager followers that hung upon his gracious words and watched his wonderful works, Jesus chose twelve to be the envoys of the King and the heralds of the Kingdom. They were the elect of the election, the surviving remnant of a sifting process that found in them the enduring strength for foundation stones to his spiritual temple. For it is on the rock of an inspired insight that could perceive his divine personality through the veil of flesh (Matt. 16. 17, 18) that he has built his church. "No man can say, Jesus is Lord, but in the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 12. 3).

All excepting Judas, the man of Kerioth, were Galileans. Two of them bore Greek names and some others had Greek surnames. Galilee had been more or less under domination of Greek ideas for three centuries. The Syrian faith, which was soon to take its deepest rooting on Greek soil, found in these peasant preachers of northern Palestine the bilingual missionaries whose mental and moral fiber fitted them for a universal mission. It is an interesting fact that the Greeks who in the week of our Lord's Passion desired to "see Jesus," made their approach to him through the two disciples with Greek names, Philip and Andrew.

All were probably plebeian by birth. No man of rank or of great wealth was among them. They were sons of toil, made hardy by their handicrafts and full of the free life of the open air. Work is the very salt of manliness, the girdle of virile strength. They were sane and wholesome souls, with red blood in their veins, steady of nerve and quick of sense, whose unsophisticated minds were virgin soil for the seed of the gospel and whose unspoiled perceptions fitted them for their great work as witnesses

for Christ. The chief apostolic function is testimony. No church can claim to be in the apostolic succession which has ceased to be a witnessing church. It is still true that "not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called." There is a primal simplicity of soul to which the spiritual kingdom is as native air; these are the stuff from which the King chooses his ambassadors.

There was an interior network of kinsmanship in the apostolic college. Probably half of them were distantly related to our Lord. Two, perhaps three, pairs of brothers are in the number. Nature is made a channel for grace and upon the fellowship of the family is built the higher brotherhood of the Spirit. The church in its beginnings symbolized the mighty household of faith transcending the bond of blood and race and making all "one in Christ Jesus."

The number, twelve, was also significant. It is a new Israel that he is gathering, and though the twelve tribes are forever lost, these twelve names shall keep alive the spiritual continuity of the kingdom of God. As on the high priest's breastplate the tribal names flashed in jeweled beauty in three groups of four each, so in the four lists of the twelve found in the New Testament they are always grouped in fours, forming concentric circles about the Master. Nearest him stand Peter and Andrew, James and John—these are the inner circle to whom he disclosed his inmost heart and who share with him the deepest experiences of his life. Beyond these stand the more reflective group, the questioning Philip, the skeptical Thomas, the meditative Nathanael, and the businesslike Matthew. Farthest off are the Hebraistic group, representing intensest Jewish orthodoxy, James the Less, Thaddeus, Simon the Zealot, and the Iscariot. These three classes are persistent in the church: the men of vision, the men of thought, and the men of tradition—the mystic, the rationalist, and the dogmatist. Wonderful company, that could contain at once the poetic insight of John and the investigating mind of Thomas, the tax-gathering Matthew and the tax-fighting fanatic Simon! Doubtless each of them filled some important function in the new community. Even the vile traitor, cast out at last to

give place to Paul, "an apostle by the will of God," does not go to "his own place" until his wicked lips have been forced to give his witness to the character of Christ, "I have betrayed innocent blood." All types and temperaments have their place in the Kingdom, but better than the bitter orthodoxy of the outermost rim is the spiritual sympathy of the inner circle.

It was after a night of preparation by prayer that Jesus, in the dewy freshness of a Galilean dawn, chose this "glorious company of the apostles." In the foundation stones of the New Jerusalem their names shall be symbolically graven. They were chosen to be with him, to be trained by him, and at last by his holy breath at Pentecost to be endued with fiery power for the witness of the church of the resurrection.

At sound as of rushing wind, and sight as of fire,
Lo! flesh and blood made spirit and fiery flame,
Ambassadors in Christ's and the Father's name,
To woo back a world's desire.

These men chose death for their life and shame for their boast,
For fear courage, for doubt intuition of faith,
Chose love that is strong as death and stronger than death
In the power of the Holy Ghost.

None are in their Apostolic Succession excepting those who, not through mechanical finger touch, but by the spiritual dynamic of Pentecostal power are equipped for the apostolic success.

THE JOY IN HEAVEN

THE Bible is a happy book; it is set to the key of the *Te Deum*; it is glad with *Glorias* and joyful with *Jubilates*. The hallelujahs of heaven drop down upon its pages. But its divinest beauty is not this revelation of celestial gladness, but in the fact that heaven's highest rapture is born out of earth's victories.

God rejoices. The God of the Bible is not impassive, like heathen deities; he has an emotional life of infinite tenderness and sympathy, which touches all his universe and is touched by it. He knows the rapture of making; at the end of each day of

creative toil he sang his chant of gladness, "It is very good." And in redeeming the world God "renews his ancient rapture." It is the husbandman's joy as he sings the songs of harvest home, the shepherd's joy as he pipes to safe-folded flocks, the father's joy over the returning wanderer. "Jehovah thy God is in the midst of thee, a mighty one who will save; he will rejoice over thee with joy; he will rest in his love; he will joy over thee with singing" (Zeph. 3. 17).

Angels rejoice; they are in perfect sympathy with God. They joined the creative chorus as "the morning stars sang together." They are deeply interested in redemption, singing a herald song for the Incarnate God; following his life of pain with loving ministry and circling his grave with shining messengers of heaven's interest. Heaven is nearer to us than we think. We need only the opened vision and the air about us would glow with glory and be tremulous with triumph. Earth's joy is poor; we lack greatness of heart and brain enough to measure the might of the pain and love that has redeemed us. If we want full gladness we must call the angels in.

It is a social joy. God wants our sympathy and cries, "Rejoice with me!" He sings the solo of gladness and invites us to join the chorus. The Father calls to his servants, "Let us eat and be merry." There is community in all highest joy; it always breaks away from its solitude to share its ecstasy with others.

Salvation is the highest source of God's joy. Of course, he has not forgotten his creative gladness and his song is still heard through the music of the spheres. His sight takes in all glories and he rejoices in all his works. He is glad in bending a rainbow against a cloud, or painting a sunset in the western sky, or tinting a rose in the rapture and riot of June. But he knows a higher than his delight as maker, even the recovery of his lost ones, and in this he calls for sympathetic songs, while—

Wondering angels 'round him throng
And swell the chorus of his praise.

What we regard the greatest events of earth are not those

which most interest celestial beings. We are jubilant over the advance of science, the progress of art, the achievements of statesmanship, the triumphs of war, the reform of old abuse. No doubt God and the angels rejoice in many of these. Whenever goodness triumphs, or a noble cause gains a victory, their shout answers earth's fidelity and progress. But how often does this world rejoice over smaller things than these? We hold jubilee over the petty triumphs of selfishness, and sing over our poor plans while heaven weeps. And are we not all too indifferent to that which is the beatitude of the skies?

The joy of heaven is excited by one of earth's sorrows, the pain of repentance. The tears of the penitent are the wine of angels—

Tears that sweeter far
Than the world's mad laughter are.

It is the pang of soul-birth; it is the heir claiming his inheritance. And so they do not wait for the moment of pardon to begin the song, but strike up the happy strain on the first news that a soul has turned his back on sin and his face toward the Father. This is the "joy in heaven," "the joy in the presence of the angels"—joy on the eternal throne, joy among the heavenly hosts, a joy that at last entering human hearts swallows up all other felicities.

Shall not the divine and angelic example teach us the value of the human soul, the tragedy of its loss, the glory of its redemption? Shall we not add to the happiness of heaven and help to make God glad? This we may do by the surrender of our own lives, and by becoming partners of the Son of God in his work of saving the world. Every falling tear of sympathy, every word of kindly help, and every faithful service shall help to swell the symphony of the divine bliss, which heaven and earth sing together. It is the prayers of earth that feed the holy lamps that light the halls of heaven; it is the sacrificial service of earth that sets the bells of glory ringing and starts the celestial choirs to singing.

THE PENTECOSTAL PROGRAM

THE Day of Pentecost in the Hebrew calendar was the feast of the first fruits, and traditionally a memorial of the giving of the Mosaic Law. Under Christianity it became Whitsunday, the birthday of the church, on which were gathered the first fruits of the gospel by the writing of the spiritual law of love in the hearts of three thousand penitent believers. As in Creation the cosmic Spirit brooded over chaos and brought forth the beauty of earth and sky, so now the redemptive Spirit broods over the darkness and confusion of the sinful soul and brings forth the new creation in Christ Jesus.

Spirit can best be known through symbols. And so Holy Scripture is full of divine pictures of the operations of the unseen presence. He is water that cleanses and refreshes, wind that awakens and vivifies, fire that purifies, transforms, and energizes. The living water, the breath of God, the fire baptism—these are a few of the great visible pictures which symbolize the invisible presence of the Indwelling Spirit.

Perhaps the noblest conception is that pragmatic one which finds in the heavenly gift of the Holy Spirit the endowment of power for service. It is written of the first great Day of Pentecost and of the company in the upper room that "they were all filled with the Holy Spirit." And we know that they were filled, because one hundred and twenty earthen vessels overflowed and three thousand more souls felt the kindling of the sacred flame. This was the promise of the Master: "Ye shall receive power . . . and ye shall be witnesses." Conviction of sin chiefly comes by Spirit-filled church. God uses man to save men. The kingdom of heaven grows by the contagion of character and influence. Only by personal contact and effort do the sacred streams flow forth to fertilize other lives and start new centers of sanctified service.

Hope not the cure of sin till self is dead;
Forget it in love's service, and the debt
Thou canst not pay the angels shall forget;
Heaven's gate is closed to him who comes alone,
Save thou a soul and it shall save thine own.

The pentecostal program proposes to turn every Christian into an evangelist. The heavenly gift was not confined to the apostles. The entire body of waiting worshipers, "all," were filled. The message of salvation is to be proclaimed, not by preachers alone; the world will be saved only by a witnessing church, every member of which burns with the flame of holy love and confesses Christ with certainty and assurance.

Not on one favored head alone
The Pentecostal glory shone;
But flamed o'er all the assembled host—
The baptism of the Holy Ghost.

Whitsunday should have for Methodists an added significance and emphasis. Ten days before it this year, May 24, is the anniversary of the conversion of our father in God, John Wesley. On that day in 1738 he "felt his heart strangely warmed." That fire then kindled has burned round the world. Let every Methodist who believes in and feels the "Witness of the Spirit," our heritage from our founder, join the Pentecostal Program. Let us make the sacred ten days which culminate in Pentecost, June 4, days of holy expectancy and prayer. That day may become a Day of Ingathering, when there shall be set aflame a new consuming passion for souls, and be started a holy conflagration of sacred fire which shall girdle the world with salvation.

See how great a flame aspires,
Kindled by a spark of grace!
Jesus' love, the nation's fires,
Sets the kingdoms on a blaze;
To bring fire on earth he came;
Kindled in some hearts it is:
O that all might catch the flame,
All partake the glorious bliss!

THE CHANCE OF CHILDREN'S DAY

WITH June sunshine, bird song and roses, comes one of the gladdest festal Sundays of the year, Children's Day.

Unfortunately, many of our churches and schools make it

merely a day of entertainment rather than one of sacred opportunity. Vaudeville programs, a conglomeration of wholly unrelated numbers, in which wretched dialogues and doggerel declamations are interspersed with cheap music, sung once and never heard again, waste one of the most precious chances for binding childhood to the church and for stimulating child culture and family religion. Rather should we construct a program which develops some climaxing lesson that will tie up our children more closely to the church and in which worship and instruction are given emphasis rather than amusement.

First and foremost comes the baptism of young children. This means, and the fact should be emphasized, that the babies presented become enrolled members of the visible church, whose names are at once placed on the church records, and listed in the Cradle Roll of the Sunday school. They are to be kept under the watchful care of parents, pastor, teachers, and leaders, until the union with Christ typified in baptism becomes at last an open confession of Christ at the altar of the church.

Childhood is the chief chance of the church. God impanels a new jury with each generation and retains his holy church as his chosen advocate to win the case of righteousness against sin. Hear the wise words of Benjamin Kidd: "Give us the young and we will create a new mind and a new earth in a single generation."

Children's Day is an evangelistic chance to bring to final and full decision all the youth of the church not reached by the White gift appeal of Christmas and the acknowledgment opportunity of Palm Sunday. And it may also be used for the reception into full membership of those who became preparatory members at those two earlier dates.

Children's Day is an educational chance to stress the call to life service, to press the claims of the Christian school, and to exalt the spiritual above the secular ideals of culture. Probably nothing has been such a helpful propaganda for college education among the children of Methodism as the collections for the Children's Fund of our Board of Education taken upon that day. More valuable even than the fund itself has been the interest inspired in higher culture and especially Christian culture, psycho-

logically resulting from the modest investment by our boys and girls of nickels and dimes in that noble cause. And to-day special attention should be given to the pressing need of that fund for larger gifts. This lovely holiday, if made a sort of Commencement Day for the year's schedule of religious education in the church, will become a true commencement in myriads of young lives of higher aspiration and holier purpose in the training of both head and heart.

Childhood, in spite of the larger interest in child welfare, is still in need of protection from the ignorance and indifference of parents, the greed of labor, the exploitation of capitalistic production, vicious commercialized amusement, and the folly of the children themselves. Children's Day, coming just before the summer vacation period, should seek to save the coming race from the dangerous dissipation of those perilous days.

The church that cares for childhood guarantees its own perpetuity. It will keep young itself and never feel the touch of decay. The Sabbaths will all be Christmases and Easters, when the Holy Child smiles forever and the spring flowers bloom perpetually upon its altars.

Children's Day is a climactic chance of the church year, closing the program begun at the Advent and leading up to the beginning of a fresh program for the coming year.

Do not miss the chance of Children's Day.

THE HOUSE OF THE INTERPRETER

It will be noted that in the brief exposition on Josiah in this issue no reference is made to the Deuteronomic Law, its discovery and its influence on the reformation under that king. There is a reason. Critical questions may prepare the preacher for preaching, but they have no place in the pulpit, unless he happens to be one of those homiletical geniuses who can treat them constructively, and get practical religious values out of them.

MANASSEH'S SIN, SUFFERING, AND SALVATION

THE priestly compiler of the books of Chronicles was deeply interested in genealogy. He felt strongly the power of the blood-bond of kinship and of a noble past. Yet even he cannot ignore the limitations of the principle of heredity so far as it applies to personal moral and re-

ligious character; 'bad fathers have good sons and pious fathers are succeeded by wicked descendants. Quaint Thomas Fuller, commenting upon this strange anomaly, says, "I see, Lord, from hence that my father's piety cannot be entailed; that is bad news for me. But I see also that actual impiety is not always hereditary; that is good news for my son."

How far was the good king, Hezekiah, to blame for the abominable behavior of his heir, Manasseh? (2 Chron. 33, 1-13.) Saints are not always strong in dealing with the sinners of their own household; wisdom, as well as piety, is needed for good family government. Yet it should be noted that Manasseh was but twelve years old when he began to reign; he was too early deprived of paternal care and counsel. The great statesman-prophet, Isaiah, whose vision and voice had inspired the great reforms of his father's reign, had passed away. It was the very climax of opportunity for that political and moral reaction which is always watching its chance to overturn the reign of righteousness. And so it was easy for the antiprophetic party to capture the imagination of the boy king, and sweep him into the whirlpool of the promised pleasures of the larger license offered by the abandonment of the puritan régime of the prophets and the reestablishment of the sensuous worship and the free and easy morals of Canaanite idolatry. It is a most melancholy story, constantly repeated in the history of moral reform; expelled evil returns in reckless riot to undo the work of pious statesmanship. "So Manasseh made Judah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem to err, and to do worse than the heathen before whom the Lord had destroyed the children of Israel." When, after a "dry" period, the county went "wet," we got a new glimpse of the awful possibilities of wickedness.

Nothing went well with him. He found the way of transgressors hard; he was whipped all around, cheated and checkmated at every turn, and at last, a fettered slave in Babylon, he tasted the last bitter drops of disappointment and degradation. God was afflicting him in mercy. This is frequently the meaning of misfortune; God is faithful to the soul at the expense of the body. Punishment is disciplinary as well as retribution. He will not permit us to be permanently duped by the deceptive promises of sin. Mercy is wrapped up in judgment. Well for us when the glamour of irreligious prosperity fades and the worldly scheme of life is seen to be what it really is, a cheating mirage. The stern honesty of God opens through suffering a road to salvation.

Manasseh had not yet become wholly apostate; he was not hardened by affliction. Some men are not subdued by suffering; trouble angers them against God, adversity drives one man to his closet and another to his cups. Few things are so certain a touchstone of character as chastisement; one obeys, the other defies; one is melted, the other is hardened. Was it some memory of childhood, some reviving influence of his father or Hephzibah, his mother, that saved him at last? The voice of holy heredity begins to speak in him, "and when he was in affliction he besought the Lord his God, and humbled himself greatly before the God of his fathers." And he found "grace abounding for the chief of sinners." Manasseh is a monument of mercy, one of the beacon lights of holy his-

tory, holding out hope to the worst and most abandoned of souls. He found pardon, not through the mediation of priest and sacrifice, but by personal penitence and prayer. Here again the chronicler, ritualist as he is, records the limitations of sacerdotalism. An exiled king, far from the altars of the true God which his own guilty hands have polluted, finds grace through contrite confession and humble trust. Priestly prepossessions cannot obscure this prophetic principle, which is the fundamental principle of Protestantism, of the unique originality of every man's relation with God.

"Then Manasseh knew that Jehovah was God." No man really knows God until he finds pardon. He may feel the hand of God in punishment and hear the voice of God in judgment; but he cannot see the face of the Father until he knows the joy of reconciliation. For the heart of God is not known in the power that creates, or the wisdom that rules, or the justice that condemns, but in the love that redeems. It is not the father that the prodigal really remembers in his hunger and wretchedness, but only the master of well-fed servants, but it is the father he finds in the embrace of love and the kiss of pardon. Not until the heart is clean shall the eye be clear. In one of his most exquisite lyrics, now almost forgotten, Charles Wesley describes this experience—

A pardon written with his blood,
The favor and the peace of God,
The seeing eye, the feeling sense,
The mystic joys of penitence.

The o'erwhelming power of grace,
The sight that veils the seraph's face,
The speechless awe that dares not move,
And all the silent heaven of love.

AN OLD-FASHIONED YOUNG MAN

JOSIAH, the boy king of Judah, was the very good son of a very bad father. Handicapped by his immediate heredity, he reached back through a long line of ancestry and made his model the first and noblest figure of the whole royal line: "He walked in the way of David his father." (2 Chron. 34. 1-13.) For there is this saving fact about heredity that there is so much of it; we all have more fathers than one. It is a complex tide of life that flows in our veins; in each of us there may live a multitude of possible personalities, seeds sown by the immemorial past. Dr. Holmes, when asked at what age should begin the education of a child, replied: "A hundred years before he is born!" Josiah did better than that; his training took its start four hundred years back in the splendid career of the heroic founder of his line. While we are not given the privilege of choosing our parentage, it may be possible to select from the contending strains of inherited tendency within us what legacy of the years shall live in our lives and be transmitted through us to the future.

Which of our forbears shall we resemble? This spiritual selection, more potent for character building than all natural selection, is mostly

made early in life. "While he was yet young he began to seek after the God of David his father." He was well started. How came he to know anything about David, or David's God? We may well imagine that his early boyhood was not under the care of his wicked father, Amon, but that from the loving lips of Jedidiah, the beloved of Jehovah, his mother and from the instruction of Hilkiah, the high priest, he learned the lays of the hero-king, and the story of his deeds. Environment surpasses heredity in character building. If one could be sure of the right sort of training, it would be safer to be the son of a healthy burglar than of a consumptive bishop. Guarded from the ways of the wicked world, from the perils of power, the corruption of evil counsel, and the contamination of a licentious court—out of the sacred past the shadowy hands of holy help were stretched over him in benediction and influence, and in the depths of his spirit he sought and followed the most sacred suggestions of Hebrew history. Childhood is the everlasting chance to remake the world. The nearer we are to the cradle, the nearer we are to the Christ. Some day the Church will learn this lesson, and in a single generation will largely cancel the curse of depraved descent in the interest of our higher heredity from God. Josiah was, in the best sense of the phrase, an old-fashioned young man. Doubtless there were many of the pagan, antiprophetic party who regarded him as quite behind the times, a puritanic, psalm-singing foggy. One of the strangest illusions of sensual worldlings is that they are "up to date," and that those who reverence the past are belated "back numbers." It is so easy to forget that sin is the one unchanging and antiquated thing in the world, the one dreary monotony of history. Nothing is so unoriginal and unprogressive as sensual license. Josiah did not really go backward, but upward; his inspiration came not from David but from David's God. The so-called "spirit of the times" passes, but the eternal Spirit abides. The fashions of heaven are never out of style. No electric lamp of earthly invention shall ever supersede the sunlight. Every great reform of history in which our humanity has made a swift and sure advance, has been led by souls who, divining the meaning of the "good old times," have broken the dam of evil custom and set free the currents of the divine intent to sweep in "the good time coming."

Josiah proved himself no puritanic prig, no mere milksop satisfied with praising the past and bewailing its loss; his was a militant goodness, which at once repaired the house of God and swept away old abuses. He was a hearty hater of evil, marching in the front rank of those strenuous souls who, feeling the power of a holy past, make out of its mighty memories the pavement of the path of progress. Hebrew prophecy, suppressed in the persecutions of the long reign of Manasseh, again flamed forth, and a host of ardent young souls rallied around the banners of Jehovah. His kinsman, Zephaniah, great-great-grandson of King Hezekiah, the young Jeremiah, most faithful of all witnesses for God, and the poetic Habakkuk, whose prophetic message glowed with the lyric splendor of the Davidic psalmody—these were a part of the galaxy of spiritual genius led forth by the loyalty of the young reforming king.

These old-fashioned young men were the true possessors of the future; they were the crusaders whose courage and consecration have conquered centuries. And still the Eternal Wisdom stands in the human highway, crying, "I love them that love me and they that seek me early shall find me."

THE GOODLY FELLOWSHIP OF THE PROPHETS

[The following essay is intended as an introduction to the studies on the prophet Jeremiah, to which this department as well as that of Biblical Research in the next number of the *Review* will be devoted.]

THE fall of Samaria in 722 B. C. had much the same significance to Jerusalem and Judea as the capture of Constantinople in 1453 A. D. had to Rome and Italy. In both cases they were rival religious capitals of a divided empire. Just as the eternal city condemned Byzantium as the seat of a schismatic church, so did Zion despise Bethel as the shrine of a debased religion. Yet as the downfall of the Eastern Empire poured the treasures of classic culture into Italy and, lighting the candle of learning, produced the Italian Renaissance and at last the Protestant Reformation, so the ruin of the northern kingdom endowed Judah with the gift of literary prophecy and with the Deuteronomic law, which flamed with the splendor of the great prophetic age beginning with Isaiah and Micah, culminating in the great reformation under Josiah, and ending in the birth of heart religion in the person and messages of Jeremiah. We to-day are spiritually debtors to this great age of national agony and decline, but also of religious evolution.

The prophets are the chief actors of this intense historic drama. They are greater than the greatest kings. Isaiah towers above Hezekiah, and Josiah's statesmanship pales before the radiance of Jeremiah's dream. These spokesmen of Jehovah became foundation stones of the everliving church, not so much because of their predictions as because of their vision of eternal truth. These lonely pioneers of the human spirit were trumpets through which the breath of God made wild and warning music for their own age and the inspiring melody of holy hope for all time to come. What a glorious galaxy they are! Micah, Isaiah, Nahum, Zephaniah, Habakkuk, and Jeremiah! Their writings are a part of that literature of power which the world will never let die. And this, not so much because of literary form as for their spiritual substance. Glorious as their rhetoric is at times, their message grips us by its might of meaning rather than by splendor of their style.

Men in earnest have no time to waste
In patching fig leaves for the naked truth.

To this period we owe the literary activity which preserved for us the holy history and divine library of sacred Scripture. The "men of Hezekiah" collected the wisdom of the past, and these with the rescued records of the northern kingdom have given us an enduring treasure, the hero stories of Israel and the Chronicles of the kings. Priceless as is this possession, it must yield for vividness of historic value to the pages

of prophecy. These are original sources and human documents of the first order; we read in them, not only the names and deeds of kings and priests, but the very life of the common people. They throb with living reality and thrill with human passion. They agonize with all the tragedy of poverty, pain, and penitential passion; they exult in all the ecstasy of human aspiration. Through them Jehovah the God of Israel has become the Lord of all the earth.

The prophets were true patriots and statesmen. To them the whole of life, and not worship alone, is the sphere of religious activity. They will not divorce either ethics or that particular department of ethics we call politics from religion. The vision of the divine righteousness must illumine the whole realm of social and civic duty. Certainly the prophetic preaching inspired the reforms of Hezekiah and the greater revolution under Josiah. It is impossible to doubt that Isaiah was in hearty sympathy with the former and that Jeremiah and his friends entirely approved the latter. Yet it would be difficult to find explicit commendation of either movement in their books. Does not this mean that the prophets perceived that no merely mechanical reformation can permanently produce real prosperity? Nothing but the religious regeneration of a nation can secure its political welfare. To-day it is the duty of every Christian to sustain every effort toward social betterment and political purification; but it is also our Christian wisdom to distrust every man-made receipt for the millennium. The Washington Conference on Disarmament will doubtless render high moral and political service to the world. But we need a religious revival rather than a "naval holiday" to rescue mankind from militarism and all other historic iniquities.

The historic crisis helped the prophetic party in their growing emphasis upon the futility of external reform and the inwardness of true religion. The nation dies, but the individual lives. Isaiah's righteous "remnant" and Jeremiah's "good figs" are found in such great souls of the exile as Ezekiel and Daniel and his companions. If Zion is laid waste, its temple in ruins, and its worship abolished, the solitary soul must the more surely find a private pathway to the heart of God. Henceforth social salvation must find its living root in personal consecration. So Jeremiah proclaims a new covenant in which the law shall be written in loyal hearts. He is one of the first to feel religion as an inward impulse; his tragic tale foreshadows Christ and the cross. He is no pessimist; the darkest clouds of his message are aflame with the glory of a coming triumph of the truth. He has left—

A name earth bears forever next her heart,
One of the few that have a right to rank
With the true makers: for his spirit wrought
Order from chaos, proved that right divine
Dwelt only in the excellence of truth;
And far within old darkness's hostile lines
Advanced and pitched the shining tents of light.

THE ARENA

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE SONS OF WESLEY

SOME time, somehow, unification of Methodism will be an accomplished permanent fact. The basis upon which unification will be founded will be an equitable, broad, simple, workable plan; nothing else will prove acceptable to a practical democratic people, North or South.

While no degree of perfection is claimed for the following suggestions as a basis for the unification of Methodism, nevertheless they are submitted with a prayer and hope that they may in some way add a little toward the solution of the most important problem with which the sons of Wesley will have to deal in this generation.

NAME OF CHURCH

A name appropriate for unified Methodism would be: THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH. Any prefix or suffix to that name would prove irksome if not an effective barrier to unification.

AREAS

The Area Plan has come to Methodism to stay and it is well for all concerned that it has. Unified Methodism can be divided into Areas of approximately 250,000 communicants each, boundaries to be fixed according to State and Conference lines. The Area idea may prove to be the key to the solution of the unification problem.

CONFERENCES

Four Conferences will be required and should be sufficient for unified Methodism, namely: General Conference, Area Conference, Annual Conference, and Quarterly Conference. Official Board meetings might be called Local Conferences.

The General Conference should have supervision of the work of the entire church. It should meet in the month of May, quadrennially, and have power to consecrate Bishops, fix boundaries for Areas, elect Editors for publications authorized by the General Conference and Corresponding Secretaries for the Boards under General Conference control.

The General Conference should be composed of the Bishops, who should be ex-officio members, and from one to three ministers, with an equal number of laymen from each Annual Conference, the ratio of representation to be fixed by the General Conference.

The Area Conference should have the supervision of the work within the bounds of the Area. It should meet in the month of April, quadrennially, preceding the General Conference. Area Conferences outside of the United States should meet in the month of March preceding the General Conference. The Area Conference should have power to elect a Bishop, Editor of Area Christian Advocate, and Representatives for the General Boards of the Church, and fix boundaries of Annual Conferences within the Area.

The Area Conference should be made up of an equal number of ministers and laymen, the ratio of representation to be fixed by the General Conference.

Annual and Quarterly Conferences should be maintained approximately as they are at the present time.

The third Annual Conference session each quadrennium in each Area should have the joint presidency of two Bishops, the Area Bishop and another Bishop appointed by the Board of Bishops for that purpose. All other sessions of Annual Conferences should be held by their respective Area Bishops.

GENERAL SUPERINTENDENTS

Bishops should be elected by and be amenable to Area Conferences and consecrated by the General Conference. Election of Bishops by Area Conferences will secure and maintain a cosmopolitan episcopacy and consecration by the General Conference will maintain the General Superintendency.

The quadrennial assignment of Bishops to Areas should be made by a General Conference Committee on Episcopal Assignments and confirmed by the General Conference. Each Area should have one Bishop.

The Board of Bishops should choose one or more of their number to preside over the General Conference, and Bishops not presiding over General Conference sessions should be seated with their respective Area delegations and have the privilege of the floor and vote.

Should the General Conference at any time establish more Areas than there are Bishops, the same General Conference could elect one or more Bishops, equalizing the number of Areas and Bishops.

Should an Area lose its Bishop during the interim of the General Conference by death or otherwise, the Board of Bishops could provide supervision for such Area until the meeting of the next General Conference.

LITERATURE

There should be one General Christian Advocate, one General Review, and uniform Sunday-school and Epworth League literature, editors of which should be elected by the General Conference, and the place of publication fixed by the General Conference also.

Each Area should have a Christian Advocate published at Area Headquarters and called by the name of the Area, as follows: "New York Area Christian Advocate," "San Francisco Area Christian Advocate," "Nashville Area Christian Advocate," "New Orleans Area Christian Advocate," etc., editors of which should be elected as already suggested by their respective Area Conferences.

Each General Board of the Church should issue a monthly publication devoted to the interests of the society which it represents.

COLORED WORK

Work among colored people of the Church should be administered as among white people with Areas, Area Conferences, Bishops, Editors,

Representatives on General Boards, etc., of their own race and chosen in the same manner as among other Areas.

NOTES

Details of unification should be worked out by properly constituted Commissions and ratified by the General Conference.

Unification will mean a permanent holiday for Methodism in the matter of overlapping and rival work.

Unification will mean a world program big enough to cover with applied redemption every need of the human family. Amen!

Winfield, Kan.

ROBERT L. SELLE.

PRINCIPAL PETER TAYLOR FORSYTH

THE recent death of Principal Forsyth of Hackney College, London, at the age of seventy-three years, has removed from our midst one of the greatest modern theologians. Like many another man who attained eminence, he experienced years of neglect. He did not, however, yield to the temptation to depreciate the success of mediocre men because his own great gifts failed to receive recognition. During the period of obscurity he did not mark time, but toiled terribly to equip himself for the task he was assured would be given him. Even in early life he was a marked man, and no less a leader than Dr. R. W. Dale wrote with reference to a volume of essays by some younger Congregational ministers: "Forsyth's is out of sight the most brilliant and vigorous."

Such a man could not long remain in the backwaters. In 1896 he preached a remarkable sermon on "Holy Father" before the Congregational Union of England and Wales, and at once leaped into a position of influence, which he maintained with increasing power. He kept up his habits of hard study and his writings reveal surpassing surprises of acquaintance with subjects and books outside the range of the ordinary theologian's reading and thought.

I have read and reviewed most of his books and have been impressed by his intense conservatism and no less intense radicalism. It is not easy to say to which school of religious thought he belonged, nor is it necessary. Truth was his supreme passion, and he found light in the writings of Roman and Protestant thinkers. He was a catholic in the highest sense because his thought was deeply controlled by the evangelical emphasis on what he characterized as "the cruciality of the Cross." In defending this phrase, he explained, so far back as 1906, that it was deliberately chosen by him to convey what he found no word for, adding, "In Christianity everything for time and eternity turns on the Cross, and on the Cross as Paul understood it."

To be sure, Dr. Forsyth wrote in a peculiar style, but it admirably fitted his type of thought. He is not easy reading, any more than is Browning; but whoever patiently follows him will be richly rewarded. Some think that had he written less and concentrated on a few big books,

and clarified his style, he might have been more influential. This post-mortem judgment is too far fetched. He was the Browning among theologians, and just as there is no poem of "R. B." that we could afford to spare, so it would be a difficult matter even for a committee to decide which of Dr. Forsyth's books could be dropped. Some are more valuable than others, but each one has a pointed message, and through his versatile writings he did more than any other to recreate the evangelical conscience.

Let me briefly refer to a few of these books. *Religion in Recent Art* is a profound study of the relation of aesthetics to character. *Christ on Parnassus* shows deep insight in relating painting, architecture, music, poetry and art to Christianity. *The Principle of Authority* discusses one of the central issues of Protestantism and is a notable contribution to the philosophy of religion. *Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind* is an incisive examination of the credentials of the Christian preacher. *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ* is one of the greatest books in the language on the question of Christology. *The Church and the Sacraments* is a forcible discrimination between the sacramental and the sacramentarian views of life on which hinge the vital differences between Protestantism and Romanism. *Theology in Church and State* helps to a clear understanding of the specific task of the church in the world. *The Work of Christ* and *The Cruciality of the Cross* are discerning interpretations of the Atonement, the first more popular than the second. *The Justification of God* expounds the love and the holiness of God with special reference to the element of catastrophe in history. *This Life and the Next* dwells on the moral rebound of faith in immortality. Which of these books could be spared?

OSCAR L. JOSEPH.

FOREIGN OUTLOOK

SOME LEADERS OF THOUGHT

It was inevitable that the war should affect theological literary production in several ways. The bulk of works representing extensive research has been considerably diminished, especially in Germany and France. But at the same time religious thinking has been greatly quickened and deepened. It would seem that the gain has overbalanced the loss.

Certainly theological thinking in Great Britain has been growing deeper and richer in these last years. The loss of such men as Holland, Sanday, Denney, and Forsyth is keenly felt, but the number of vigorous and impressive living thinkers is unusually large. If one should undertake to name the really notable living British theologians and biblical scholars, the list would be a fairly long one. Dean Inge is perhaps the most incisive and thought-provoking among them.

French Protestantism has been profoundly stirred by the war. The new religious interest will bear fruit in intellectual as well as practical ways. Since the war, however, there has not yet come the tranquillity

needful for the best scholarly work. French Catholicism has been considerably revived, and there is evidence, especially in the various biblical and ecclesiastical reviews, of vigorous thinking and scholarly work. Probably, however, the most significant theologian in France is the excommunicated modernist, Alfred Loisy.

In Sweden there is one preeminent religious leader whose writings and personal activities merit our best attention. This leader is Dr. Nathan Söderblom, Archbishop of Upsala and Vice-Chancellor of the university at that place. Dr. Söderblom's scholarly distinction was gained by his researches in the field of the history of religion. For several years he was professor of that subject in Leipzig. His return to Sweden took place some time before the war. The most important of his books is entitled (in its German version): *Das Werdendes Gottesglaubens* (Leipzig, 1916). Doubtless, however, it is in some of his addresses upon practical themes that the man's personal influence can best be understood. Two addresses published in a German translation under the title "*Zur religiösen Frage der Gegenwart*" (Leipzig, 1921) will be found very interesting. In the first of them the question, "Are we moving toward a religious renewal?" is discussed in an unusually impressive manner. Söderblom clearly pictures the moral and religious distress of the time, but he also bears witness to the old gospel as the only way of salvation. "We feel," he declares, "more deeply than formerly how impossible it is to keep our faith fixed at once upon the far prospect and upon the immediately pressing tasks, unless we stand upon Calvary and have a sense and experience of the divine way of suffering leading to redemption. Can anyone in this fearful time strive about particular doctrinal statements and institute an examination of men's faith, with a schoolmaster's markings for the several points? Perhaps so, for man is a peculiar creature, especially when he appears in the rôle of piety. For myself, however, everything, everything is swallowed up by the great question concerning reconciliation and satisfaction. . . . The only religion that now signifies, the only religious thought that can now satisfy the deep, inquiring souls out of all tongues and peoples, is a new, irresistible preaching of the cross, a fresh, convincing experience of the universal mystery of redemption, revealed in the Redeemer's devotion of himself in living and in dying. . . . I champion no heathen doctrine of a change wrought in the nature of God and no heathen theory of sacrifice. But I stand for that which is the very kernel of Christianity, from Paul's day until ours an offense to rationalists devout and undevout." Söderblom gratefully recognizes the advance made in modern evangelical thought and life, when, under the influence of Ritschl, the idea of the kingdom of God, which had formed the substance of Jesus' own preaching, was once more put into the foreground; but he warns against the modern tendency to take the heart of religion out of the idea of the kingdom. "In its various applications the idea of the kingdom of God is indispensable, incomparable; but in the midst of the kingdom of God stands the cross."

In the other of the two addresses, which has to do with "The Way

of the Church of Christ in This Time," Söderblom again lays special stress upon the principle of suffering. The church's way must be "a way of service, a way of suffering, a way of miracle," because this is God's own way. It is upon the second point that he lays the greatest stress. In his treatment of this idea we get interesting glimpses into the author's way of regarding Christianity as a fulfillment, not only of the Old Testament religion but also of the prophetic longings manifest in other religions. "Whenever I have had, or still have, occasion to occupy myself, in thinking and research, with these things, my wonder is ever new and great. I can never cease to reflect upon the fact that since the times of dim antiquity our race has ascribed suffering to the nature of deity, until at last an instrument of death, the cross, became the highest symbol of religion. The way of suffering is the way of God. In this time suffering forcibly asserts its place in the theory of life as never before. It would be an act of cruelty in the presence of the unspeakable woe which the World War has caused, to seize upon the idea of design and to say, this had to happen in order that a blessing born of pain should issue from it. Nevertheless, by a divine miracle a kindness has been brought forth from the distress, a compassion, a reconciliation, an ethical value, a purification, a turning to what is essential, that we had never expected to see. No view of life can now find acceptance that disregards suffering." Söderblom refers impressively to the persecutions and martyrdoms of Christians in parts of Russia and in Finland. "But the inhuman acts have at the same time revealed the superhuman, silent heroism of reliance upon God and faithfulness and added imperishable leaves to the white-and-red book that contains the history of the passion of the Christian Church."

In a circumspect manner Söderblom affirms that God himself must be thought of as suffering. He is aware of the fact that this is an idea not in perfect accord with the first article of the Creed. And yet he affirms it, although not without repudiating some of the crasser notions of the divine suffering. "Nevertheless the thought recurs in new forms, in spite of the fact that the church had rejected it in the so-called gnostic systems. How can we believe and experience the living God in history and human life, without thinking of him as suffering, since life and history are so full of suffering, or, more correctly, since what is new, significant, and full of blessing in history seems unable to become realized except through pain and death? Pascal saw the exalted Redeemer still suffering in heaven the torment of the cross. Before the World War in our own time the doctrine of God's sufferings emerged with such a man as Wilfred Monod and other Christian thinkers. It has been asked, at first softly and tremblingly, then openly: Does God suffer with us and for us? And the answer has been given: Yes. In conflict and pain God realizes himself against the insensible order of nature and the resistance of wickedness and lethargy. . . . We must join ourselves to him, bear our part in his conflict and pain, and let him help us through the hindrances of nature, distress, and inward and outward sin, unto his kingdom."

Humanity has fancied other Redeemer-Gods, who should submit to death and rise again. "Yet why should he (Jesus) alone . . . be born into the world, suffer, die, overcome death and stand for all ages in the midst of our human race? . . . Why just this one in preference to all the other millions that have lived on our earth and died? . . . Search, search everywhere, compare, investigate. History answers without possible contradiction: There is no other." Men have sought in every way to explain the unique place of Jesus in the history of the race. "We cannot get away from the two chief causes of his uniqueness. One of these I have already pointed out: not only Israel's religious tradition, but the history of religion in its wider compass, was for millenniums making ready his place for him. When he came, he possessed the power to make all of humanity's seeking after God a history of preparation for himself. The other and primary cause, which no discussion and explanation can remove, is Jesus' own person, the eternal miracle in the world." If one would explain this miracle, it cannot be done by reference to Jesus' historical environment nor to the imparting of the Spirit at his baptism. "The really miraculous element was already there. . . . The real miracle lay in the incarnation, in Christ's origin. The second article of the Creed is right as over against all attempts to explain Jesus' unique equipment by reference to the later influences that affected his development."

The other parts of the address are of like importance and interest. In the more specifically practical utterances toward the close Söderblom expresses his gratitude for the fact that his boyhood stood under the influence of the Revival, whose blessed influence must long endure. "But now a new time has come." The preaching of the Kingdom has been, here and there, rather one-sided—individualism has not always had its dues. "Now again religious individualism is demanding its right in relative independence of the outward church, nationality, and creed." The new preaching of the cross does not mean a renouncing of the ideals of a social Christianity and a return to the way of preaching the cross that characterized the Revival. "But it means a synthesis, a higher unity of the old hearty love to Christ, with its preaching of the cross and its mystical fervor, and the ethically saturated proclamation of the reign of God." "God is; that means, love is the real power of life. Only this certainty can heal our distracted Christian world. Only that can help the individual soul."

In these addresses Söderblom gives himself entire. Himself, the man, the Christian prophet and leader, not his wealth of learning. In these addresses a certain feature of his Christian personality and interest finds incidental expression, namely, his pronounced evangelical catholicity. This highly important characteristic comes, however, to fuller expression in an essay in *Die Eiche* (September, 1919) on "The Task of the Church: International Friendship Through Evangelical Catholicity." Readers of the *Constructive Quarterly* are acquainted with some of his work in this direction. By every means within his power he is laboring to bring the churches of all lands into a closer and richer

fellowship. To promote this cause he has established at Upsala a lectureship, through which representative men of various communions and from different countries are invited to discuss the problems of Christian internationalism and unity. Among the lecturers that have hitherto appeared mention may be made of Professor Deissmann and Bishop Nuelson.

Söderblom's efforts toward international conciliation through the churches have brought him into sympathetic relations with leading churchmen in several countries. Among these are several well-known Germans, such as Rade, Otto, Heller (perhaps the most gifted of Söderblom's pupils), Deissmann, and Siegmund-Schultze. The last is editor of *Die Eiche*, a quarterly devoted to the social and international tasks of the church.

Dr. Siegmund-Schultze's significance as a leader of thought is not due to any extraordinary scholarship or originality, but to his standpoint, the clearness of his purpose, and the force of his personality. Long before the war he was a pronounced pacifist in the best sense of the term and a leader in movements directed toward a better international understanding. At the same time he was actively interested in the social problems of the day. In these particulars he is to be compared with Rade.

Incidentally let it be remarked how much is published these days on the social problems of Christianity. And it is particularly noteworthy that recent writers are generally inclined to redeem and convert socialism—to modify it according to Christian principles—rather than, as formerly, to condemn it unconditionally. Among the recent books and pamphlets upon the relations of Christianity to socialism or the social task of the church, mention may be made of those of Heller (*Jesus und der Sozialismus*), Büchsel, Althaus the younger, Gottfried Naumann (who died in 1921 without having been able to take up his duties as professor at Marburg), and finally of a book edited by Siegmund-Schultze under the title: *Die soziale Botschaft des Christentums (The Social Message of Christianity)*. One of the contributors to this volume was Dr. Michaelis, who was for a short time chancellor of the German Empire in the midst of the war.

As editor of *Die Eiche*, Siegmund-Schultze, although himself a doctor of theology, has been known as a rather severe critic of the church, or churches. His critical attitude recently called forth a firm yet moderate protest from Dr. Theodor Kaftan in the form of an open letter. Inasmuch as Kaftan is one of the ablest and most influential German churchmen of his generation (he has now retired from his long service as General Superintendent of Schleswig-Holstein), and both his letter and Siegmund-Schultze's brief reply are unusually illuminating, it will be worth while to reproduce their main thoughts.

After a frank word as to the occasion of the letter Dr. Kaftan proceeds substantially as follows: "Since I am a convinced churchman, . . . I am persuaded that the watchword of Christians in the present must be 'The Church!' The faults of our 'corporate church' are not un-

known to me. I hold Christianity to be heavily burdened by ecclesiasticism, so much so that I once went so far as to say that nothing in history had so much helped, but also nothing had so much hurt Christianity as the church." Kaftan's position is based upon the indispensability of the church. Christianity never was without the church and it will not be. The possibility of individual existences without direct relation to the church, yet in the general stream of Christianity, is not thereby denied. "I hold it to be deeply grounded in the inner nature of Christianity that Pentecost followed Easter. Upon the development and vicissitudes of the church hang—this is to be understood *cum grano salis*—the development and vicissitudes of Christianity."

"You call attention now and again to the scant understanding that our existing churches have shown for the questions concerning social matters and to their narrowness as over against the international character of the church. You are right in this complaint. But with regard to this matter permit me to ask, *Did we have churches hitherto?*

"I answer the question negatively. We had—more or less under the appearance of churches—departments of state for church affairs. In the states of Prussia, for example, this condition of things was in the Older Provinces somewhat more veiled, in the Newer Provinces it existed in remarkable nakedness. State-churchdom is, as is well known, enormously older than the Reformation, and it was still unfolding itself in its crassest form even in the twentieth century, not upon German evangelical soil, but in the lands of the Orthodox Church, especially in Russia. But upon German evangelical soil state-churchdom gained, through the failure of the bishops and the coming forward of the territorial rulers, the fatal form in which until now it has worked itself out among us. The substance of the church's task is the building up of the kingdom of God; in accomplishing *this* task the church incidentally renders to the states of the civilized world the service which she owes them. Our state-churchdom reversed this. What was incidental it made to be essential and what was essential, incidental. . . . Is it to be wondered at that churches so situated should occupy—officially—an attitude of indifference toward matters of international church fellowship and, when it comes to the social problem, should look up to the state as a maid to the hand of her mistress?" So far as the social problem is concerned, the state church never was set to go, but to stop.

"Now, however, state-churchdom has been shattered by God. We may assume that this unnatural formation will not reappear. . . . The upheaval reaches deeper than many an eye sees. . . . There are doubtless many Christians, even excellent ones, who cannot get out of the narrowness which became their habit through the influence of the state church; but the number of those is growing who apprehend that the Christian church is the true 'League of Nations' given of God himself and on whom the idea is dawning, how unnatural was that state of things, which had once seemed so natural, that the Christian churches of the world took no notice of one another, unless it were to combat one another."

To such a letter Dr. Siegmund-Schultze naturally could take no serious exception. His reply, however, is very interesting. He gently repudiates the intimation that he was somewhat inclined toward a "new Christianity" that admits an admixture of foreign elements. "I too," he writes, "am chilled in the neighborhood of a hodge-podge religion. . . . However, quite another thing than a mixing of diverse elements is fulfillment. It is from this point of view that I seek to value and use both the old and the present Christianity. For Christianity is for me not a new, different religion, but it is the reign of Christ; and this reign of God as King can be set up in every place where mankind is traveling one of the many roads leading to his throne."

"The unity of the church rests upon the Holy Spirit, who fills and controls the communion of the saints. If one calls *this* communion the 'holy universal Christian Church' (holy catholic church), then I have a very high regard for the church—I believe in it."

"But what Christian does not feel the monstrous difference when he passes from this *Una Sancta* to the many unholy churches? I do not wish now to speak at all of the shocking phenomena which confront us, when we journey into some lands upon which Christianity was merely grafted. I do not wish to speak at all of the fatal outward manifestations that are to be found anywhere; but I am speaking now of matters that are fundamental. That is to say, I am speaking the essential defectiveness in the general design, of the want of a true ideal, of the ever-recurring secularization of the church—even of the idea of what the church is. And so I would once more underscore your statement: *Hitherto we had no churches.*

"How can we obtain churches? Not by accommodating ourselves to the wishes of our people or by seeking to satisfy the cultural requirements of the state. . . . A true church of Christ can arise only when, at least in an elementary way, the will and aim are clear, to bring the body of Christ to a real expression. When that is the case, I shall be disposed for the present to pass by the questions, whether the church is sadly divided and whether special interests of this or that church arise, much as I deplore these things. When that is the case, the basis is clear at least. And further: where the members of the body of Christ feel their unity and join themselves together, there is the church; even the smallest communion is thus a representation or specimen of the church.

"Should any one ask, whether such a church would know its duties toward the individual and toward collective humanity, that is, its social and international obligations, I should answer with you: As a matter of course *this church knows its tasks.*"

Dr. Siegmund-Schultze briefly sets forth his view of the woeful failure of the churches in relation to the war. "Our churches"—he is speaking here of the German churches—"almost invariably kept right up with the severest, most unbrotherly, craziest stuff that a soul corrupted by war reports and *Reichsbote* anecdotes could anywise fancy. How often did my soul cry out, Oh that the scourge of Christ might

once again purge our churches of filth, this filth of national selfishness, and that a voice like that of Christ might shout to these advocates of a 'cheery,' 'joyful,' or 'holy war,' to these authors of 'war devotions,' . . . these 'German-God' Christians: My house is a house of prayer, but ye have made it a den of murderers.

"And because French Protestantism as well as the German national churches, the Polish Lutherans as well as the American church pacifists, could and still can fall under the spell of this spirit of murder, I say ever and again in the Eiche, there is not much to be expected of them, when it comes to the question, how they as churches can build the kingdom of God.

"But gladly and ever anew I greet the individuals, the few, who feel their membership in the body." And here Siegmund-Schultze addresses all such along with Dr. Kaftan: "To you I stretch out my hand in grateful, inexpressible joy and fellowship. And with you I know that to this fellowship belongs the victory, even though the world has the might."

With great firmness of purpose and good courage Dr. Siegmund-Schultze has been contending in a noble cause; and the number of those who stand by him grows steadily. There is no fundamental difference between his standpoint and that of such a man as Theodor Kaftan. Doubtless his criticism of the church is designed to be in the best sense constructive.

J. R. VAN PELT.

BIBLICAL RESEARCH

HOW TO STUDY THE FOURTH GOSPEL

WHAT shall I do with the Fourth Gospel? is a question which comes to every student of the New Testament. The uniqueness of the Johannine literature in the Bible is indisputable. That when one passes from the Synoptics into the Johannine Gospel one enters a new world is a fact so patent that any argument is superfluous. This fact, however, would not be, in itself, disturbing, did not the two worlds appear to be more or less incompatible. And the incompatibilities begin with the first chapter of John and end with the last. Two artists (if we may regard the Synoptic portrait as one type) painted their Master's portrait. One was a realist and the other an idealist. Now, while there is no such creature as an absolute realist, since even the most ardent realist is to some extent conditioned by his notions of what ought to be; and since there is no such creature as an absolute idealist, for the ideas of the most ardent idealist are to some extent conditioned by his experience, nevertheless the two types are clearly distinct. And in this age of realism we naturally regard the realistic portrait as authentic and put a question mark after the idealistic picture, if we do not make bold to state a negative conclusion. And when the Fourth Gospel is used to support a teaching or viewpoint of Jesus, or toward Jesus, with a wave of the hand we brush aside this support with the condescending words,

"But that comes from the Fourth Gospel." And the question which then arises is, "What is the worth of the Fourth Gospel, wherein does it lie?" "To what extent is the Christ of John the Christ that was?"

It is clearly seen, then, that the chief Johannine problem is not the problem of authorship, nor could it be solved by the solution of that problem. It is rather the problem of the authenticity of the Christ-portrait painted in this Gospel. A few questions: Does the authenticity of the Johannine portrait of the Christ depend upon its historic accuracy or historic truth, as we know the word "historic"? Need it be historically true to be true? Is history the only criterion of truth? If history is a "psychological science," whose interpretation of the "facts" shall we regard as historically "true"? What is a "fact" apart from its interpretation? These considerations suggest that perhaps we had better not speak quite so glibly about the falsity of the Johannine Christ-picture. May not both the Synoptic and the Johannine portraits be "true," but true from different standpoints? May there not be different kinds of truth? Or at least different criteria of truth? The Synoptic picture may be true from the point of view of history. (Though one should remember that as Zahn says, "The Gospels are not chronicles, diaries, memoirs, or biographies: they are sermons." Yet whether instinctively, temperamentally, or consciously, the "historic sense" is stronger in the Synoptics than in John.) The Johannine picture may be true from the point of view of Christian experience. John sensed the "mind of Christ" better than the Synoptists; they knew better, or expressed better, or were more interested in the earthly conditions under which that mind unfolded. They knew Jesus according to the flesh (*κατὰ σάρκα*), John knew Jesus according to the Spirit (*κατὰ πνεῦμα*). John seems to have adopted the Pauline viewpoint of 2 Cor. 5. 16, "Even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know him so no more." Since all of our knowledge of Jesus is obtained, not from him directly, but from the reactions which he effected in his followers, it may well be that the life of John more perfectly mirrored forth the true mind of Christ than that of any of the Synoptists. The comparatively sober tones of their writings may be an under appreciation of Jesus, or a more mechanical appreciation, rather than the true historic evaluation. Jesus was too great to be understood adequately by his disciples.

Thus, both types of portrait, judged by their own criterion, are true. Both judged by the criterion of the other are untrue. Hence, if one admits of different criteria for the different types, the divergencies between them are not *essentially* contradictions. It is only as we insist upon judging them both by the same standards that a bridge between them becomes impossible. Taken together, they are like complementary colors which blend into the pure white light of completed truth. Some words of A. Sabatier are interesting here: "La théologie aura donc deux sources: La psychologie et l'histoire, dont l'union constituera toute sa méthode d'observation, directe et indirecte. L'histoire, c'est la psychologie remontant en arrière aussi loin et aussi complètement que les documents le permettent; la psychologie, c'est l'histoire poursuivie jusqu'à

moment présent et jusqu'à l'expérience personnelle du penseur." (Theology, then, will have two sources; psychology and history, the union of which will constitute its entire method of observation, direct and indirect. History is psychology reverting back as far and as completely as the documents permit; psychology is history followed up to the present moment and up to the personal experience of the thinker. The quotation is taken from p. 528 of *Les Religions D'autorité et la Religion de L'esprit. Religions of Authority and Religions of the Spirit.*)

The aim of this rather extended introduction has been to show that in the study of the Fourth Gospel, the ultimate question, the answer to which determines one's conclusions in regard to that Gospel, is the question of attitude or method of interpretation. *What was the mind and purpose of the author?* Or better, what was the dominant purpose of the author? This is essentially the problem of one's method of interpretation. If the author's *dominant* interest was to present to his readers a historic account of the unfolding of the life of Jesus, then the contradictions between John and the Synoptics are essential, and the Johannine portrait is to be declared untrue. Or, if his purpose was to present a logical, philosophical treatise concerning the relation of Jesus to Judaism, John the Baptist, and Greek philosophy, again one must estimate the worth of the book by different standards. Or, if his purpose was to win men to the life of fellowship with the Lord Jesus (20. 21), to preach expository sermons on the mind of Christ, then history, logic, philosophy, Judaism, Baptistism, etc., would be distinctly subordinate to the more practical purpose—they are *means*, not *ends*—and again the book is to be judged by different standards. One's method of interpretation of the Gospel is determined by the one of these three points of view which he accepts. He may find them all present to some extent, but one of them was necessarily dominant to the author's mind, whether consciously or unconsciously.

Professor Adolf Deissmann of the University of Berlin has formulated his viewpoint toward this question very aptly and unambiguously. And it is well worth the attention of those who are interested in this important New Testament problem. It is the main purpose of this paper to present the suggestions of Professor Deissmann as to how to study the Fourth Gospel. They are certainly stimulating and thought-provoking and should be of real value to those wishing to enter more deeply into this greatest interpretation of our Lord, the Gospel according to John. The writer would not be so bold as to attempt either to prove or to disprove the correctness of Professor Deissmann's position. It is only hoped that it will be stated completely enough to be clear.

1. Compare the Johannine pericopes with those of the Synoptics.

(a) Does John presuppose Synoptic material? Does he wish to add to it? By way of illustration, John presupposed the Synoptic account of the Baptism of Jesus as known and hence he does not relate it. He rather transforms Synoptic material and adds to it. So the Passion in John is good Synoptic material transfigured. He is like a modern artist using the old symbols in new arrangements. (b) Does his material seem to be

from a good source? In the trial before Pilate, Jesus answers the question of Pilate as to whether he is a king or not, by the words "Thou sayest" (18. 37). This must be regarded as a non-interest of Jesus in the question. It is actually a denial. Also Pilate's answer (v. 38) shows it to be such. Mark has another tradition, in 14. 61, "I am." The Markan tradition here must be secondary (cf. Luke 23. 4).

2. What is the relation of the Johannine text and "Geistes-welt" to Paul? Luke has been called the Pauline Gospel, but John really deserves the name. (a) The Pauline Christ-mysticism is identical with that in John. A central thought in both John and Paul is that the essence of Christianity is fellowship (*κοινωνία*) with God, Christ, and man. (b) The frequent occurrence of the Pauline formula, *ἐν Χριστῷ* (in Christ), is noticeable. Chapter 15 seems to be an exposition of the formula. (c) Both Paul and the Fourth Gospel minimize the flesh (*σὰρξ*) and emphasize the spirit (*πνεῦμα*) and life (*ζωή*). John really had the Pauline view of 1 Cor. 15 that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom. It is truly the "spiritual" Gospel, the "pneumatic" Gospel. (d) The idea of the paraclete is common to Paul and John. Though Paul does not use the term, he has the idea in Rom. 8. 26, 34. (e) The contrast of grace and law (1. 17) is Pauline. Cf. Rom. 6. 14.

3. Does the author take apologetic and polemic regard to the conditions of his own time? (a) "The Jews." Are they the inhabitants of Palestine at Jesus' time or the enemies of Christianity during the author's time? They are clearly the latter. Nicodemus misunderstands Jesus: so the Jews often misunderstood the Gospel, interpreting it crassly, as Nicodemus does. Also the Jews mocked the cross: John shows that Moses has already lifted up a serpent on the cross (3. 14). The Jews said that Jesus could not be Messiah because he did not judge the world: John's polemic is that judgment is not Jesus' function (3. 17). He protests against the conception without giving it up. In part he spiritualizes the parousia. (b) The disciples of the Baptist. These disciples must have been strong in the circle in which the Gospel was written. So in the prologue the writer will show John's subordinate position in the world. John was sent from God, but he was not the light. Another illustration of this point is to be found in the Nicodemus incident. In 3. 5 some omit the words "of water" as having no place in the thought of the section, and verse 8 speaks only of being "born of the Spirit." But John is polemic here. The emphasis is on the words "And the Spirit" (verse 5). The writer is not so much interested in the baptism as in the *pneuma*. One recalls the story in Acts 19 of John's disciples who had not yet heard that the Spirit had been given. (c) Against Christian gnosticism.

4. The general character of the Johannine text. Is his book written for practical use in the church services, for the *Kultus*? Is it a pericope-book. This is very important for the interpretation of the book. The Johannine speeches of Jesus must not be read microscopically, but telescopically. They were written to be read in church service. The great "I am" sections were intended to make the church services assume

the character of Christophanies. The great "Christological" sections are not really "Christology." They are testimonies, confessions. By way of illustration, probably chapter 6, 41-51 was used in the service of the Lord's Supper. Also the story of the Passion in John is a cult-pericope. The author's purpose is to paint the crucified before their eyes (Gal. 3. 1), not for historical purposes, but for religious purposes. Hence, he doesn't tell everything, but only facts of cult importance. Thus the practical exegesis is often better than "modern" exegesis because the text is meant for practical use in the church service. It follows, then, that the book is essentially a pericope-book, a book of sections to a large extent independent of each other. For example, chapter 1. 29 begins a new section. The words "On the morrow" are a pericope introduction. They have no chronological value. Also, according to the Synoptics, a Jerusalem journey at the time of chapter 2. 13-22 is improbable. But John is not to be taken chronologically. The pericopes are to be taken by themselves. In 5. 1 it is fruitless to ask what feast is meant. It is but the background of the story. Here as elsewhere John's chronology is not to be taken into account. And the fact that Jesus was early regarded as the true Passover indicates that the Synoptic date of the crucifixion is preferable to that of John.

5. To what extent are the texts popular (*volkstümliche*) texts? From the idea of the Logos, the book is regarded by many as a book on the philosophy of religion. This is wrong. Textually and from the standpoint of content, the book is simple. (a) The papyri show how firmly the Johannine style was rooted in the language of the people. Also the similarity of the Johannine use of the first personal pronoun and certain non-Christian and pre-Christian examples of the same style is striking. (b) The book is not the treatise of a philosopher; it is the confession of a mystic. The more theologically the prayer of chapter 17 is regarded, the less is it rightly understood. One should not work upon the prayer. One should allow the prayer to work upon him. The Prologue must be regarded as a confession to the spiritual Christ who became flesh to bring grace and truth and sonship. It is opposed to legalism and Baptistism. The Logos-Christ of John is the pneuma-Christ of Paul. John was not directly influenced by Philo. The Logos idea came to him through the educational fashions of the day. But he does not treat it philosophically. The philosopher sees the problem. The mystic sees the *pleroma*. John is a man without problems. They are all solved for him in Christ. Nor is John a theologian. Rather he is a confessor. A dogmatist would say, "Christ gives the bread of life." The psalmist says, "Christ is the bread of life." And the familiar Johannine antitheses, "light and darkness," "good and evil," "truth and falsehood," do not mean that the author had a reasoned-out dualistic view of the universe. John would smile if we should accuse him of not having a uniform *Weltanschauung*. He was interested in saving men. *Word, light, and life* are poetry, not philosophy.

6. Were there different hands at work in the Gospel? In general, the unity of the Gospel is not to be questioned. Wellhausen and Schwarz do

not understand the book. They demand a logical text, not the confession of a mystic. The weakness of the theory of the modern source hunters is that the interpolator is always stupid. Why should this be? Redactors usually remove offenses, rather than cause them. For example, Wendt removes 1. 6-8, 15 from the text, as not being in the *Grundschrift*. This leaves a good text, but it is no proof that it is not original. The microscopic consideration of John is not the way to understand the book. One must stand off and get the total effect. The Gospel is not a mosaic; it is a monotone text. It is a circle, not a straight line with progress of thought. There is thought-concentration. A logical text is not to be demanded.

7. What is the historic value of the book? Historically, its value is far below that of the Synoptics. It is much more a confession. Indirectly it is of first rank for understanding Jesus. It is a book of the workings of Jesus upon the writer. It also reveals apostolic Christianity. One sees the polemic against Judaism, Gnosticism, and the Baptist. In the history of the Christ-cult it is with Paul the classical book. But the author is not a historian as we know the science. He is an apologist, polemicist, confessor. His gospel is not historically founded; it is experienced.

8. What is the religious value of the book?—for the individual, the church, the times? These devotional or edifying considerations have important reflections on scientific results. These books were written not for the seminar but for the praxis.

The present value of an ancient document does not depend on its historic worth. There may be inauthentic texts with great religious value and authentic texts with no religious value. One should not exaggerate the historic. Whatever may be the relation of history to faith, religious values should be tested not by their stamp but by their intrinsic value—like gold coins. Every Bible word is only past interest until we experience it. Until one says, "So speaks the living God," the Bible is a dead letter. "Jesus speaks" is of more religious value than "Jesus spoke."

The religious value of the book is inestimable. Paul is too individual. John is the synthesis and quintessence of Synoptic and Pauline religious experience. Christian mysticism of the Johannine type, regulated by the gospel ethic, is the power of our religion. And this is the historic Jesus behind the mystic Christ. And like John's preaching, all gospel preaching must be: not only "so spoke Jesus," but also "so speaks Jesus."

Townville, Pa.

FRED D. GEALY.

BOOK NOTICES

A NEW BOOK ON BOWNE

Studies in Philosophy and Theology. By Former Students of Borden Parker Bowne. Edited by E. C. WILM, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Philosophy in Boston University. The Abingdon Press, 1922.

THIS work is a cooperative volume, comprising papers by a number of Dr. Bowne's former students in Boston University. It is not intended as a eulogy of Bowne, his reputation being assumed as established, but as a study of various independent subjects and problems, similar to the volumes of studies recently published in honor of Garman, Royce, and James.

The introductory chapter, by the editor, is a sketch of Bowne's personality, with some attempt to outline the principal features of his system, and to indicate his position in the history of modern philosophy. An interesting feature is a part of some correspondence between Bowne and Professor G. M. Duncan of Yale University, summarizing in very compendious form one of the principal features of Bowne's system of philosophy. There is also appended a charming characterization of Bowne by Professor George Herbert Palmer of Harvard, in the form of a letter addressed to the editor, regarding some comments in the latter's paper.

A paper by Professor Coe, printed in part or whole, I believe, in this number of the REVIEW, is on the empirical factor in Bowne's thinking, which seems to the writer to live on in the greatest vigor in our minds to-day, rather than the dialectic or speculative factor. "He turned multitudes of minds away from religious, theological, and metaphysical conventionalities toward certain of the living dynamic realities of experience."

The third paper is by Professor Brightman, on the subject of neo-realistic theories of value. Value-theories are classified as holding value to be either mental or extra-mental in kind, either subjective or objective in locus, and as either personal or impersonal. Perry's theory, which regards value as fulfillment of interest, is based on a behavioristic psychology, and includes both naturalistic and antinaturalistic features; it is a subjective, impersonal, mental (or "consciousness") theory. Spaulding is treated as another typical neo-realist, differing radically from Perry in theory of value, as well as in theory of consciousness. He holds to a Platonic, objective, impersonal, extra-mental theory. Each theory contains elements of truth which are more adequately expressed by a mental, objective, personal theory.

The next paper, by Professor Hayes, attempts to show that the Methodist Church, founded by John Wesley, was the most tolerant ecclesiastical organization since the time of the apostles, and that it encouraged all freedom of thought and all reverent scholarship as no other existing church did; and the suggestion is made that Professor Bowne was in the line of succession with John Wesley, standing in his day for the same

high ideals in genuine scholarship and all-inclusive toleration. The motto of both was, "Think and let think."

The paper on religious apriorism, by Professor Knudson, states that the term "religious a priori" has become the watch-word of an important theological movement, represented by Ernst Troeltsch, Rudolf Otto, and Wilhelm Bousset. Their contention is that there is in man's rational nature an immanent religious principle, an a priori, that guarantees the truth and permanence of religion. As to the nature of the religious a priori and its relation to the theoretical reason there is no agreement, but its bare existence—it is urged—provides a safeguard against religious relativism and authoritarianism. The term "religious a priori" has objectionable rationalistic implications, but brings out in a suggestive and significant way the essentially religious nature of man.

Professor Youtz's paper on democratizing theology maintains that the democratization of theology calls for the overthrow of three tyrannies which beset the thinking of to-day—orthodoxy, mechanism, externalism. Orthodoxy is defined as "the mental habit of thinking religion in terms of fixed standards, and not of living truth." Mechanism is "the widespread tendency in our thinking to treat the experiences of consciousness as though a man were simply a resultant and not an actor." Externalism is the tendency to forget that "the essentially spiritual is an inward movement, an inward act, an inward achievement." In the spirit of emancipation and freedom we must bring Jesus' living message to the people, namely, "the challenge to rise up and follow him, and go against the strong currents of life, and wrest a victory over the world in the form of Christly character, Christly service, and a new Christly order of society in which men shall follow Christ, not because he has the loaves and fishes, but because they love him and want to follow him!" This is the path out of unreality and weakness into reality and power.

There are two farther papers by Bishop McConnell and Professor Van Riper on Bowne and the social sciences, and on logic, summaries of which the writers unfortunately failed to furnish in time for inclusion in this review, and which my readers will therefore have to seek out, in their complete form, in the volume itself.

May the little volume serve the purpose for which it was meant, and measure up, to some small extent, to the ideal which Bowne would himself have conceived!

Boston, March 13, 1922.

E. C. WILM.

The Origin of Paul's Religion. By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. Pp. 329. New York: The Macmillan Company.

THE lectures which now form the substance of this book clearly represent the settled conviction of their author that Paulinism is Christianity, and that Christianity, in its nature and origin, is a supernatural religion, being indebted to no contemporary philosophy or religion.

Of the eight chapters, three are taken up with introductory studies. "The principal subject of investigation," namely, "What was the origin

of the religion of Paul?" is reached on page 117. Part of this introduction, however, serves clearly to set forth the argument. Paul is shown to be anything but a liberal Jew; in fact, he is not even an Hellenistic Jew, according to Professor Machen's interpretation of his boast in 2 Cor. 11, that he is a "Hebrew of Hebrews." For the "key" to the understanding of this expression is to be found, not in other Pauline usage but in the terms "Ellenists" and "Hebrews" found in Acts 6. 1 (p. 46, cf. pp. 175, 256), whereby it is established that Paul is strictly a Palestinian Jew, not a Jew of the Diaspora.

The historical Jesus is made the basis of the religion of Paul, a fact which appears clearly enough in prospect before the first chapter is read. "The Jesus of the Gospels is a supernatural person" (p. 5); "the traditional view of the New Testament and the supernaturalistic conception of the origin of Christianity" (p. 31) usually go with the acceptance of the Pastoral Epistles as genuine; caution should rule in admitting any difference that is said to exist between Paul and the intimate friends of Jesus, for "then the way is opened for supposing that he was in disagreement with Jesus himself" (p. 40). The judgment of our author is early expressed that "it was not Paul the practical missionary, but Paul the theologian, who was the real apostle to the Gentiles" (p. 17).

The chapters on "The Early Years" and "The Triumph of Gentile Freedom" minimize the differences that appear to have existed between the Christians of Antioch and those of Jerusalem. "The Decrees of the Council at Jerusalem" were of but limited application and "the relation between Paul and the original disciples of Jesus was cordial, with no reason to suppose that the good relationship was broken off at any later time" (p. 113).

Not only are we to expect the new wine of Paulinism to be unmingled with any strain of earthly philosophy or contemporary religion, but even the conversion of Paul is to be assumed as entirely without any psychological preparation (p. 61ff.). As Paul "is willing to stake the whole of his life upon the immediateness of his conversion, and upon it base his apostolic authority" (p. 68), it seems best to our author to oppose all attempts to exhibit the conversion of the apostle as the end of a series of mental states.

It seems to the reviewer, however, that we should be already past the time when any given experience of a human being can be estimated apart from the mental history of that person, or when a system of thought, even if it have for its subject the redemption of the race, can be considered to be evolved with absolute detachment from other philosophic or theological thought of the times.

The constructive argument of Machen, covered by Chapters IV to VIII inclusive, deals with three theories as to the origin of Paul's religion, no one of which receives his approval. The theories are: First, that Paulinism is to be traced to the Jesus of modern liberalism, as many, from Ferdinand Christian Baur to the present time, would reconstruct him. Secondly, that the contemporary Judaism, particularly in its forms of Messianic expectation, contributed chiefly to the formation of Pauline

Christianity. Thirdly, that the Christianity of Paul gained much from the so-called pagan or mystery religions of the Greco-Roman world.

In the discussion of these chief hypotheses of the opposition, Professor Machen has shown a remarkable familiarity with the writings of the leading continental scholars as well as with those of England and the United States. At times he engages directly in combat with one or more of them, and, granted his premises, comes away with the laurel. Yet the reader at times regrets that it seems desirable to Professor Machen to question the motives of men who for years have shown themselves to be sincere searchers after truth and not in any sense "special pleaders," as, for example, on pages 48, 207, and many other places.

When Machen turns to the defense of his own theory, one reader at least feels that he has before him a thoroughgoing piece of apologetic, so rigid, indeed, that the ever dangerous "either . . . or" to which the hypothesis is subjected leads to regret that the religion of Paul should ever be submitted to it.

The author goes to great lengths to prove that Paul *could* have known the details of Jesus' daily life and teaching, and few would doubt that he could have been, nay, must have been very familiar with these details. The question to be considered in such a treatise as the one under review is, however, not so much, Did Paul use this knowledge when he wrote? but Why did he not use this knowledge when he wrote his epistles? No amount of straining can produce a handful of items other than those referring to the birth and passion of Jesus. For some reason the teaching and life of Jesus in detail were omitted from Paul's writings. The answer to the question Why? would take us farther on our way to complete solution of the Jesus and Paul question than this volume of lectures conducts us (cf. p. 147).

There is some doubt as to the meaning put into the term "historical Jesus" by Professor Machen. This is regrettable, for it is the "historical Jesus" who is precisely the basis of Paul's Christianity. Sometimes the definition is broad, as broad as "the Jesus of the whole New Testament and of Christian faith" (p. 317); the Jesus of the gospels is both a real historical person and a supernatural person (p. 5); "the heavenly Christ of Paul" is possibly set over against "the historical Jesus" as "another Jesus" of 2 Cor. 11. 4. It would minister to clearness if the term "historical Jesus" were kept strictly for the Jesus whose earthly life is recorded in the Gospels, when other terms, as "the heavenly Christ" or "the spiritual Christ" or "the dynamic Christ," would stand for the Christ who, still living in the world of persons, is experienceable in the Pauline sense.

The field in which Professor Machen conducted his investigation is still not overworked. In a sense it is "white to the harvest" and it is an encouraging sign that such well equipped scholars are entering it. The present product of this study is indeed a worthy sheaf; but, of course, the last word has not yet been said. No fact or series of facts should be neglected for fear of unwished for results, the strictly human values in religion must be estimated, in fact, we should probably talk more about

religion and less about religions. It is the conviction of the present writer, however, that origins do not necessarily determine, in themselves, intrinsic values. In this, he notes, he differs with Professor Machen.

The work is equipped with an admirable Index of Names and Subjects and a list of biblical passages found in the volume.

Garrett Biblical Institute.

ERNEST W. BURCH.

Altar, Cross, and Community. By W. F. LOFTHOUSE, M.A. Pp. 310. London: The Epworth Press. Price, 4 shillings.

THE Fernley Lecture is delivered during the annual session of the Wesleyan Methodist Conference of Great Britain. This is the lecture for 1920. It has been rumored that when the lecture was delivered it evoked a great deal of criticism. One may easily believe this to have been the case. It is to be questioned if the Fernley Lectureship has ever produced anything quite so daring as Professor Lofthouse's book. The title is awkward, and the paper covers are not promising, but such details are soon forgotten by the reader who gives himself up to the force of the argument. Briefly, the book is a discussion of the idea, fact, and function of sacrifice, and of its supreme expression and fulfillment in Christianity.

Almost one half of the book is historical. We are shown the rude religious practices of the denizen of the jungle and the bush, the elaborate ceremonials of India and Greece, the suggestive symbolism of the Mystery Religions, and all the varied forms of sacrifice as these were offered among the Hebrews. It is contended that amid all the diversity that thus comes to light, there is one common feature, namely, the search for divine-human reconciliation or communion. The worshipers—for sacrifice is held to be essentially a social act—would enter into communion with their deity. They bring an offering. But why do they? As a payment? No. Sacrifice, at least in its primary sense, is not "a system of bribery or of commercial dealings with heaven" (p. 57). But they bring it in order that the deity, by sharing with them in their gift, may enter into fellowship with those who bring it. The gift is a means of establishing a personal relation. "What can lie behind sacrifice, as we observe it, save these two conceptions—a person to be approached and a society to approach him? . . . In all his gropings and hardships, his terror at the unknown or his savagery to foes and even friends, his callousness to the sufferings of the weak, and his dark and turbulent passions, man has made the discovery, in the midst of his blindness, of these two great principles on which society and religion would both seem to rest, and he has never wholly lost them. Throughout all his feeling after God he has held to the great rite that has embodied these ideas, even although he has all but forgotten the ideas themselves" (pp. 56, 57).

But every rite tends to gather accretions. Professor Lofthouse shows that it is so in the case of sacrifice. Thus we find associated with this primary idea of reconciliation the other ideas of substitution and expiation. We meet them all in the Old Testament, where there is ample evidence

that both priest and people often conceived sacrifice as an end in itself—"as the one thing God desired from man" (p. 121). But in the Old Testament, as elsewhere, we find a vehement protest against sacrifice conceived in this secondary and external way. In India and in Greece the protest failed. Among the Hebrews the failure was partial in that the prophets, who were the chief protestants, did not wholly root out the practices and beliefs which they abhorred. But they succeeded in doing two things: they destroyed all sacrifice, save in one place, and they drove out of sacrifice the idea of a general atonement. In doing this, they went far toward destroying the religious value of the elaborate priestly code. "At the end of the development of Jewish religion, as it is recorded in the Old Testament, we have a consistent theory of sacrifice, which finds no place for atonement or propitiation . . . but which clings all the more to the thought of sacrifice as a means to communion—the removal of the last obstacle to the presence of Jehovah in the midst of his people" (p. 121). Thus we have the prophetic emphasis on the offering of the transformed life. By Jeremiah, for example, "reconciliation is seen to be only through the reformation and forgiveness of the heart" (pp. 144, 145), and by the Second Isaiah such reformation is anticipated through the "sacrifice" of one who himself will bear not the "guilt" of men, not their "penalty," but their "sins" (see pp. 150-153).

It is not difficult to predict what will be the application of all this to Jesus and the teaching of the New Testament, and to the course of theological thought. Here Professor Lofthouse lays down a principle which is simple enough, but which has all too often been ignored. The principle is that the conception of reconciliation found in the mind of Jesus provides the standard whereby we are to test the value of every doctrine of sacrifice. Now what we find here is that Jesus carried on indirectly the prophetic protest against the priestly system by making repentance the one condition to the forgiveness of moral fault; that "Jesus stood for just that side of sacrificial religion which the Levitical system had neglected—the free approach to God as children might come to a father for whatever they needed" (p. 175); that Jesus, being equally "at home" with God and with man, is the ideal means of communication between them, making it possible for man to "get at" God because he is himself the road, the believer being "brought into touch with God because he puts himself in touch with One who is in touch with God already" (p. 177); and that "to accept the principles which he taught and the way of life which he laid down as authoritative and as the true path of obedience to God" is to "accept Jesus," and if he is so accepted "he really becomes thereby the means of communication between man and God" (p. 179). It is clear therefore that Professor Lofthouse would not isolate Christ's death from the rest of his experience. He claims that the language in which our Lord speaks of his death neither suggests nor illustrates Levitical (that is, priestly) ideas (see p. 173). "His death would have meant nothing to us, it would have done nothing for us, apart from his life. . . . His whole life, from the manger to the cross, and from the cross to the Mount of Ascension, was the great sacrifice. It was because he was at once the Son of man and the Son of God

that he has brought men to God. What the victim was supposed to become in the sacrificial moment at the altar Jesus was through the long, sacrificial years of his life—the mediator between God and man" (p. 181).

But is this also the apostolic interpretation? Professor Lofthouse claims that it is. He does not deny the use of sacrificial language—what Bushnell would call the "altar forms"—by Paul and the other New Testament writers, but he does claim that they never think of Christ as a "substitute," but as one who by what he was and did brings sundered parties together. Paul "saw a stupendous act of love and self-devotion inspired by One who would stop at nothing, even the torture and ignominy of his own Son, to break down the barrier between sinful men and himself. . . . Paul's conception of the sacrifice of Jesus is one with the conception held by Jesus himself. . . . Christ is our sacrifice, not because he dies instead of us, but because he makes it possible for us to come with boldness into the presence of God" (pp. 195, 196). To a large extent, the history of theology is the history of the replacing of this "deeper view" of sacrifice by "less profound and moral ideas of expiation and penalty and substitution, and of how the expressions, so frequent and touching, in the New Testament writers, 'by his death,' 'by his blood,' were changed into the forbidding terms of a legal document" (p. 240). On the basis of his findings, Professor Lofthouse offers an illuminating discussion of "The Eucharist and the Mass," of "Faith and Forgiveness," and of "Sacrifice and Reconciliation." In these discussions he reveals a deep sympathy with two of the emerging features of British Methodism, namely, the desire for a more adequate and impressive doctrine of the Lord's Supper, and the desire to make what is central in the work of Christ central also in the life of society. Reconciliation to God involves reconciliation to man. The law is the same in each case. "Since everything which the church calls sin and the moralist vice is the result and the sign of the barrier between man and God, the sacrifice of Christ, as long as that barrier exists, must be carried out by the Christlike ministry of his followers" (p. 306).

To that increasing number for whom the more familiar ideas of the work of Christ are full of difficulty, this book will come as a breath from the ocean. They will be grateful for so clear an expression of their own half-formed convictions. Others will reply: "This is nothing but a moral influence theory of the atonement." Professor Lofthouse properly takes exception to that contemptuous "nothing but." On what ground are we justified in calling the ideas expressed in this book "shallow," and those expressed by Anselm and Grotius "profound"? In the view of Professor Lofthouse, Christ reconciles God and man because he makes possible the removal of the barrier which keeps them apart. That barrier is the sinful spirit—that, and nothing else. Is he right? If the abstract is necessarily profound, and the simple and concrete necessarily shallow, then the construction here presented must suffer. But why deify the abstract? What practical end, after all, is attained by a metaphysic of abstract Law and abstract Holiness, and their supposed demand on an abstract hostile humanity? Whatever a person's theory of the back-lying principles of reconciliation may be, the actual reconciliation itself comes about in only

one way—by the removal of that which keeps the man from God. That there is a barrier in man all are agreed. That there should be a barrier in God other than that supplied by human sin, and which repentance suffices to remove, is becoming increasingly difficult for many to believe. Surely it is a travesty of the whole idea of Him whom Jesus called "Father" to suppose that he would not forgive sin until he had "satisfied" himself or something called Law by exacting some kind of penalty or by making some kind of legal demonstration. There will be many who will join with the reviewer in thanking Professor Lofthouse for this book, so courageous, so convincing, so true to the essential witness of Scripture, and therefore also so profoundly Christian.

EDWIN LEWIS.

Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J.

Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity. By LEWIS BAYLES PATON, Ph.D., D.D., Nettleton Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Criticism, Hartford Theological Seminary. Pp. ix+325. New York: The Macmillan Company.

THIS is a sound, useful, instructive, and interesting book, made in a thoroughly workmanlike manner by the practiced hand of a competent as well as careful scholar. The making of a good book has to be learned by practice of the art, and Professor Paton has practiced long enough and well enough to know and to do. But even if the work were less well done it would still be worth the reader's while, for its subject is of unfailing interest to every thoughtful human being. Normally constituted men long for a life after the great dissolution of death, and seek by religious faith, by psychic research, or even by means either wholly or partly subversive of reason to confirm the deathless hope. A single death in a family renews the wonder, the questioning or the faith of those who are left behind, and the numerous deaths in any community through shipwreck or a mine explosion set the whole vicinity again upon the scent for the trail of life after death. A great war which brings death to youth not seldom sets whole peoples agog with a new desire to know that these who have passed away before their time are still alive though breath has left the body. In such times there is always a recrudescence of Spiritism, commonly but erroneously called Spiritualism. To tell the story of Spiritism in Antiquity and to explain its meaning and significance is the purpose of this book. It is a most useful purpose, for it is folly for us now to ignore what our forebears or predecessors have done or what other peoples, however strange, may have thought. Those of us who have a deep concern to understand the Bible dare not ignore the problem, and he who has intelligence about it to offer may well challenge our attention. For any who may be seeking light upon the history of present ideas or hopes it may be well to indicate the scope of this book by setting down the chapter titles, and here they are: I. Spiritism in Primitive Religion; II. Spiritism in China; III. Spiritism Among the Indo-Europeans; IV. The Cult of the Dead Among the Indo-Europeans; V. Spiritism in

Egypt; VI. Spiritism Among the Early Semites; VII. Spiritism in Babylon and Assyria; VIII. Earliest Hebrew Conception of the Dead; IX. Babylonian Influence on Hebrew Conceptions of the Dead; X. Worship of the Dead by Israel; XI. Early Opposition to the Worship of the Dead by Israel; XII. Prophetic and Legal Denial of the Vitality of Spirits; XIII. New Theories of Immortality in Post Exilic Judaism; XIV. The Teaching of Jesus in Regard to Immortality; and then there follows a serviceable index. This list of chapters shows how comprehensive is the book, and at the same time declares plainly that no one scholar, however learned, would be able to know all these languages and literatures at first hand, nor does Professor Paton make any such claim. Indeed, he states explicitly his limitations, saying, "In the fields of Semitic religion and of the religions of Israel, Greece, and Rome, the author has been able to work at first hand from the sources; in the cases of the religions of China, India, and Egypt, and some of the Indo-European races, he has been obliged to depend upon the researches of others" (p. viii). In judging the book as a whole I have to say that, in so far as I can claim any real right to speak, it is fully satisfactory, and deserves full commendation. The only chapters that I can test at first hand are those relating to Egypt and the Semites. As was to be expected, these are sound and thorough. I do not think that they are everywhere equal, nor could that be expected of any writer. The best are those concerning the Hebrews, in which field Paton is an acknowledged master. I have noticed a few quite insignificant spots in the Babylonian translations which I think might be done better. Thus, to cite an illustration in itself of no importance, there is on pp. 213, 214 a translation of the curious passage about the "toothache worm," which is taken from Thompson. It could, I think, be bettered, as I have tried to do in my *Cuneiform Parallels*, pp. 52, 53. I may also say that in the chapter on Egypt I have considerable doubt about some of the judgments based upon the conclusions of even so excellent a scholar as Breasted. These are, however, spots on the sun, and I commend the book gladly and heartily.

Drew Theological Seminary.

ROBERT W. ROGERS.

An Encyclopedia of Religions. By MAURICE A. CANNEY. Pp. 397. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Price, \$10.

THIS is an attempt to make a reference book of moderate size on the general subject of Comparative Religion. Its editor is Professor of Semitic Languages and Literature in the University of Manchester, England.

While it contains much valuable material, it is strangely lopsided. For example, the Irvingites (a small and vanishing English sect) are given two full pages, while Wesleyan Methodism occupies a page. The two greatest Protestant bodies in Christendom, the Lutherans and the Methodist Episcopal Church, are not mentioned at all, while even the Christadelphians, an almost invisible American sect, is allowed several hundred words. And that misnamed society, Christian Scientists, fills

two pages of the book. Half a page is given to the Atonement, but there are no articles on Sacrifice, Sin, or Salvation. Of course, one purpose of an encyclopedia is to furnish information on obscure and unfamiliar subjects and things, but certainly fair attention should be furnished on important subjects and facts.

So far as we have examined and tested this book, it is learned and accurate, and the information given is of the highest value. It is a very useful handbook, so far as it goes. But the one volume, *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, reviewed in the January-February, 1922, number of this REVIEW, is far more comprehensive and quite as accurate.

The book is very British, both in its sources and subjects. While it does not wholly ignore foreign scholarship, American, French, and German writers have influenced its information very little.

Every minister and teacher, especially those who cannot afford expensive books of reference, should use all their influence to make their local public libraries secure such outstanding reference books as the *Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, the twelfth and last volume of which is just coming from the press. Then they should add *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, and, above all, when it comes out, the projected *American Encyclopedia of Christianity*. A public library should be rich in reference books.

The Promise of His Coming. An Historical Interpretation of the Idea of the Second Advent. By CHESTER CHARLTON McCOWN, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of New Testament Literature in the Pacific School of Religion. Pp. xvi+256. New York: The Macmillan Company. Price, \$2.50.

DR. McCOWN's book is to be praised above all for its method. After a brief exhibition of the nature of the eschatological problem to-day, the author devotes the larger part of the book to a critical history of apocalypticism and concludes with a positive, constructive discussion of the content of truth in the idea of the second advent. This last part is very sane and helpful, and for the ordinary reader it is likely to be the most welcome portion of the book. It is, however, the historical study of apocalypticism that gives the book its distinctive character. Now one might have expected that his "history-of-religion method" would have led Dr. McCown to a rejection, with many another modern scholar, of every form of eschatological realism. But such is not at all the result of Dr. McCown's thinking. His historical studies have, indeed (along with his theological reflections) led him to conclude that the formal aspects of the biblical apocalypses are not of the essence of revelation, but he holds that there is, after all, something fundamentally true, and therefore indestructible and irremovable, in the biblical hope of a real consummation of the kingdom in the coming of our Lord. This standpoint is very gratifying, and it is expounded with much force. In a day when the widespread disgust at the excesses and absurdities of much current adventistic teaching and an overemphasis upon evolutionism have

led many to reject every thought of a Second Advent but an "immanent, progressive coming," it is good to have a fresh, scholarly discussion that tends to conserve the essence of the historic positive Christian hope.

J. R. VAN PELT.

The Prophetic Ministry for To-Day. By CHARLES D. WILLIAMS. New York: The Macmillan Company.

HERE is the authentic voice of leadership in high places. Bishop Williams speaks out as the prophet of God. If he lays the prophetic burden upon his brethren of the ministry it is because he has himself borne it and bears it nobly to-day. The reader of these lectures cannot help asking what would be likely to happen in the church and in human society if all those who speak from the vantage ground of high position within the ecclesiastical order of the various branches of the church should proclaim such a message as we have in these Lyman Beecher Lectures.

The very title of the book is significant: *The Prophetic Ministry for To-Day*. And it is with the prophet that the lecturer deals from start to finish. The minister has other functions than the prophetic, but this is basic and finally determinative of his worth to society.

In the opening lecture we are presented with a composite picture of the modern minister. The past has contributed to make him what he is. Prophet, Priest, Administrator, and Rhetorician are traceable in the lineaments of his face. Brief paragraphs set off the distinguishing marks of these different types. Insight is displayed in discriminating between the desirable and undesirable strains in this heritage. The "business manager" and the "public entertainer" are set forth in their true light. The priest and the prophet are balanced and adequately appraised. The next four lectures, dealing in turn with the Prophetic Succession, the Prophetic Inheritance, the Prophetic Message for To-Day, the Prophetic Program for To-Day, form a section in which history and present-day life are shown as contributing variously to the personal life, equipment, and task of the minister of Christ.

While the author makes something out of "Apostolic succession" for the sake of continuity and regularity he makes much more out of "prophetic succession" for the sake of the moral and spiritual needs of men and society. The man conscious of these needs and speaking a message God-derived, himself filled with the sense of God, stands in the line of a vital succession. His inheritance is a rich one. Historically the message of the prophet is a social message filled with ethical content, seeking the establishment of the rule of God in all the earth and throughout the whole of society.

It is in the light of the foregoing that the prophetic message is to be discovered. Chiefly is it to stress the principles and practices that help forward the Kingdom of God in human society. "It is the church's business to be radical and go to the roots of things, to proclaim the principles upon which alone civilization can stand secure." These principles are

concerned with the individual life, with the economic order, with national and international relationships. The program is not a ready-made formula which may be passed on from one to another. It grows out of the purpose with which the message is burdened. Whatever sets forward the work of making society more truly Christian, and not merely more truly social, has a place in the program. The "temper or attitude of goodwill" is to be created and made more nearly universal. The "mercenary motive" is held to be a powerful force working in the opposite direction. That the pre-war church miserably failed to proclaim this message and advance this program is held by the lecturer to have been due to two chief causes: the lack of vision and the unhappy divisions into which the church had been broken.

Chapter 6 is the heart of the book. Here we have a clear outline of the three roles which may be followed by the modern minister-critic, reformer, prophet. It is almost impossible to give any adequate indication of the author's treatment of this part of his subject. With an insight that reveals a deep understanding of the workings of the human mind, and in language that hits the mark with unflinching precision, the weakness and the strength of the minister as a man among men in the world of present-day life are set forth. The herd instinct, the domination of the master class, the superficial qualities of the "good mixer," the man who falls a victim to the notion that he must "do" something that shows a positive result in social conditions, all come in for treatment and valuation. The conclusion is a clear presentation of the ideal of the prophetic ministry in which the prophet "sees whole and steady" and follows the course indicated by his vision at whatever cost to himself without succumbing to the temptation to play the part of a pseudo-martyr.

A following chapter draws a fine distinction between the prophetic and the priestly functions of the minister and places emphasis upon the individual and sacramental aspects of the holy calling always needed to balance and fulfill the commission to discharge a complete ministry.

The final lecture sets forth the social gospel in its widest implications as the "gospel for a day of disillusionment." Program-makers and movement-organizers in all our churches may well consult this chapter.

It is to be regretted that this excellent course did not at some point stress the fundamental relation of a prophetic ministry to the task of Christian education. In this realm the message and program come into contact with the minds chiefly responsible for that better world which is slowly shaping. This cannot be held to be a minor omission, but the author may definitely have limited himself in this respect.

East Orange, N. J.

DORR F. DIEFENDORF.

The Christian in Social Relationships. By DORR FRANK DIEFENDORF. Pp. 125. New York: The Methodist Book Concern. Price, 75 cents.

MANY books on the social teaching of Christianity suffer from over-emphasis of the theoretical or from undue stress of the practical. Few writers combine historical knowledge of the social context of the New

Testament age with first-hand understanding of modern social problems. The interpretation and application of New Testament principles therefore fail to secure intelligent assent. To be sure, we agree that the New Testament solution is final, but many are confused how to give effect to it.

This book by Dr. Diefendorf is the product of a thinker and a worker. As pastor of Roseville Church, Newark, for thirteen years, he made discerning use of his unusual opportunities to study the social question. He has also mastered the best literature on the subject, but while he does not quote any learned names, his treatment of the theme is marked by mature judgment. His suggestions are so timely that the book will be welcomed by all who are beginning to think of the issues in the light of Christian teaching and obligation, as well as by others who have given considerable thought to them.

Dr. Diefendorf is quite right that no ready-made programs are feasible. Each community must understand its own needs and formulate its own program in accord with the positive message of Christian redemption. We are therefore not treated to embarrassing diagrams, with their hieroglyphic signs, nor do we have wearisome statistical schedules. The more important matter is to get the historical perspective and the correct conception of what should be done and how it might be carried out. The writer keeps himself in the background with becoming modesty, but what he has written in these pages is virtually a report of his own successful efforts in cooperation with others of insight and foresight.

It is by no means an easy work to engage in the modern crusades for the kingdom of God, but the results more than compensate for all the sacrifice of time and energy. "Be prepared to pay the cost of your service of Christ and humanity. Someone has paid the cost of our liberties and privileges: why should not we in turn be willing to pay a part of the price of the greatening good of the world?" This is the spirit in which this excellent manual is written. There are thirteen chapters on the social emphasis of Christianity and its bearing on public education, the wage problem, working conditions, public health, amusement, commercialized evil, criminology, the efficient church. Preachers will find it a good tonic; adult Bible classes cannot have a better text book; all thoughtful folk will find in it a stimulating summons to realize the ideal of the kingdom of God.

OSCAR L. JOSEPH.

The Life-Story of Sir Robert W. Perks, Baronet. M. P. By DENIS CRANE. With 7 Illustrations. Pp. 240. London: Epworth Press (J. Alfred Sharp). Price, 2s. 6d. net.

In an academy this reviewer attended when a boy, the principal at the opening of the day's work would take up a little old worn copy of the Bible and read a verse from the Book of Proverbs. Sometimes the passage was, "Seest thou a man diligent in his business, he shall stand before kings, he shall not stand before mean men." The subject of this biography is the best commentary on that text. And it is a fascinating story of a full, noble, active life, where every honor has been more than

earned by hard work, incorruptible integrity, and Christian devotion. Unlike too many men reared in Methodist homes, this man remained true to the church of his fathers (his father was the Rev. George T. Perks), not from a timid conservatism but from conviction and affection, an affection which did not prevent but rather caused him to advocate reforms and thus increase her efficiency and insure her future. The extension of the pastoral term and the full use of laymen without derogating the rights of the clergy were two of these reforms, and in the general building up of his church, her legal and other defense, and especially the Million Guinea Fund—one of the most romantic stories in church history—he rendered splendid and unselfish service. This book, which has only two faults—it is too short and has no index—sheds light on the religious and political history of England within the last fifty years, besides being the record of the life of a student, lawyer, organizer, engineer, statesman, and even of an ecclesiastic in the best sense. It is interesting that one of the changes he opposed, the use of chairmen of districts in full time in supervision of their districts (like our district superintendents or bishops), has recently been taken up in a limited way as an experiment. Will it succeed and be adopted as a part of the polity of the Wesleyan Methodist Church? That church in Canada on her union with the Methodist Episcopal Church of Canada adopted a general superintendent, even though his functions are limited.

J. A. F.

The Conservative Character of Martin Luther. By GEORGE M. STEPHENSON, Ph.D. Philadelphia: The United Lutheran Publication House, 1921, 143 pages.

This little book gives a true, impartial, excellent account of Luther under the point of view of his general conservatism: I, The Formative Years. II, The Catholic Reformer. III, The Break with Rome. IV, The Radicals at Wittenberg. V, The Peasants' Revolt. VI, The Marburg Colloquy. VII, The Augsburg Confession. While it contains nothing new, it can be heartily commended to any who have been inclined to look upon the Reformer as an iconoclast. On p. 25 the author says: "It never became the doctrine of the Church that the forgiveness of sins accompanies the purchase of an indulgence." This is true in the sense of an official creed, not otherwise. Official instructions made the purchase of an indulgence itself a plenary remission of sin, and the Jubilee Indulgence as giving grace and plenary remission. Therefore in the Ninety-five Theses (Nos. 5, 20, 34) Luther speaks of those buying indulgences as thinking they are sure of salvation and free from guilt as well as from punishment. (See Faulkner, in *Lutheran Quarterly*, October, 1917.) Remove the umlaut from the u in Bucer's name on p. 119.

J. A. F.

Silhouettes of My Contemporaries. By LYMAN ABBOTT. 8vo, pp. x + 361. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. Price \$3.00.

Few men have been in vital touch with more of the movements and personalities of the last half century than has Dr. Abbott. He has, during

the course of his life, written voluminously along many lines of thought, and naturally has sometimes provoked considerable disagreement, but it is to the highest degree doubtful if he ever wrote a single page devoid of interest or suggestion. *Silhouettes of My Contemporaries*, published and likely for the most part written in its author's eighty-sixth year, might be regarded as a footnote to Dr. Abbott's notable volume of reminiscences, but it is in itself a distinct contribution to biographical literature. Among the subjects of the "silhouettes" are the following: P. T. Barnum, John B. Gough, Alice Freeman Palmer, John Fiske, John G. Whittier, Henry Ward Beecher, Phillips Brooks, Booker T. Washington, Theodore Roosevelt, and Jacob Abbott.

In coming into contact with these side lights upon outstanding figures of the last century, one cannot help gaining a deeper insight into the real significance of many aspects of the life of a generation not yet so very far from us. Not all of the studies are of equal value, several of them being rather slight, but it must be remembered that the sketches make no pretension to inclusiveness. It is true, moreover, that a book which provides so much information, suggestion, and inspiration should not be condemned for what it lacks, but rather appreciated for its wealth of material of real worth.

One of the most charming and revealing of these reminiscent chapters is that dealing with Henry Ward Beecher, who, it will be remembered, was followed by Dr. Abbott in the pastorate of Plymouth Church. He once asked Beecher to write an article for *The Christian Union*, now *The Outlook*, on how to keep well. He replied, "There are but three rules: Eat well, sleep well, and laugh well." On one occasion he expressed a love and admiration for Dwight L. Moody, but added: "We could not work together. For Mr. Moody thinks this is a lost world, and is trying to save as many as possible from the wreck; I think Jesus Christ has come to save the world, and I am trying to help him to save it." When Abbott was looking for his first parish Beecher advised him to notice the condition of the horses which the farmers drove when they came to town. He said, "Wide-awake teams indicate a wide-awake community." Another of the nuggets of wisdom quoted from the great Brooklyn preacher consists of the words: "You cannot pray cream and live skim milk."

The study entitled "John G. Whittier, Mystic," contains some data which are a real contribution to our knowledge of the spirit life of the hermit of Amesbury. The author's account of his meetings with the poet at the home of Governor Claflin at Newtonville and of his visit to the quiet cottage at Amesbury, although somewhat dimmed by years, are veritable treasure trove to the lover of Whittier. Dr. Abbott speaks of a sermon which he preached in 1893 on "John G. Whittier's Theology." In this discourse he says that "the faith once delivered to the saints is not a creed or form of doctrine; it is always a personal experience in the heart of the individual"—"a seed planted which takes on many forms and many growths."

Another especially attractive picture is that of "John Fiske, Evolutionist." The comparison between the militant, sure-footed, illumined

theism of Fiske with the spiritual dimness of Spencer, Huxley, Darwin, and Tyndall is a highly valuable history of one of the mighty thought conflicts of the nineteenth century. The study of "Alice Freeman Palmer, Teacher," is a result of Dr. Abbott's visits to Wellesley in the capacity of "college preacher." He speaks of how as he walked through the college corridors with Mrs. Palmer, then Miss Freeman, he was impressed with her personal familiarity with every one of the three hundred students. He says: "Thus while her students studied their lessons she studied her students, and she put no less painstaking into her studies than the most studious of them put into theirs. This was no compulsory or professional study. She delighted in it. She wished to know every pupil that she might better befriend every pupil. It was true for her then, as it was true for her always: 'It is people that count.'"

This work is highly informing along many lines of thought. But its outstanding merit is genuine humanity. "The proper study of mankind is man." The reader of *Silhouettes of My Contemporaries* has a signal opportunity to enlarge his acquaintance among those most decidedly worth knowing.

West Virginia Wesleyan College.

LEWIS H. CHRISMAN.

MORE EDUCATIONAL TEXTBOOKS

American Citizens and their Government. By KENNETH COLEGROVE. Pp. 333. The Abingdon Press. Price, \$1.75, net.

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Story Telling for Teachers of Beginners and Primary Children. By KATHERINE DUNLAP CATHER. Pp. 144. The Methodist Book Concern. Price, 60c.

Songs for the Little Child. Verses by CLARA BELL BAKER. Folk Melodies harmonized by CAROLINE KOHLSAAT. Pp. 100. The Abingdon Press. Price, \$1, net.

A Study of Luke's Gospel. By ROLLIN H. WALKER. Pp. 212. The Methodist Book Concern. Price, \$1, net.

The Bible a Missionary Message. By WILLIAM OWEN CARVER. Pp. 192. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Price, \$1.50.

RELIGIOUS and secular education are coming together in the common ideal of character building as their goal. The time must come when the public schools shall pay more respect to religion and the time has already arrived when the educational program of the church is directed toward making Christian citizens and the shaping of a new social order.

Professor Colegrove has prepared a school textbook on civics from the American standpoint, a work which can rank with Woodrow Wilson's *Constitutional Government in the United States*, and which for class use

is one of the most comprehensive treatises yet published, covering as it does the entire field of national, state, and local government.

But for high political inspiration, as well as instruction, nothing is more useful than the study of Hebrew history. It is the only ancient history in which we see the whole life of the common people and is therefore the real source book of democracy. Mr. Hunting has given us a handbook not only admirably adapted to week-day schools, but for special courses in senior and adult Bible classes.

The drama has from the beginning been a handmaid of religion, and the play ideal is at the very root of education. If the church can seize and control the dramatic and play life of the community, it alone can conquer and cure the horrible corruption that has come to the world through the commercialization of amusements. Mr. Meredith, born in a Western parsonage, has inherited the cultured values of the past, free from their taint, and not only gives the dramatic instinct its true place in moral and mental growth, but develops a practical program for the church to pursue.

For child-training story telling is fundamental, but few of us can do it well. Teachers of primary schools and classes, as well as parents, can learn the technique of this art from Miss Cather's little handbook.

How shall we save our children from the decadent influence of jazz, rag-time, and doggerel? There is no purer fountain of music than the folk song. These lovely melodies with their rhythmic perfection have been adapted to little nature, play, and religious lyrics in the *Songs for the Little Child*.

Dr. Walker has followed his excellent study of Saint John's Gospel with one on Luke, following the questionnaire method. Such a plan makes study not a bit of passive absorption of facts, but a creative act which invigorates the intellect and gives fresh vision to the soul.

Mission study classes have long needed an adequate textbook on the missionary message of Holy Scripture. Dr. Carver has probably provided one of the best up to date. Some improvements might be made, such as would be suggested by Prof. W. G. Jordan's *Song of the Soil*, a charming sketch of missionary thought in the Old Testament.

BOOKS IN BRIEF

The Eagle Life and *Other Studies in the Old Testament*. *The Friend on the Road* and *other Studies in the Gospels*. By the Rev. J. H. JOWETT, D.D. (George H. Doran Company, \$1.50 each). There is the fragrance of lavender in these refreshing meditations, and one finds himself spontaneously turning to prayer as he reads them. This after all is the supreme test of real devotional writing. Warmth of feeling, spiritual insight, sympathy with human need, deep knowledge of the blessed Word, apt illustrations, and the thought expressed in the choicest English, are high qualities that place these two volumes among the best books of the heart. Dr. Jowett has done nothing better. We hope he will add another volume of studies in the Epistles.

The Prophet of Reconstruction. By W. F. LOFTHOUSE, M.A., Tutor in Hebrew Language and Literature, Handsworth College, Birmingham (The Pilgrim Press, \$2.25). The facile program outlined by Wells in *The Salvaging of Civilization* is the work of a romantic idealist. He, however, fails to show us where the new heart can be obtained for the rebuilding of the world. This is possible only in the sanctions of religion, not as expressed in stale dogmas nor outworn creeds, but in the puissant power of the living Christ. Mr. Lofthouse discusses this question in his incisive study of the prophet Ezekiel's philosophy and program of reconstruction. He rightly recognized the absolute rule, the supreme will, and the restoring mercy of God, as against the evil agencies of greed and self-indulgence. In Ezekiel's day, no less than in our own, these latter stand in the way of a new heaven and a new earth. This excellent study, fully illustrated by arguments from European history and literature, is a timely contribution toward an understanding of the gospel of redemption.

The New Testament Epistles. By PROFESSOR D. A. HAYES (Methodist Book Concern, \$2.50). This fourth volume completes the series of New Testament Introductions by Professor Hayes of Garrett Biblical Institute. Written in a popular style, without any sacrifice of scholarship, this last volume on Hebrews, James, First and Second Peter, Jude, covers the ground and keeps in the background what others have written, in order that he may give an independent estimate of the place and value of these epistles for our spiritual guidance. Preachers and teachers will find ample material here. What is more important, they will be induced to study the writings themselves, so generously and sagaciously introduced by an honored teacher. Without doubt, these four volumes are among the best on the subject.

The Divine Initiative. By H. R. MACKINTOSH, D.D., New College, Edinburgh (George H. Doran Company, \$1.75). These four lectures, originally delivered to missionaries, review certain conspicuous features of the Christian Faith. God creates and satisfies man's need for himself by meeting the desires for a fuller life, for escape from suffering, for the removal of despair. The way this is done is illustrated from history and experience. Man's response to this quickening appeal is next discussed, with a final chapter on Christianity as a corporate life. The point is well taken that "the New Testament shows no interest whatever in unattached Christians." This thoughtful book has a wholesome message.

Washington and the Riddle of Peace. By H. G. WELLS (Macmillan, \$2). These reflections forcibly set before the nations the supreme task of building up a new spirit, inspired by forbearance. Mr. Wells is impatient with "futile haggling for national advantages," but he forgets that short cuts have invariably ended in failure. No reference is made to Christ, who is at once the crown and criterion of genuine peace. With all its limitations, this latest volume by the most widely read author should be seriously reckoned with. Most impressive are his references to

certain nations, whose voices have hitherto been stifled but who must be considered for the sake of an adequate association of nations.

To Him That Hath. By RALPH CONNOR (George H. Doran Company, \$1.75). Under the guise of a well told story, whose scenes are laid in the west of Canada, this popular novelist, also known as the Rev. Charles W. Gordon, deals with some of the post-war problems relating to capital and labor, not only as they affect these two parties, but also the public, the third party in all industrial strifes, and who in the final analysis must foot the bill. Happy shall we be if our difficulties can be settled in actual life as they are done on paper in this readable melodrama. In any case, one of the ways in which a solution might be reached is here related, and it is quite possible, if we have the courage of faith.

Paul the Interpreter of Christ. By PROFESSOR A. T. ROBERTSON (George H. Doran Company, \$2). This enthusiastic book on the teaching of the apostle Paul does full justice to his influence in molding the thought of the early church and giving the gospel a worldwide emphasis. Those who cannot read the extensive literature on Paul will find in this book keen estimates of what scholars have written, and also an independent discussion of the apostle's contribution to modern Christianity. We would, however, have preferred more of Robertson and less of the other writers.

To Be or Not to Be? By S. D. CHAMBERS. A new volume of five-minute talks to children and junior congregations.

A Gentleman in Prison. The Story of Tokichi Ishii, translated by Caroline Macdonald (Doran). This is a touching story of a Japanese Jean Valjean, who confessed to a murder to save the life of an innocent man. This criminal found Christ in the prison. Every page has a fresh thrill from the Saviour's presence. You learn to love and respect Mr. Arima, the governor of the prison, and Fujii, its Buddhist chaplain, and other Japanese officials whose honest execution of the sentence of death does not diminish their honor of the converted convict.

A READING COURSE

Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century. By HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR. Two volumes. New York: The Macmillan Company. Price, \$9.

The Age of the Reformation. By PRESERVED SMITH. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Price, \$6.

THE revival of historical study is a welcome incentive toward a better understanding of international life. Wells' *Outline of History* has had an extraordinary reception. Even when we disagree with this vigorous writer we cannot but be impressed by his generalizations and pre-

dictions. Another volume, more recent, is *The Story of Mankind* by Hendrik Van Loon, written for young folks but containing considerable information of value to adults. The numerous illustrations give a striking setting to this story, which in some respects supplements Wells. But we are naturally skeptical of the ability of one mind to cover adequately the entire circle of human history. After reading these two introductory sketches we must therefore turn to specialists dealing with limited fields of art, letters, politics, religion.

The Reformation period is of special interest to Protestants, but we learn very little about it from Wells' *Outline*. Two noteworthy contributions have been made on this significant movement by Dr. Taylor and Dr. Preserved Smith. Their volumes must be placed by the side of *A History of the Reformation*, by T. M. Lindsay, and *The Renaissance, the Protestant Revolution and the Catholic Reformation in Continental Europe*, by E. M. Hulme. Those who are familiar with *The Mediæval Mind*, by Dr. Taylor, will find in the present work the same wealth of large scholarship, wide research, independent criticism, mature judgment, and conscientious thoroughness. This history is largely confined to the opinions of the upper classes and little is made of the development among the common people, of the growth of language as the medium of communication, of the struggles of the majority to find a voice in the clash and conflict of the times, and of the persistent though slow movement toward the democratization of life. In saying this, let us hasten to add that the author's purpose was to set forth the divers sentiments of this alluring time, "as they expressed themselves in scholarship and literature, in philosophy and science, and in religious reform." Judged as a selective rather than a comprehensive history, these two volumes help to an understanding of the Renaissance-Reformation period, which reaped the sowing of former days and in turn sowed generously on fertile soil for the harvest of later generations.

Dr. Smith's volume, on the other hand, makes much of the economic changes which preceded and accompanied the Reformation. He thus throws much needed light on the reflex influences of economic purposes and struggles upon the welfare and wellbeing of peoples. The chapters on "Social Conditions," "The Capitalistic Revolution," "Main Currents of Thought," and "The Temper of the Times" reveal a state of affairs whose importance only recent study has tended to emphasize. The problems they suggest were vital in affecting religious character and conduct. A knowledge how these were faced will give us a better understanding of our own baffling situations. We have indeed traveled a long distance from those days when the average family had twelve and the poor wife was a drudge. We are amazed that it was possible for Luther to remark without protest from anyone: "If women bear children until they become sick and eventually die, that does no harm. Let them bear children till they die of it; that is what they are for" (p. 509). After reading these chapters, you will be better able to answer the question, whether the world is growing better, and meet the ignorant assertions of a type of piety which fails to maintain the forward look and seems to be in-

capable of distinguishing between traditionalism which is domination by the past and tradition which is respect for the past.

The great distinction of the sixteenth century was that it cast off external authority and asserted the rights of freedom based on reason. The causes that led to this climax and other relevant considerations engage the informed attention of these two writers. "The ways of human progress in knowledge," says Taylor, "are continuous beneath the apparently broken surface of the road. Thoughts may seem new and methods novel, but within them as their efficient moving core lies the self-transmission of the past, the moving content of knowledge and forms of thought and expression, as well as the impulse to perpetuate and add to it" (2: 308). However convenient as an aid to memory, we should see to it that the division of history into chronological periods is not allowed to interfere with historical continuity and synthesis. As Benedetto Croce puts it in his recent study on *History, Its Theory and Practice*, "To think history is certainly to divide it into periods, because thought is organism, dialectic, drama, and as such has its periods, its beginning, its middle, and its end, and all the other ideal pauses that a drama implies and demands. But those pauses are ideal and therefore inseparable from thought, with which they are one, as the shadow is one with the body, silence with sound: they are identical and changeable with it" (p. 112). Taylor's history is written in accordance with this conception. It is divided into five books: "The Humanism of Italy; Erasmus and Luther; The French Mind; England; Philosophy and Science." The discussion is largely biographical, and there passes before the reader an impressive procession of distinguished names of those whose contributions are appraised with unusual ability of understanding and appreciation. Petrarch, Boccaccio, Valla, Lorenzo, Marsiglio, Guicciardini, Raphael, Angelico, Botticelli, Reuchlin, Mirandola, Nicholas of Lyra, Wessel, Ruysbroeck, Tauler, Huss, Carlstadt, Commynes, Casaubon, Rabelais, Colet, Ascham, Cartwright, Raleigh, Marlowe, Vesalius, Tycho Brahe, and other celebrities. Alas! these are mostly names to many of us, and yet let us remember with gratitude that we without them would be sadly imperfect. Some of them are placed on a large canvas and their full-length portraits have perspective and color. Others are cameo sketches. If space permitted, some of the concise characterizations would be quoted, but for these and much else the author must be allowed to speak for himself. Read the two chapters on Luther and you will have a clear conception of his dynamic character, given to violent wrath and impulsive sympathy in quick succession. Then compare him with Erasmus the rationalist, Melancthon the moralist, Zwingli the eclectic, Calvin the logician, and you will understand how Luther was a Providential man, to turn the tides of the human race toward freedom.

The closing chapter on "The Sixteenth Century Achievement" is a readable summary, with a preliminary rapid review of what we owe to Greek culture, Roman law, Hebrew religion, and the gospel of Jesus. "From the point of view of the power and adequacy and beauty of its

expression, the sixteenth century may be regarded as the crown of previous growth." An exception is, however, made in the realm of science where "all was brave inception, but as yet too crude to admit of finished statements." Turn next to Smith's chapter on "The Reformation Interpreted." It is a masterly critical exposition of the four schools of historical writers on the Reformation, followed by a constructive estimate of this movement—its causes and effects on religious, political, and social life, and of the Catholic reaction. Our obligations are well expressed in these sentences: "The Reformation did not give *our* answer to the many problems it was called upon to face; nevertheless it gave the solution demanded and accepted by the time, and therefore historically the valid solution. With all its limitations it was, fundamentally, a step forward and not the return to an earlier standpoint,* either to that of primitive Christianity, as the Reformers themselves claimed, or to the dark ages, as has been latterly asserted" (p. 750). The call, then, is clear to go forward; and what direction we take will in no small measure be determined by our knowledge of what has hitherto been accomplished. Hence the imperative need for a close and comprehensive study of history.

Going back to other parts of Taylor's work, we are impressed by the industrious research required in writing such chapters as "Italian Self-Expression in Painting"; "Self-Expression Through Translation and Appropriation"; "Anatomy, Physiology, and Disease"; "The Revolution in Astronomy and Physics." Book II on "Erasmus and Luther" is a discerning exposition of the strength and weakness of the Reformation, with pertinent observations on modern Protestantism. Of special interest to us of the Puritan lineage is Book IV with chapters on Wyclif, Latimer, Puritan Doctrine, Richard Hooker the Anglican *Via Media*. These recall the moral and spiritual forces that molded economic and social life. The two strains preparatory to the English Reformation were "the self-assertion of the English realm against papal encroachments," and, "the protest of an evangelical and independent conscience against an ecclesiastical authority which seemed both irrational and unjustified by the faith of Christ" (2: 21). Separate chapters are found in Smith on lands where the Reformation gained a strong foothold. That on "The Counter-Reformation" unfolds the militant versatility of Romanism, with which Protestantism must always reckon.

Both these writers trace the origin and growth of ideas. As these found utterance in the sixteenth century they became the basis for yet other ideas, which were modified or enriched by the steady growth of science and knowledge. There also appeared sinister beliefs, the inevitable heritage of the rank and rampant superstitions which flourished in the underbrush of civilization. Taylor remarks that they can rarely be dispelled by direct argument. "It is rather through a general change or advance in the sum total of the intellectualities of an individual or of an epoch that these beliefs are sloughed off as dead or inconsistent elements, which will no longer operate in harmony with the rest of the mental organism" (2: 327). He quotes with approval a remark by Bishop Pecock,

who opposed the Lollards, to the effect that heresy was rife among the laity because of the dearth of clergy learned in logic, moral philosophy, and divinity, to expound Scripture (2: 46). How true this is in our own day of the riotous prevalence of poisonous "isms," which undermine the faith of the half-educated in our churches. Most urgent is the call for a teaching pulpit. No amount of institutional activities in the name of the church can ever make up for this central necessity. We are indebted to both these writers for setting the issue before us with such striking ability.

SIDE READING

In addition to the extensive bibliography in Smith's volume, reference should be made to a descriptive article by him on "A Decade of Luther Study" in the Harvard Theological Review for April, 1921.

For further information about books on subjects of interest to preachers, address this department, *Reading Course*, care of the METHODIST REVIEW, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

OSCAR L. JOSEPH.

WHO'S WHO IN THE REVIEW

No one was more intimate with the personal and thought-life of BORDEN PARKER BOWNE than Bishop Francis John McConnell, D.D., LL.D., now in charge of the Pittsburgh Area of the Methodist Episcopal Church. A brief biography of Professor BOWNE will be found at the end of the posthumous article by him in this number of the METHODIST REVIEW. The contributors to the symposium of appreciations to Bowne and his philosophy are introduced to our readers at the close of each of their tributes.

P. WHITWELL WILSON, an English journalist, formerly a member of the British Parliament, and the author of such unforgettable books as *The Christ We Forget* and *The Church We Forget*, has been in attendance on the Washington Conference for Disarmament and therefore can discuss it with the knowledge of a journalist and the insight of a Christian.

JAMES CHAMBERLAIN BAKER, D.D., head of the Wesley Foundation at the University of Illinois, continues his study of the Interchurch Steel Strike Report, which he began in the REVIEW of May-June, 1921.

BERTRAND M. TIPPLE, D.D., President Collegio Internazionale, Monte Mario, Rome, Italy, probably has no peer as to knowledge of political and religious conditions in Italy from a Methodist and American standpoint.

The Rev. FRED D. GEALY, Methodist minister at Townville, Pa., interestingly discusses the Fourth Gospel in the department of Biblical Research. He has been a pupil of Professor Adolph Deissmann, University of Berlin, one of the greatest living New Testament scholars.

Owing to the space given to Bowne material, the editor has been compelled to greatly circumscribe the Notes and Discussions in this number.

